THE CHARACTER OF MAN.

OR,

His Nature exactly displayed, in a Philosophicall Discourse, by the Learned

NEMESIUS.

Now made English.

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To the Reader.

Courteous Readers,

THis Book, which directs you to the knowledge of your Human Natures, (which ought to be your continuall ſtudies) was Originally written in Greek, by the knowing Pen of Nemeſius, ſirnamed the Philoſopher, one of the chiefeſt Luminaries in the Antient Church. To praiſe this Piece, were to derogate from its worth, the Title carrying the beſt commendation. Cenſure it if you pleaſe;

pleaſe; but let your judgments be ſquared by reaſon, not byas'd by common opinion, which commonly raiſeth thoſe things to the greateſt, which merit the leaſt eſtimation.

Farewell.

NEMESIVS
of the Nature of MAN.

CAP. I. SECT. I.

I. *The* Definition of *MAN: A* quære *touching the* Understanding; *and the opinions of* Plotinus, Apollinarius, Aristotle *&* Plato *concerning the SOVL & BODY of MAN.* II. *MAN partaking in somewhat with every* Creature, *is a* medium *knitting together the whole* Creation, *& a manifestation of the* Unity *of the CREATOR of all things.* III. *The Agreement, and comely order of GOD'S* Works, *of all which MAN is the true* Epitome.

GOod men, (and of those nor a few) have defined *Man* to consist of an *Vn-*

derſtanding Soul and a *Body*; and ſo true is this *Definition*, that it may ſeeme he could not otherwiſe be, well, *defined*. Yet, when wee terme him an *Vnderſtanding ſoul*, it may appeare doubtfull to ſome, whether the *Vnderſtanding* comming to the *ſoul* (as one diſtinct thing comes to another) did beget *Vnderſtanding* in the *Soul*; Or, whether the *Soul* doth naturally contain in it ſelf this *underſtanding*, as the moſt excellent part thereof; and, as being the ſame to the *Soul*, which the *Eie* is to the *Body*.

There be ſome, (and of this opinion is *Plotinus*) who thinking the *Soul* to be

be one thing, and the *Body* another, doe therefore affirme, that MAN is compoſed of theſe three, a *Soul*, a *Body*, and *Vnderſtanding*. Of this mind alſo was *Apollinarius* Biſhop of *Laodicea*: For, having laid this, as the *Foundation* of his own opinion, he made the reſt of his Building agreeable to the ſame *Groundwork*.

Others there are who divide not the *Vnderſtanding* from the *Soul* in this manner; but ſuppoſe rather, that the *Vnderſtanding* is a *principall* of the *Soules* eſſence. *Ariſtotle* conjectures that a certain *potentiall underſtanding* was made together

with MAN, which might become *actuall* in time; and that the *understanding* which commeth to us from *without*, (and whereby we acquire an *actuall knowledge*) pertains not to the naturall Essence of the *Soul*; but, assisteth in the *knowledge* and *speculation* of things: By which means it comes to passe, that very few, or none, but men addicted to the study of *wisdome*, are thought capable of this *Actuall understanding*.

PLATO seems to affirm that MAN consists not of a *double essence*; that is to say, joyntly of a *Soul* and a *Body*: but rather, that he is a *soul*, using (as it were

In-

Inſtrumentally) ſuch a *Body*: and perhaps by fixing the mind upon that only, which is the moſt excellent part of *Man*, he ſeeks to draw us to ſuch a ſerious conſideration of our ſelves (and of the divine nature) as might win us, the better, to purſue *vertue*, *godlineſſe*, and ſuch *good things* as are in the *Soul*: or elſe by perſwading that we are (eſſentially) nothing elſe but *ſoul*, hee would, peradventure, allure us to renounce the deſires of the *Body*, as things not primarily pertinent to MAN as MAN; but, chiefely belonging to him, as he is a *living creature*; and ſo, by conſe-

quence, appertaining to him as he is a *Man*, in regard *Man* is a *living-creature*.

And it is indeed confeſſed (not much otherwiſe) of all men, that the *ſoul* is far more to be eſteemed then the *body*: and that the *body* is but as it were an *Inſtrument* moved by the *ſoul*, as is evident in *death*. For if thereby the *ſoul* be divided from the *body*, it is immediately as much without motion, as a Workmans *Tools* when hee hath caſt them aſide.

II. This is manifeſt, that MAN in ſome things participates with *creatures void of life*; and that he is partaker

partaker alſo of *life*, as thoſe *living-creatures* be, which are *unreaſonable*: and that he is indowed likewiſe with *underſtanding*, as are *Creatures reaſonable*. With *inanimate creatures Man* partakes in this, that he hath a *Body*, and in his mixture of the *foure Elements*. He agrees with *Plants*, not onely in that which is afore-mentioned, but in having alſo both a *nouriſhing* and a *feeding-power*. His coherence with *unreaſonable Creatures* (over and above all the former particulars) is, in having a certaine *voluntary motion*, *appetite*, *anger*, and a *power* enabling him to *feele* and *breathe*:

for all these are common both to *Men* and *unreasonable creatures*. Furthermore, he communicates with *Intelligent incorporeall Natures*, in *reasoning*, *understanding*, *judging*, and in pursuing *vertue* and a *good life*, which is the chief end of all *vertues*.

These things considered, MAN standeth in such a *Being* as comprehends the *sensible* and *intelligible Nature*. In respect of his *Bodily powers*, and of his *Bodily substance* (which is subject unto *sense*) hee agrees both with *living-creatures*, and with things *void of life*. In respect of his *Reasonable part* he communicates with *Substances* which

which are *bodileſſe* (or *ſpirituall*) as hath been ſaid before: For, GOD the *Creator* of all things, hath ſeemed by little and little ſo to collect and knit together ſundry *differing natures*, that all *created things* ſhould become ONE. And indeed, it will be a manifeſt proofe unto us, that there is but *One Creator* of all things, if we well conſider how fitly he hath united the *ſubſtance* of *individuall things* by their particular parts; and all the ſeverall *ſpecies* (thorowout the world) by an excellent *ſympathie*.

III. For, as in every *living creature* hee hath joyned the parts *inſenſible* with

ſuch as have *ſenſe* in them (as *bones*, *fatt*, *haire*, (and other *inſenſible* parts) to the *fleſh* and *ſinewes* (which are ſenſible) compounding the *Living-creature* both of *ſenſible* and *inſenſible* portions; and declaring that all theſe together make but one *living-creature*: Even ſo he hath joyned one to another, every particular *ſpecies* which was created, by *ordering* and *compounding* that *agreement* and *diſagreement* which is in their natures; In ſo much that things *inanimate* doe not greatly differ from *Plants* which have in them a *vegitative* and *nouriſhing life*; neither are *Plants* wholy differing

differing from *ſenſible living creatures void of reaſon*; nor are thoſe *unreaſonable creatures* ſo alienated in all things from *creatures* indowed with *reaſon*, as that they have no naturall allyance or ſimilitude, whereby they may be linked one to another.

For even in *ſtones* (which are *inanimate creatures*, not having in them, for the moſt part, ſo much as a *vegitative life*) there is otherwiſe a certaine *power*, making them to differ from each other even in their *ſtony properties*: but the *Loadſtone* ſeemeth very far to exceed the nature and vertue of other *ſtones*, in that it both attracts

tracts *Iron* thereunto, and alſo detaineth it (being ſo attracted) as if it would be nouriſhed thereby. Neither doth it exerciſe this vertue upõ one peece of *Iron* alone; but, by that one peece, linketh faſt another, and imparteth his owne power to all other peeces which are contiguous thereunto: yea *Iron* draweth *Iron*, when it is touched by the *Loadſtone*.

Moreover, when the *CREATOR* paſſed from *Plants* to *living-creatures*, he ruſhed not (as we may ſay) all at once, into things whoſe nature is to *remove from place to place*; and, to ſuch as are indowed with *ſenſe*: but, he pro-

proceeded, rather, by degrees, and by a naturall and moſt comely progreſſion. For, the Shell-fiſhes called *Pinnæ*, and *Vrticæ*, are ſo made as if they were certain *Plants*, having *ſenſe* in them. For, he faſtned them in the Sea with *roots*, and covered them alſo with ſhells as with *bark*. And, as therein he made them to participate with *Plants*; ſo, he gave them likewiſe (in ſome meaſure) the *feeling-ſenſe*, which is common to *living-creatures*. They agree with *Plants* in being *rooted* and *fixed*, and they communicate with *living-creatures* in their *feeling*. In like manner the *Sponge* (though

(though it be rooted in the Rocks) is of it ſelf, *opened* and contracted, according as the paſſenger approcheth toward it, or departeth frõ it. And therefore, *Wiſe men* have anciently termed ſuch things Ζωόφυτα, in Engliſh, *Life-plants*, if by a new word I may ſo name that which is partly a *living-creature*, and partly a *Plant*.

After the Fiſhes called *Pinnæ*, he proceeded unto thoſe, which (being unable to paſſe far from their ſtation) doe move onely to and fro within ſome certaine ſpace, ſuch as are the moſt part of thoſe, which have *ſhells*, and are called the *bowels of the earth*.

earth. He went further, and added (in the like maner,) ſomething to every thing in particular (as to ſome things more *ſenſes*; and to ſome other, more abiiity to remove themſelves from *place* to *place*;) and, came next to thoſe *unreaſonable-creatures* which are *more-perfect*. Thoſe, I call *more-perfect-creatures*, which have obtained all the *ſenſes*, and, can alſo remove themſelves to places far diſtant.

And when GOD paſſed from *unreaſonable-creatures* to MAN (a Creature indowed with *Reaſon*) he did not perfect him in *himſelf*, (and, as it were, all

all at once;) but, first, ingraffed into some other *living-creatures*, certain naturall *wiles*, *sleights*, and *devises* for the saving of themselves, which, make them seeme to be almost *reasonable-creatures*: And, having done all this, he, then, brought forth MAN, which is, indeed, the true *Reasonable-Creature*.

The same *Order* (if it bee well considered) will appeare in the *Voice*, which from the *noise* of *Horses* & *Oxen* is brought, by little and little, from one plaine simple *sound*, unto the *voices* of *Crowes* and *Nightingales*, (whose *voices* consisting of many *notes*, can imitate what they

they are taught) and, ſo, by degrees it is terminated in the Articulate *voice* of MAN, which is diſtinct and perfect.

Furthermore hee made the various expreſſions of the *Tongue* to depend upon the *Minde*, and upon *Reaſon*; ordaining the *ſpeech* to publiſh forth the motions of the *Minde*: And, in this wiſe, by a ſweet Muſicall proportion, hee (collecting all things together) incorporated *all* into ONE; as well, things *Intelligible*, as things *viſible*, and, made MAN as a meanes thereunto.

SECT.

SECT. 2.

I. *Why* MAN *was firſt made, and why he hath in him ſomewhat of the Nature of all* Creatures. II. *MAN is the* Bounder *between* viſible *and* Intellectuall *things, and becomes either an* Earthly *or* Spirituall *MAN, according as he is inclined to* Good *or* Evill. *A diſtinction between the* Goods *of the* Mind *and* Body; *and betweene the* life *of* MAN *as he is* Man, *and as he is meerly a* living creature. III. *The opinion of the* Hebrews *touching the* mortality *and* immortality of MAN.

Theſe

THeſe things conſidered, *Moſes* in expreſſing the Creation of the World, did very properly affirme that MAN was laſt made. Not only, becauſe all things being made for MAN, it was moſt convenient, that all ſuch things ought firſt to bee provided, which were neceſſarily pertinent to his uſe; and that he who was to have the uſe of them, ſhould afterward be created: But, in reſpect both *intellectuall* and *viſible ſubſtances*, were created, it ſeemed alſo convenient that *One* ſhould be made, by whom thoſe two *Natures* ſhould be ſo united together, that the whole

World

World might become ONE; and be in it owne ſelfe ſo agreeable, that the ſame might not bee at variance, or eſtranged from it ſelfe. Even to this end, was MAN made ſuch a *living-creature*, as might joyne together both *Natures*, and (to ſumme up all in a word) therein was manifeſted the admirable wiſdome of the univerſall *CREATOR*.

II. NOW MAN being placed (as it were) in the *Bounds* betweene the *Reaſonable-nature*, and that which is *Irrationall*; if he incline to the *Bodie*, ſetling the maine part of his affectiō upon corporal things; he chuſeth and embraceth the

the life of *unreaſonable creatures*; and, for that cauſe, ſhall be numbred among them, and be called (as Saint *Paul* terms him) *An earthly MAN*, to whom it ſhall be thus ſaid, *Earth thou art, and to Earth thou ſhalt returne*: yea by this meanes he becomes (as the *Pſalmiſt* affirms) like the *Beaſt which hath no underſtanding*. But, if he incline rather to the *Reaſonable* part, and contemning *Bodily* luſts and pleaſures, ſhall make choice to follow that bleſſed and divine life which is moſt agreeable unto MAN, he ſhall, then, be accounted a *Heavenly MAN*, according to that ſaying;

Such

Such as the earth is, ſuch are they that are earthly; ſuch as the heavenly are, ſuch are they that are heavenly: and indeed that which principally pertaineth unto the *Reaſonable-Nature*, is to avoid and oppoſe *Evill*, and love and follow that which is *Good*.

Of *Good things* ſome are common both to the *Soul* and to the *Body* (of which ſort the *Vertues* are) and theſe have a relation unto the *Soul*, in reſpect of the uſe which it maketh of the Body, being joyned thereunto.

Some *good things* pertaine to the *ſoul* only, by it ſelf, (ſo that it ſhould not need the help of the *body*)

as

as *godlineſſe*, and the *Contemplation of the nature of things*: and therefore ſo many as are deſirous to live the life of MAN as he is a MAN, (and not onely in that he is a *living creature*) do apply themſelves to *Vertue* and *Piety*. But we will anon ſhew diſtinctly what things pertain to *Vertue*, and what to *Piety*, when we come to diſcourſe of the *Soul* and of the *Body*: For, ſeeing wee doe not yet know what our *Soul* is in reſpect of the *ſubſtance* thereof, it is not yet convenient for us to treat here, of thoſe things that are wrought by it.

III. The *Hebrewes* affirme that

that MAN was made from the beginning, neither altogether *mortall*, neither wholly *immortall*, but, as it were, in a ſtate betweene both thoſe *natures*, to the end that if he did follow the affections of the *body*, he ſhould be liable to ſuch alterations as belong to the *bodie*; But if he did prefer ſuch good things as pertaine to the *ſoul*, he ſhould then be honoured with *Immortalitie*. For, if GOD had made MAN abſolutely *mortall* from the beginning, he would not have condemned him to die after he had offended; becauſe it had beene a thing needleſſe to make him *mortall* by condemnation,

tion, who was *mortall* before. And on the other ſide, if he had made *Man* abſolutely *immortall*, hee would not have cauſed him to ſtand in need of *nouriſhment*; for, nothing that is *immortall* needeth *bodily nouriſhment*.

Moreover, it is not to be beleeved, that *God* would ſo haſtily have repented himſelf, and made *Him* to be forthwith *mortall*, who was created abſolutely *immortall*: For it is evident that he did not ſo in the *Angels* that ſinned, but (according to the nature which they obtained from the beginning) they remained *immortall*, undergoing for their of-

fences, not the penalty of *Death*, but of ſome other puniſhment. It is better therefore, either to be of the firſt mentioned opinion touching this matter; or, elſe, thus to think, that MAN was indeed created *mortall*, but, yet, in ſuch wiſe that if hee were perfected by a vertuous and pious *progreſſion*, he might become *immortall*: that is to ſay, he was made ſuch a One, as had in him a potentiall abilitie to become *immortall*.

SECT.

SECT. 3.

I. *Our* Author *ſheweth why the* Tree *of* knowledge *of* good *and* evill *was forbidden; & that it was, at firſt, expedient for MAN to be ignorant of his owne* Nature. II. *MAN by the* Tranſgreſſion, *attained that knowledge of* himſelfe, *which diverted him from the* way of perfection *and* Immortalitie. III. *The* Elementarie *compoſition and nouriſhment of* Mans *bodie: The reaſons alſo why it needed* feeding, clothing, curing, *&c. and why MAN was made a* Creature

ſenſible, *and capable of* Arts *and* Sciences, *&c.*

IT being inexpedient, rather then any way helpful, for MAN to know his own *nature*, before he came to his *perfection*, GOD forbad him to taſte the *Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill:* For there were, and doubtleſſe as yet there are very great vertues in *Plants*; but at the firſt, (in reſpect it was in the beginning of the worlds Creation) their vertues being *(before the curſe)* pure and void of all mixture, had in them a ſtrong operation: and it is not therefore ſtrange that there ſhould be *(by Gods pro-*

providence) the taſte of a certain *Tree*, that ſhould have a power given to ingender in our firſt *parents*, the knowledge of their own nature.

The cauſe why *God* would not have MAN to know his owne *nature*, before hee had attained to *perfection*, was this: leſt he knowing himſelf to ſtand in need of many things, ſhould (*as by the ſequell we find it manifeſt*) labour only to ſupply the wants of his *Body*, and utterly caſt away the care of his *Soul*; and for this cauſe did God forbid him to taſt of the fruit of *knowledge* of *good* and *evill*.

By diſobeying this *Com-* II.

mandement, MAN attained to the knowledge of *Himſelf*, but thereby fell from the ſtate of growing to *perfection*, and buſied himſelf in taking care for ſuch things as the *body* needed: For (according to the words of *Moſes*) as ſoone as he had eaten, *He knew that he was naked*, and immediatly ſought about to get a covering for his nakedneſſe: whereas, till then, God kept him as it were in a Traunce, and in ſuch caſe that hee knew not *himſelf*.

When hee fell away from the ſtate of growing to *perfection*, hee fell alſo from his *immortalitie*, which by the mercy of his *Crea-*

Creator he ſhall recover againe at the laſt. In the meane time it was granted him that hee ſhould eat fleſh (whereas before his *fall*, God willed him to bee content with ſuch things only as grew out of the earth, all which hee had provided for him in *Paradiſe*) yea the firſt meanes of growing to *perfection* being become deſperate, it was permitted him to feed as hee would.

III. Now, ſeeing *Man* conſiſteth of a *Bodie* (*as of one of his parts*) and ſeeing every (*inferiour compound*) *bodie* is compoſed of the foure *Elements*, it is neceſſary that ſuch things

ſhould happen unto him, as the *Elements* are ſubject unto; That is to ſay, *Cutting*, *mutation* and *flowing*. By *mutation* I mean *mutation in Qualitie*; and I terme it *Flowing* when he is emptied or purged of ſuch things as are in him. For a *living creature* hath alway his evacuations, both by ſuch pores as are manifeſtly ſeene, and by ſuch alſo as we ſee not; whereof I ſhall ſpeake hereafter.

It is neceſſary therefore, that ſo much ſhould be *taken in* again, as was *evacuated*; ſeeing elſe, the *living creature* would periſh through defect of what ſhould re-enter to ſupply

ſupply the want: And (if the things *evacuated* be either *dry*, or *moiſt*, or *ſpirits*) it is as neceſſary that the *living creature* ſhould have a continuall ſupply of dry and moiſt nouriſhments, and of ſpirits.

The meats and drinks which wee receive, are made of thoſe *Elements*, whereof we alſo are compoſed: for every thing is nouriſhed with what is agreeable and like unto it, and (*in diſeaſes*) we are cured with what is contrary (to the diſeaſe.)

There be ſome of the *Elements* which we ſometime receive into our Bodies immediately of themſelves;

ſelves; and ſometime uſe means unto the receiving of them; as for example, we ſomtime receive *water* of it ſelf; ſometime wee uſe Wine and Oyle, and all thoſe that are called moiſt fruits, as means to the receiving of *water*. For *wine* is nothing elſe but a certain *water* comming from the *Vine*, and ſo or ſo qualified. In like manner we partake of *Fire* ſometime immediately, as when we are warmed by it; ſometime alſo by the means of ſuch things as we eate and drink: for all things containe in them ſome portion of *Fire*, more or leſſe. We are in like caſe partakers of *Aire*: either

either immediately when we breathe it, and have it ſpread round about us, or draw it in by our eating and drinking; or elſe by meanes of ſuch other things as we receive into us.

But as for the *Earth*, we ſeldome or never receive it immediately, but by certain *meanes*. For, we eate the corn which commeth of the *earth*. Larks, Doves, and Partridges feed oftentimes upon the earth; but *Man* uſually feedeth on the earth by the means of ſeeds, fruits, berries, and by the fleſh which proceedeth from things nouriſhed by the *Earth*.

And

And foraſmuch as God reſpecting not onely a *decencie*, but alſo the furniſhing of us with a very quick ſenſe of *feeling*, (in which man exceedeth all other *living creatures*) he hath clothed us neither with a tough *skin* as Oxen and other beaſts, that have a thicke hide; neither with large thicke ſet *haire*, as goats, hares, and ſheepe; neither with *ſcales*, as fiſhes and ſerpents; neither with *hard ſhells*, as Tortoiſes and Oyſters; neither with a more *fleſhie bark*, as Lobſters; neither with *feathers*, as birds; and therefore (*wanting theſe coverings*) it is neceſſary wee ſhould

ſhould have *Raiment*, to ſupply that in us, which *nature* hath beſtowed on other *living creatures*.

Theſe are the cauſes why wee ſtand in need of *nouriſhment* and *clothing*: And not onely for the ſame ends are our *houſes* become neceſſary; but alſo that wee may eſcape the violence of wilde beaſts, which is none of their leaſt commodities.

Moreover (by reaſon of the diſtemperature of *qualities* in the *humane body*) *Phyſitians* and their art are likewiſe needfull, that thereby (as often as occaſion requires) thoſe things which are rent aſunder, may be faſtned againe

gaine together for the preſervation of health. And whereas the alteration conſiſteth in the *quality*, it is neceſſary that wee bring the ſtate of the *body* to a juſt *temperature* by the *contrary Quality*: For, it is not the *Phyſitians* purpoſe (as ſome think) to coole the Bodie which hath beene in a heat, but to change it into a *temperate eſtate*; ſeeing if they ſhould coole it, the diſeaſe turneth (*not to health, but*) to the contrary *ſickneſſe*.

Now in regard of *Arts* and *Sciences*, (and by the neceſſarie uſe which we have of ſuch things as they accompliſh) it ſo com-

commeth to paſſe that we need the mutuall aſſiſtance one of another, and by that need which wee have each of other, many of us aſſembling together in common, doe thereby the more conveniently bargaine and contract for ſuch things as may ſerve to ſupply the neceſſities of life.

This meeting and dwelling together, was anciently termed by the name of a *Citie*; by the neere neighbourhood whereof, men received aid and profit by each others *arts* & *labours*, without the diſcommodities of long and far Travaile. For, *Man* was naturally made

made to be ſuch a *living creature*, as ſhould be *ſociable*, & delighted in *neighbourhood*. And foraſmuch as men could not otherwiſe be ſo conveniently provided of uſeful things; it is evident that the ſtudy of *Arts*, and the neceſſity of *traffick* were the firſt occaſions of erecting *Cities*.

SECT.

SECT. 4.

I. *Of the two* Priviledges *which* MAN *hath obtained above all other* Creatures, *(viz.) to be capable of the* Forgivenes of ſinnes, *and* Immortalitie: *The* Juſtice *and* Mercy *of* GOD *in vouchſafing the pardon of ſinne to* MAN, *and denying the ſame to* Angels. II *Man only is a creature capable of learning* Arts *and* Sciences: *A* Definition *of* Man, *and Reaſons juſtifying every branch of that* Definition. III. *The* World *was not made for the* Angels, *nor for any other, but* MAN *onely.*

To

To him was committed the government of the Vniverſe, with a limitation to uſe, not abuſe the Creatures.

THere are alſo two *Priviledges* which *Man* hath ſpecially gotten above all other. One is, to obtaine *pardon* by *Repentance*; the other is that his *body* being *mortall* ſhould be brought to *immortalitie*. This (*priviledge*) of the *body*, he getteth by meanes of the *ſoul*; and the priviledge of the *ſoul*, by reaſon of the *bodie*: Yea, among *Reaſonable creatures*, *Man* only hath obtained this *Peculiar*, that God vouchſafeth him

him the pardon of ſin upon repentance; For neither the *Devils* nor the Angels are vouchſafed *pardon*, though they doe repent.

Hereby the moſt exact *Iuſtice*, and admirable *mercy*, of GOD is both fully proved and evidently declared: For, good cauſe is there why pardon ſhould not bee granted to *Angels*, though they doe repent; becauſe there is nothing in them, which naturally allures or draws them to ſin; and in regard alſo that they (of their own nature) are free from all paſſions, wants, and pleaſures of the *body*.

But MAN, though hee be

be indowed with *Reaſon*, yet hee is alſo a *bodily living creature*, and therefore his wants (in that hee is ſuch a *living creature*) together with his *paſſions*, do often blinde and captivate his *reaſon*. And therefore (when he returnes againe by *repentance*, and applies himſelfe unto *vertue*) he obtaineth *mercy* and *forgiveneſſe*: For as it is proper to the *Eſſence* of MAN to have the ability of *laughing* (becauſe it agreeth to *man only*, *to all men*, and *ever to man*) ſo (in reſpect of thoſe things, which proceed from the *grace* of *God*) it is proper unto *Man* above all *Creatures* indued with

with Reaſon, to bee delivered, by *Repentance*, from the accuſation and guiltineſſe of all thoſe things wherein he hath formerly tranſgreſſed. Yea, this *Grace* is given to MAN *onely*; *to all men*; and *ever to man*, during the continuance of his life in this world, and no longer: for after *Death* there is no more *Forgiveneſſe*.

Some there bee who give a reaſon why the *Angels* could no more obtaine *pardon by repentance* after they had fallen; and it is this that followes. The *Fall of Angels*, was (*as they affirme*) a kind of *Death* unto them; and God vouchſafed them the tender

render of a pardon before their utter *falling away*, when like account was to bee made of them, as is made of *Men* during this *life*: But becauſe they accepted not the *grace* offered, they received afterward (as a juſt reward) puniſhment everlaſting without *pardon*. And hereby it plainly appeares that ſuch as refuſe *Repentance*, doe reject that which is a ſpeciall good gift of God, and peculiar to MAN.

This alſo is one of the things proper and peculiar unto MAN, that of all other *living creatures* only the *body* of MAN ſhould ariſe againe after *Death*, and

and aſpire to *Immortalitie*. This priviledge the *body* gaineth in reſpect of the *immortalitie* of the *ſoule*; as likewiſe the *ſoule* obtaineth the other (that is to ſay, *pardon after Repentance*) in reſpect that the *Body*, is weake and troubled with many *paſſions*.

II. It is a thing proper alſo, to MAN only, to learn *Arts* and *Sciences*, and to worke according unto ſuch *Arts*: For which cauſe they who define him, ſay thus; MAN *is a living Creature, indued with Reaſon, mortall, capable of Conſideration and Science.*

He is tearmed a *living-creature*, in that he is a *ſubſtance* having *life* indued with

with *ſenſe*: for, that is the *definition* of a *living-creature*.

He is ſaid to be indued with *Reaſon*, that hee may be diſtinguiſhed from *unreaſonable-creatures*.

He is called *mortall*, to make a difference betwixt him and the *Reaſonable-creatures*, that are *immortall*.

And, this clauſe [*capable of Conſideration & Science*] is added thereunto, becauſe wee come to *Arts* and *Sciences* by learning of them; having in us naturally a certaine potentiall ability to receive both *underſtanding* and *Arts*; but, not actually attaining them ſave by ſtudy and practiſe. There

There be ſome, who ſay that this laſt clauſe was lately added to the *Definition*; and, that it had beene good enough without the ſame, were it not, that ſome bring in their *Nymphes*, and other *petty Deities* of thoſe kinds, who are ſaid to live long, and yet not to be *immortall*; And to diſtinguiſh MAN from thoſe, theſe words, *Capable of conſideration and ſcience* were judged needfull; becauſe, none of that ſort are thought to *learne* any thing; but, to *know naturally*, whatſoever they are ſaid to *know*.

III. The *Iewes* are of opinion that the whole *World*

was made for MAN (even immediately for his ſake) as Oxen with other beaſts for tillage, or to bear burthens; and, as graſſe was made for the *Beaſts*. For, ſome things were made for their owne ſakes; and ſome for the ſakes of others. All *reaſonable-creatures* were made for their owne ſakes: *Vnreaſonable-creatures* and things *without life*, were ordained for others, not for themſelves.

Now, if ſuch things were made in reſpect of others, let us conſider for whom they were, indeed, created. Shall wee think they were made for the *Angels?* Doubtleſſe, no wiſe man will ſay that they

they were made for their ſakes; becauſe, the things made for the reſpect or ſake of another, muſt concern either the *making*, or the *continuance*, or the *recreation* of thoſe things for which they were made: For, they are made either in reſpect of the *propagation* and *ſucceſſion* of their kinde; or of their *nouriſhment*; or to *cover* them; or to *cure* them, or for their better *welfare* and *reſt*.

Now the *Angels* need no ſuch things; for, they neither have any *ſucceſſion* of their *kind*, neither want *clothing*, *bodily nouriſhment*, nor any thing elſe: And, if *Angels* have no need of

ſuch things, it is then evident that no other *nature* having place above the *Angels*; can have need of them; becauſe by how much higher the place of it is, ſo much the leſſe need hath it of ſupply or aſſiſtance from another.

This being ſo, we muſt ſeek out a *Nature* which is indued with *Reaſon*, and yet needeth ſuch things as are aforementioned; and what other *nature* can be found of that ſort, if MAN be paſſed over? Surely none: And if no other can be diſcovered, it followeth by good reaſon that both *things void of life*, and *unreaſonable creatures*, were made for the ſake of

of MAN; and if they were ordained for him (as it is evident they were) then, that was likewiſe the cauſe why he was conſtituted the *Governor* alſo of thoſe *creatures*.

Now, it is the duty of a *Governour*, to uſe thoſe things which are put under his government, in ſuch manner and meaſure as need and conveniencie ſhall require; and not to abuſe them untemperately, or to ſerve voluptuouſly his owne delicate Appetite. Neither ought he to bear himſelf tyrannouſly or ungently towards thoſe whom he governes. For, they that ſo doe (yea and they that uſe not merci-

fully, their *unreasonable-cattell*) are therein great Offenders; neither performing the part of a *Governour*, nor of a just man, according to that which is written, *The just man hath compassion upon the life of his Beast.*

SECT.

Sect. 5.

I. *It is here proved, that neither things* without-life, *nor the* unreasonable creatures, *were made for themselves; First, by arguments taken from the consideratiõ of the nature and use of things* without-life. II. *It is proved also by considering those creatures, which are* void of reason, *and which are (for the most part) very serviceable to MAN.* III. *And lastly, it is proved by considering those things which seeme to be rather harmfull then profitable to* Mankind.

BUt some perhaps will say, that nothing was

made in reſpect of another but every thing in reſpect of it *ſelfe*. Therefore, diſtinguiſhing firſt between things *inanimate* and thoſe that *have life*, let us obſerve whether things *void of life* are likely to have beene created onely for their *owne ſake*.

For if thoſe things were made in reſpect of *themſelves*, how, or upon what ſhould *living-creatures* feed? wee ſee that Nature out of the earth produceth food both of fruits, and of plants, to every *living-creature*, ſome few excepted, whoſe feeding is upon fleſh; yea, and thoſe creatures which are nouriſhed by eating fleſh,

fleſh, doe feed on ſuch beaſts as are ſuſtained by eating the fruits of the earth: For, Lions and Wolves, feed on Lambes, Goats, Harts, and Swine. Ægles alſo, and all ſorts of Hawkes, devoure Partridges, Doves, Hares, and ſuch like; which are fed with what ſpringeth out of the ground.

Moreover, the nature of thoſe *Fiſhes* which devoure one another, doth not ſo extend it ſelf to all fiſhes, that they do generally devoure the fleſh of one another; but it breaketh off in ſuch as eate weeds and ſuch other things as grow in the water. For, if all ſorts of fiſhes

had been inclined to eate the fleſh of one another, ſo that no kindes of them could feed on any thing elſe, but on the fleſh of themſelves, verily they could not have long continued (no not for a ſmall time) but would have beene utterly deſtroyed, ſome of them each by other, and the reſt for lacke of meat.

To the intent then, that it might not ſo happen, certaine *Fiſhes* were ſo made, that they might abſtaine from the fleſh of the reſt, and feed (if I may ſo tearme it) on the *graſſe of the Sea*, that, by them, the other ſorts of fiſhes might be preſerved. Theſe fiſhes

fiſhes feed upon weedes; other fiſhes feed upon them; Thoſe, againe, are food for other greater fiſhes. So, by the feeding on ſuch fiſhes as laſt of all doe eate the *weeds of the Sea*, (which come of the ſlimie waters) the ſubſtance of the reſt of the fiſhes is ſucceſſively continued.

Having reaſonably demonſtrated, that the *Plants* were not created in reſpect of themſelves, but in regard of the nouriſhment and nature both of *Men* & of other *living-creatures*, it will be thereby manifeſt that ſuch things alſo, were made in reſpect of *Man* and other

living-

living-creatures, which are meanes and causes of the encrease and preservation of those inferiour things: And if that be so, it will be as apparant that the motions of the *starres*, the *firmament*, the *seasons of the yeare*, the *showers*, and all such like things, were made in respect of those things *without life* afore-mentioned, and to the end that nourishment being continually administred unto them, the nature of such *fruits* might be perpetuated, and that *Men* and *living-creatures* also (for whom those were ordained) might bee preserved, by them.

II. It resteth now to consider

ſider whether the nature of *unreaſonable creatures*, was made in reſpect of it ſelfe, or for MAN's cauſe: and ſure, it cannot but be very abſurd, to affirme that *things incapable of underſtanding*, and living only by an inſtinct of *Nature* (yea, things groveling toward the earth, and by their very ſhape declaring their bondage) ſhould be brought into the world for their owne ſake. Much might be ſpoken to prove the contrary, even ſo much as would ſpin out this one point to the length of a *Treatiſe*, if I ſhould handle the ſame at large, and therefore I will briefly mention in this place,

place, thoſe things onely which are of greateſt weight.

By ſeriouſly conſidering (as it were in a glaſſe or image) thoſe things which are *without us* by ſuch things as are *within us*, we ſhould make a plain demonſtration hereof; yea, and by conſidering the very *ſubſtance* of the things themſelves, which are in queſtion. For, if wee ponder in our minde that part of *our ſelves*, which is *irrationall*, and the parts thereof (I mean *appetite* and *anger*, which are ordained to ſerve the *Reaſonable part*) wee ſhall there ſee, that *Reaſon* ruleth, and that the *unreaſonable-*

nable-parts, are ruled; that *Reaſon* commandeth, and that the other are commanded, and ſerviceable to ſuch uſes, as *Reaſon* will have them to bee ſubject unto; if MAN preſerve that cõdition which doth naturally appertaine unto him.

Now then, if our *part* which is *reaſonable* doth beare rule over our *unreaſonable-parts*, which are *within us*; ſeemeth it not much more probable, that our *reaſonable-part* ſhould have dominion over ſuch *unreaſonable-things* as are *without us*? and that ſuch things were ordained to ſerve our neceſſities? eſpecially ſeeing it is according

ding to the law of Nature that the *unreaſonable* ſhold be ſubject to the *reaſonable*, as hath beene declared by thoſe things which are *in our ſelves?*

This may bee further manifeſted, by conſidering that divers creatures are made even fit for the neceſſary ſervices of MAN. For, Oxen and all bearing cattell are naturally fitted for the tillage of the earth, and for bearing of burthens. Sundry other beaſts of the field alſo, and many fiſhes and foules, for dainty feeding, yea, and *ſinging birds* for our delight and recreation.

III. And albeit all things doe

doe not alwayes ſerve to ſuch pleaſing uſes, but that there are ſome which may ſeeme rather to harm and deſtroy *man*; it is to be conſidered that when thoſe things were created, the ſpeciall end of whoſe creation was at firſt for *man's* ſervice; all other things which might be otherwiſe uſefull were then created alſo, that in the *Creation* there might bee no defect, or want of ſuch things whereof there might bee afterward any uſe.

Neither were ſuch things as are now accounted harmfull, exempted utterly from the profitable fruition of *man*; but, he

he by reaſon, doth, or may, fruitfully employ to his advantage, even the moſt venomous things. For, hee uſeth poiſonous creatures to the curing of ſuch harmes as come by thoſe, and other venomous beaſts, and to the curing of many infirmities other wayes occaſioned. Such are the *confections* called θηριακαὶ (whereof our *Triacle* is one ſort) which reaſon hath invented, that by their owne power thoſe things might be made to cõquer themſelves, and procure health and ſafety (as it were) from conquered enemies.

Man hath alſo many other things of great vertue

tue given unto him by his *Creator*, which being contrary to thoſe miſchievous things, have in them a power to withſtand or qualifie their virulent operations; to remedy their hurts; and to defend him from their ſecret aſſaults. One thing ſerveth to one uſe, other things to other uſes, and God hath ſo provided that all things ſhould bee helpfull for the benefit and preſervation of *Man*, yea and ſome things there be which are ſerviceable no way elſe.

SEC.

SECT. 6.

I. *He ſheweth why the* creatures *are now harmfull to* MAN, *ſeeing all things were at firſt created for his benefit: Exemplary* demonſtrations *intimating how this miſchiefe might be remedied.* II. *A briefe* Elogium *in praiſe of the excellent nature and* prerogatives *of* MAN. III. *This* chapter *is concluded, with a ſhort* exhortation, *that a thankfull uſe be made of the high favours vouchſafed unto* MAN.

THat which hath beene formerly ſaid touching the

the harme which MAN receiveth ſomtimes from the *unreaſonable-creatures*, hath reſpect onely to the preſent condition of *Mankinde* in this life; for, if we looke back to the firſt time which was long ago, wee ſhall finde that none of the *irrationall-creatures* durſt to be offenſive unto MAN; but, that all of them were ſubject unto him, faithfully ſerving and obeying him, ſo long as he did maſter his owne *paſsions*, and ſubjected his *unreaſonable-parts* to the *part-reaſonable*. And when hee gave the reines to his owne *affections*, not ſubduing them to *reaſon*, but ſuffered himſelfe to be o-

ver-

ver-maſtered by the brute deſires which were *within him*; it was very juſt, that (as it hath ſince hapned) he ſhould be over-awed by the *wilde-beaſts*, and by ſuch other harmefull things as are *without him*.

For, after MAN had ſinned, then began thoſe beaſts to be hurtfull unto him, which had elſe been ſerviceable; as may yet appeare true by thoſe who have lived a *ſupereminent life*, and thereby prevented the miſchievous aſſaults of ſuch creatures. Of this, *Daniel* and *Paul* are exemplary witneſſes: for, neither could the *Lions* finde power to ſeiſe the one; nor the *Viper* to faſten

faſten upon the other.

II. Theſe things conſidered, who is able to commend ſufficiently the nobility of this *living-creature?* Behold, he bindeth together in *himſelf* things *mortall* and *immortall*; and knitteth up in *One*, things *reaſonable* and *unreaſonable*. In his owne nature, hee beareth the *image* of all *creatures*, and from thence is rightly called *A little world*. He is a *creature*, of whom *God* hath vouchſafed to take ſo much regard, that all *created-things* both *preſent* and *to come*, were for him created. He is that *creature* alſo, for whoſe ſake GOD became MAN, and who ſhaking off

off his *corruption*, finiſheth it in a never-ending *immortality*.

Yea, he is that *creature*, who being made after the image and likeneſſe of GOD, raigneth above the heavens, living and becomming cõverſant with CHRIST the ſonne of GOD, who ſitteth above all *power* and *authority*; and no eloquence may worthily publiſh forth the manifold preheminences, and advantages which are beſtowed on this *creature*.

He paſſeth over the vaſt *Seas*; he rangeth about the wide *heavens*, by his contemplation, and conceives the *motions* and the *magnitudes* of the *ſtars*. He enjoyes

joyes the commodities both of *sea* and *land*: He contemns the furie of *wild beasts*, & the strength of the greatest *fishes*. He is learned in every *science*, and skilfull in *Artificiall workings*. Hee communicates by writing, with whomsoever he pleaseth, though they be far distant; and is nothing hindred therein by the absence of his *Bodie*. He foretelleth things to come: he ruleth all, subdueth all, and enjoyeth all things.

He talketh with *Angels*, yea, and with GOD himselfe. He hath all the *Creatures* within his Dominion; and keeps the *Devils* in subjectiõ. He searcheth

out the nature of every thing, and is diligently ſtudious in the knowledge of GOD. He was borne to be the houſe and Temple of the *Holy-ghoſt*; and he acquires the fruition of all theſe *priviledges* by *Vertue* and *Piety*.

But leſt it may be thought, of ſome, that we proceed unſkilfully, in ſetting forth ſo largely the praiſes of *Man*; (whereas wee ſhould rather have contented our ſelves to proceed with a Diſcourſe touching the nature of MAN, according to our firſt purpoſe) wee will break off our ſpeech, in this place; though we are not ignorant, that by ſet-

ting

ting forth his *preheminence* and *priviledges*, we have not improperly profecuted our intention to declare the *Nature of* MAN.

III. And, now, ſeeing it is manifeſted unto us, of how great nobility we are partakers, and that we are a *heavenly plant*; let us not deface or ſhame our *Nature*, neither let it be truely ſaid that we are unworthy of ſuch gifts: nor let us fooliſhly deprive our ſelves of ſo great Power and Glory and Bleſſednes, by caſting away the fruition of *Ioyes* that ſhall be everlaſting, for the ſeeming poſſeſſion of imperfect *pleaſures*, which will endure but a while: But,

let us preſerve, rather, this nobility of ours, by *doing good*, by *abſtaining from evill works*, and by a *good-Zeal, intent* or *purpoſe*; For to ſuch endeavours, (if we ſeek it by *prayer*) God alwaies lendeth his aſſiſting hand.

Thus much concerning theſe matters: And now ſeeing it is the received opinion, that MAN conſiſteth of *Body* and *Soul*, we will follow the ſame Diviſion; treating firſt of the *Soul*, and therein paſſe by thoſe queſtions which being over ſubtile, and difficultlyunderſtood, cannot be intelligibly expreſſed to many capacities.

CAP.

Cap. 2. Sect. 1.

I. *The ſeverall and different* Opinions *of the* Ancients *concerning the* SOVL, *as whether it be a* Subſtance; *whether* corporeall, *or* incorporeall, *whether* mortall *or* immortall, *&c.* II. *The confutation of thoſe who affirme in generall that the* SOVL *is a* corporeall-ſubſtance. III. *Confutations of their particular Arguments, who affirme that the* SOVL *is* Bloud, Water, *or* Aire.

EXceeding great variance is diſcovered among the old *Philoſophers* in their *diſcourſes*

of the SOUL; insomuch that almost all of them differ one from another in that matter. *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, and the whole sect of the *Stoicks* doe peremptorily affirme that the *SOVL* is a *Bodie*; and those very men who affirme the *SOVL* to be a *Bodie*, dissent one from another in declaring the *Essence* of it.

The *Stoicks* affirm, that it is a certain *Blast, hot and fiery*. *Critias* holds, that it is *bloud*. *Hippon* the Philosopher, will have it to be *water*. *Democritus* thinks it is *fire*; and his opinion is, that the round Formes of *indivisible-bodies* or *Atomes* being incorporated, by ayre

ayre and fire, do make up the *Soul*. *Heraclitus* conceives that the *Soul* of the whole frame of the *World* is *a certaine breathing out of the vapours, from moist things*; and, that the *Soul* which is in *living-creatures*, doth proceed both from *exhalations without themselves*, and from exhalations, also, *within them*; and being of the same kind, of which they themselves are.

Againe (on the contrary part) there are almost innumerable disagreements among them who say that the SOUL is not a *Body*, or *Bodily-substance*. Some of them affirm that the SOUL is a *substance*

and *immortall*; Some, that it is without a *Bodie*, and neither a *ſubſtance* nor *immortall*.

Thales, who was the firſt of that opinion, held that the SOUL *was alwaies in motion, and had that motion from it ſelfe*. *Pythagoras* thought that it was a NUMBER *moving it ſelfe*. *Plato* affirmed that it was a *ſubſtance* (*to be conceived in mind*) *that received motion from it ſelf*, according to NUMBER and HARMONY. *Ariſtotle* taught that it was *the firſt continuall motion of a* BODIE-NATURALL, *having in it thoſe Inſtrumentall parts, wherein was poſſibility of life*. *Dinarchus* took it to be

be *an Harmony of the foure Elements*; not a *Harmony* made of *ſounds*, but as it were a tunable temperature and agreement, of *hot* & *cold*, *moiſt* & *dry things*, in the Bodie. But, it is without doubt that all the beſt of theſe doe agree in this, that the SOUL is a *ſubſtance*; *Ariſtotle* and *Dinarchus* excepted, who affirme that it is no *ſubſtance* at all.

Beſides all theſe, ſome were of opiniõ that there was but *one* and the *ſame* SOUL belonging to all things; which was by ſmal portions diſtributed to all particular things; and, then gathered into it ſelf againe: of which opinion

were the *Manichees* and certain others. Some likewise imagined the *Soules* were *many*, and of *differing sorts*; Some affirmed that there was both one *universall*, and many *particular* SOULS; and therefore it cannot be, but that my Discourse must be drawne to a great length, seeing I am to disprove so many opinions.

II. Therefore, to confute in generall all those together, who affirme that the *Soul* is a *corporeall essence*, it shall be sufficient to alledge that which hath been heretofore delivered to that purpose by *Numinius* the *Pythagorist*, and by *Amonius* the Master

ſter of *Plotinus*; who thus affirme:

All *Bodies*, being by their proper nature mutable, and ſuch as may be utterly diſperſed and divided into innumerable parts (and having nothing remaining in them which may not be changed and diſperſed) have need of ſomething to cloſe them in, to bring them together; to knit them into *one*; and (as it were) to hold them faſt united: And, this we ſay is done by the SOUL.

Now if the SOUL be *corporeall*, (let it be what *Body* you pleaſe) yea, though it be a body conſiſting of the moſt thin and

and ſubtile parts, what will you ſay holds that together, as that knitteth the *Bodie* in *One*? For, as we declared before, every *Bodily thing* hath need of ſome other thing to faſten the parts of it together; *yea the Bodie of this* SOUL, *that knits together our viſibly* BODIE, (*if we ſhould grant the ſame to be a corporeall* SOUL) *and the next to that alſo, infinitely, it would ſtill have need of ſome other thing to knit and faſten its own parts together, untill an incorporeall-eſſence were found out.*

If they anſwer, as the *Stoicks* doe, that, there is a certaine *motion* pertaining unto *Bodies*, extending both

both to the *inward* and *outward* parts of the *Body*: That the *motion* tending *outward*, effects the *quantity* and the *qualities* of the *Body*; and, that the *motion* tending *inward*, is cauſe both of *uniting* the *body* and of the *eſſence* thereof; wee will then aſke them (ſeeing every *motion* doth proceed from ſome *power*) what kinde of *power* it is, which that *motion* hath? in what conſiſteth it? and what gives *eſſence* thereunto?

If this *power* bee a certaine *matter* (which the Greekes call Hylen) wee will uſe the ſame reaſons againſt them, which wee objected before. If they ſay

ſay it is not *matter*, but a *materiall thing*, (for *matter* and *materiall things* thus differ; *That which hath matter in it, is called a materiall thing*) wee then aſke them, whether that which hath *matter* in it, be likewiſe *matter*, or *void of matter*? If they ſay it is *matter*, we demand how it can be both *materiall* and *matter*? If they anſwer, that it is *not matter*, then they muſt grant it to be *void of matter*, and if it be *void of matter*, wee will eaſily prove it to be no *Body*; becauſe, every *body* hath *matter* in it.

If they alleage that *Bodies* have the three *Dimenſions* in them, and that the

the SOUL extending it ſelfe through the whole *Body*, hath in it alſo the three *Dimenſions*, and therefore muſt neceſſarily be a *Body*; wee will then thus anſwer them; *It is true, that all BODIE'S have in them the three Dimenſions, but every thing having the three Dimenſions is not a BODY.* For *place*, and *Quality* which in themſelves have no *Body*, have accidentally, a *Quantity* if they bee in ſuch things as have *magnitude.*

In like maner the SOUL in reſpect of it ſelfe, is utterly void of the *Dimenſions*; but, accidentally it hath *Dimenſions*; becauſe the *Body* (in which it *is*) having

having in it the three *Dimenſions*, wee ſo conceive it, together with the *Body*, as though the Soule alſo had in it the three *Dimenſions*.

We argue further, and ſay thus: Every *Body* hath his *motion* either from *without* it ſelfe, or from *within*. If the *motion* bee from *without* it ſelfe, it muſt then be *void of life*: if it be from *within it ſelfe*, it muſt be *indued with life*: now, it is abſurd to ſay that the SOUL is either *indued with life*, or *without life* (one of which muſt neceſſarily be affirmed, if the *Soule* bee a *corporeall ſubſtance*) therefore the ſoule cannot be a *corporeal Eſſence*. Againe,

Againe, the SOUL, if it be nouriſhed, it is nouriſhed by that which is *void of Body* (for, *knowledge* is the nouriſhment thereof) but, no *corporeal-eſſence* is noriſhed by things *bodileſs*, therefore, the SOUL cannot be a *Body*. *Xenocrates* thus concluded this *argument*: If (*ſaid hee*) the SOUL be not nouriſhed, it cannot be a *corporeal-ſubſtance*; becauſe, the *Body* of every *living-creature* muſt be nouriſhed.

III. Thus much in generall, in confutation of all thoſe who generally affirm, that the SOUL is a *bodily thing*. Now, we will treate particularly againſt them who are of opinion that the

the Soul is either *Blood*, or *Breath*; becauſe, when either *Blood* or *Breath* is taken away, the *living-creature* dyeth.

Wee will not ſay (as ſome well accounted of have written) that, part of the Soul faileth away when any part of the blood faileth, if the Soul be the *Blood*: for, that were but a ſlender anſwer. In thoſe things which have *every part* of like nature with the *whole*, the *part remaining* is the ſame with the *whole*: Whether the *water* bee much or little, it is every way perfect *water*. In like maner, gold, ſilver, and every other thing, whoſe parts do not eſſentially

eſſentially differ from each other, are ſtill the ſame, as is aforeſaid: And even ſo, that part of *blood* which remaineth (of what quantity ſoever) may be called the SOUL (aſwell as the whole quantity) if the *blood* be the SOUL.

We, therfore, will rather anſwer them thus: If that be rightly accounted the SOUL, upon whoſe taking away, the *death* of the *living creature* enſues; then, ſhould it needs bee, that *flegme*, and the two *chollers* muſt be alſo the SOUL, ſeeing, if any one of theſe faileth, it brings the *living creature* to his death. The like falleth out in the *Liver*, in the *Braine*, in the *Heart*,

Heart, in the *Stomach*, the *Reines*, the *Entrails*, and in many other parts, whereof if you bereave a *living-creature*, it will immediatly periſh.

Moreover, there are many things *without blood*, which have life in them, nevertheleſſe; as ſome ſmooth and griſtly fiſhes; ſome alſo of a ſofter kind, to wit, Sepiæ, Teuthides, and Smyli (as the Greekes call them) and Lobſters, Crabs, Oyſters, and all ſhel-fiſh, whether they have hard or ſoft ſhells. Now if theſe things have a *living-Soule* in them (as we know they have) and yet are void of *blood*, then it plainely followes that blood

blood cannot bee the SOUL.

Againſt thoſe who ſay that *water* is the *Soule*, many things may bee ſaid to diſprove their opinion, though *water* helps to quicken and nouriſh all things; and though it bee (as they ſay) impoſſible to live without *water*.

Wee cannot live without *nouriſhment*, and therefore if their aſſertion bee true, wee may aſwell affirme that all *nouriſhment in generall*, and every *particular nouriſhment* is the SOUL. And whereas they have ſaid that no *living-creature* can live without water, wee finde the contrary to bee probable; for it

it is written of ſome Æ-gles, and of Partridges, that they live without *drinke*.

And why ſhould *water* be the SOUL rather then *ayre*? Seeing it is poſſible to abſtaine from *water* very long, whereas wee can hardly live a moment without breathing the *Aire*.

And yet, neither is *Aire* the SOUL: For, there are many creatures which live without breathing the *Aire*; as all *Inſectæ* (riveted creatures) ſuch as *Bees*, *Waſps*, and *Ants*; as alſo all bloodleſſe creatures, all thoſe which live in the *waters*, and ſuch as have no *Lungs*. For, none of thoſe

those things that are without *Lungs* can breath *Aire*. The *proposition* is true also, if it be converted, *There is no creature having Lungs, which doth not breath aire.*

SECT.

SECT. 2.

I. *The arguments of* Cleanthes *the Stoick (affirming the* SOUL *to bee* corporeall) *are here confuted* logically *and by* demonſtration. II. Chryſippus (*intending to maintaine the like opinion*) *is here, likewiſe anſwered, and his* Fallacies *diſcovered.* III. *A confutation of their* Tenet *alſo, who affirme that the* SOUL *is an* Harmony.

SEeing certaine *reaſons* of ſome account, are divulged by *Cleanthes* the Stoick, and by *Chryſippus* (*to prove the* SOUL *a corporeall*

reall-ſubſtance) wee will here deliver ſomewhat in anſwer of them; and it ſhall be the ſame which the *Platoniſts* have thereunto replyed heretofore.

Cleanthes compoſeth a ſyllogiſme in this manner;

There is (ſaith hee) a *likeneſſe* betweene us and our parents, not in reſpect of the *Body* onely, but in regard alſo, of the SOVL, as in *Paſſions*, *Manners*, and *Affections*: now it pertaineth to a *body* to have in it *likeneſſe* and *unlikeneſſe*; and *likeneſſe* and *unlikeneſſe* cannot belong to things void of Bodie; Therefore the *Soul* is a *bodily thing*.

It is here to be obſerved, firſt, that he proveth

things *universall* by things *particular* (*which is not allowable by the Rules of Logick.*) Next, whereas he saith that *likenesse* and *unlikenesse* cannot pertaine to any thing *void of bodie*, it is false. For wee know that *Numbers*, which have their *side-numbers* answering in proportion, are like one to another, as the *side-numbers* to *sixe* and to *foure and twentie*. The *side-numbers* to *sixe* are *two*, and *three*: The *side-numbers* to *foure* and *twenty* are *foure*, and *sixe*. Now, there is like proportion of *two* in respect of *foure*; and of *three* in respect of *sixe*: For they have a *double-proportion*, each in respect of other;

foure

foure being twice as much as *two*, and *fixe* twice as much as *three*. Thus it appears that *Nũbers* are like unto *Nũbers*, & yet Numbers are no *bodily thing*.

Likewiſe, *Figures* (in *Geometrie*) are like unto *Figures*, ſo many of them as have both their *corners* equall, & their *ſides* which incloſe their *equall corners*, anſwering one another in *proportion*: and even the *Platoniſts* themſelves will confeſſe, that ſuch *Figures* are no *Bodily things*.

Moreover, as it is a propriety in the predicament of *Quantity*, that a thing ſhould be *equall*, or *unequall*; So, alſo, it is a propriety in the predicament

of *Quality*, that things ſhould be *like*, or *unlike*. Now the predicament of *Quality* is an *Incorporeall* thing; Therefore, a thing *incorporeall* may be like unto another thing, that is *incorporeall*.

Cleanthes, thus frameth another Argument: No *Incorporeall* thing (ſaith he) can ſuffer together with a thing *corporeall*; neither can a *bodily-thing*, ſuffer with ſuch a thing as hath *no body*; but, things *corporeall*, only, may ſuffer one with another. Now it is evident, that if the *body* be diſeaſed, and wounded, the SOVL ſuffereth grief with it; The *Bodie* ſuffereth alſo with the SOVL; for, when

when the *mind* is afflicted by *ſhame*, the *Bodie* bluſheth, and when the *minde feareth*, the *body* looketh pale. Therefore the SOVL is a *corporeall thing*.

One of his *Aſſumptions* is falſe; and he taketh unto himſelf that which no man granteth. For whereas he ſaith, that no *Incorporeal thing* can ſuffer with a thing having a *bodie*; what if this be true onely in the SOVL? This is as if we ſhould argue thus; *No living-creature moves the upper jaw; But a Crocodile moves the upper jaw; Therefore*, a Crocodile *is no living-creature*. The *major* of this *propoſition* is falſe; becauſe, in ſaying, *No li-*

ving-creature moves the *upper-jaw*, hee taketh as granted that which is denied: for, behold the *Crocodile* both moveth his *upper-jaw*, and is alſo a *living-creature*. The like arguing uſeth he, who ſaith, that Nothing, *void of body*, ſuffereth together with a *bodily-thing*; for, he taketh unto himſelf, in his *negation*, that which lieth in queſtion.

But, if we ſhould grant (for argument ſake) that no *Incorporeall-thing*, doth ſuffer together with a *thing corporeall*; yet, that which is inferred thereupon, is not fully confeſſed, (to wit) that the *Soul* ſuffereth with the *Body*, if it

it be ſick, or wounded: For, it is yet in controverſie whether it be the *Body* onely that ſuffereth pain; which having taken ſenſe from the *Soul*, leaves the ſame inſenſible of ſufferings; or whether the *Soul* be grieved together with the *Bodie*. The former opinion hath hitherto been moſt generally received among *learned men*; and therefore, *Cleanthes* ought not to have made his *propoſitions* of things in queſtion; but, of ſuch onely as are quite out of doubt: for in doing otherwiſe he in vaine laboureth to demonſtrate that, for which he contendeth.

And yet (to make the

faſhood of his *Aſſumption* more evident) it might be proved, that ſome things *void of body*, doe ſuffer together with ſuch things as *have body*: For, *Qualities* being *things-incorporeall*, doe ſuffer with *corporeall-things* when they are altered: yea, both in the *corruption* of the *body*, and in the *Generation* of the ſame, the *Quality* thereof ſuffers change and alteration therewith.

II. *Chryſippus* thus argueth. *Death* is a ſeparation of the *Soul* from the *Bodie*: Now, nothing *void of body* is ſeparated from a *body*; becauſe, a thing *incorporeall* cannot be touched (*or laid even along*) by a *corporeall*

corporeall-thing: But the *Soul* toucheth, and is equally touched by the *body:* and is alſo ſeparated from the ſame: Therefore the *Soul* is a *corporeall-eſſence.*

Among theſe *propoſitions*, this is true, that *death* is a ſeparation of the *ſoul* from the *body:* But, this, that *a thing void of body* cannot touch a *body*, is falſe, if it be generally ſpoken; and true, if it be affirmed of the *ſoul.* It is falſe; becauſe, a *Line* which is an *incorporeall-thing* doth evenly touch a *corporeall-eſſence*, and is alſo ſeparated from the ſame; as alſo *whiteneſſe.* Yet, in the *Soul* it is true; by reaſon the

Soul doth not (ſo) touch the *Bodie*. For, if the *Soul* ſhould (ſo) touch the *body*, it muſt needs follow that it muſt be laid (as it were) along by it. And if that be ſo, then it lieth along by the whole *bodie* (that is, by every part of the ſame) which is impoſſible. For, how can a *whole body*, lie along by every part of another *body*?

Or, if it ſhould be that the *Soul* ſo touched the *Bodie*; then, the whole *Creature* ſhould not have life: For, if it (ſo) touched the ſame, it would indeed conſequently follow, that the *Soul* were a *corporeall eſſence*; but, then, the *thing made alive*, ſhould not have

have *life* in it, throughout every part of the ſame. And, contrariwiſe, if the whole *living-creature* hath life in it, then the *Soul* neither touches the *Bodie*, neither is it a *bodily-thing*. But, the whole *living-creature* hath life in it; therefore, neither doth the *Soul* touch it; neither is the *Soul* a *bodily-thing*; and, being a thing *void of body*; is, nevertheleſſe, ſeparated from the *bodie*, (contrary to the propoſition of *Chryſippus*.)

III. It is manifeſt, by what hath been hitherto ſaid, that the *Soul* is no *corporeall-ſubſtance*: it now remaines that we prove the ſame to be a *ſubſtance*.

And,

And, becauſe *Dicearchus* defines the *Soul* to be an *Harmonie*; And *Simmias*, contradicting *Socrates*, affirmes the ſame; comparing the *Soul* to an *harmonie*, and the *body* to a *Harp*; we will here ſet downe the ſame confutations of them, which we finde in *Plato's* Dialogue called *Phædon*.

One of them is taken from what *Plato* had proved by things granted: For, he had demonſtrated that when we doe *learne*, we doe but *call to minde* things that were ingraffed formerly in us: And therefore, taking this unto him (as a thing granted) hee thereupon confirmes his Ar-

Argument in this maner;

If (ſaith hee) the *learning of things* be nothing elſe, but the *recalling of them to minde*; then, our *ſoule* had a *being*, before it was in the *forme* of MAN: Now, if it were a *Harmony*, it was not before the *body*, but came after it, when the *body* was harmoniouſly joyned together. Such of neceſſity muſt the *compoſition* bee, as the things are whereof the *compoſition* is made: For, *compoſition* is a certaine common joyning together of thoſe things, which are compounded, having a *harmony* in the ſame: and, it cannot bee otherwiſe, in reaſon, but that the

the *Harmony* muſt *follow*, and not precede thoſe things whereof it is compounded.

Theſe matters conſidered, this ſaying, That the SOUL is an *Harmony*, is contrary to this other ſaying, That, the *learning of things* is the *recordation of things*: But the opinion concerning *recordation* (as is aforeſaid) is true; *even in their judgement who affirme the* SOUL *to bee an* HARMONIE; therefore the SOUL is not a *Harmony*, according to their owne *Principle*.

Againe, the SOUL is a part repugnant to the *body*; and is in ſtead of a *Ruler*, exerciſing a government

ment over the ſame. But *Harmony* neither exerciſeth any government over the *Body*, neither is any way repugnant thereunto; therefore, the SOUL is not an *Harmony*.

Moreover, one *Harmony* may bee more or leſſe *Harmony* then another, according as it is ſlackned or ſtretched forth, (wee meane not to bee underſtood as if we ſpoke of the very nature of *Harmony*; ſeeing it is impoſſible there ſhould be *intenſion* and *remiſſion*, in the very nature thereof,) but wee meane *Harmony* as it conſiſteth in joyning together of the *notes*: For, if a *ſhrill* and a *baſe-ſound* being

ing matched together, ſhall afterward bee made more *ſlack*, there will bee a diverſitie in the *Harmony*, by reaſon of joyning together of the *notes*, more or leſſe reached forth, though they retain the ſame nature in the *greatneſſe* of the *ſounds*: But one SOUL is not more or leſſe SOUL then another; therefore, the SOUL cannot be a *Harmony*.

Futhermore, the SOUL in that it receives *contraries* ſucceeding one another, is a *ſubſtance* and a *ſubject*: But, *Harmony* is a *Quality*, and *in* the *ſubject*. Now the predicament of *ſubſtance* is one thing, and the predicament of *Quality*

lity is another; therefore, the SOUL and *Harmony* are two distinct things. It is indeed, no absurdity, to say that the SOUL hath *Harmony* in it; howsoever, it followeth not that the SOUL is therefore an *Harmony*: Because, though the SOUL hath *vertues* in the same, it cannot bee thereupon inferred that the SOUL is *vertue*.

SECT.

SECT. 3.

I. *It is here declared, that the* SOUL *is not* (*as* Galen *implicitly affirmeth*) *a* Temperature in generall. II. *It is here proved alſo, that the* SOUL *is no* particular temperature *or* quality. III. *And it is likewiſe demonſtrated, that the* SOUL *is rather* governeſſe *of the* temperatures *of the* Body, *both ordering them, and ſubduing the* Vices, *which ariſe from the* bodily-tempers.

GAlen, hath determined nothing peremptorily of the SOUL; yea, hee

hee himſelfe affirmeth plainly, in his writings of *demonſtration*, that hee hath delivered nothing preciſely of the ſame: But, it may bee collected by ſome of his expreſſions, that he could be beſt pleaſed to affirme that the SOUL is a *temperature*.

For, he ſaith, that the diverſitie of *manners* followes the *temperature* of the *Body*, and confirmeth his opinion by certaine collections out of *Hippocrates*: Wherein, if hee delivered that which hee truly thinketh, then, doubtleſſe, hee beleeveth alſo, that the SOUL is *mortall*: not the whole SOUL, but that onely which

which is *irrationall*; for, hee maketh a doubt concerning the *reasonable soul*, as his words declare.

Now, that the *temperature* of the *Body* cannot be the SOUL, it may be made evident by these reasons: First, every *body*, aswell that which hath *life* in it, as that which is *void of life*, is made of the *temperature* of the foure *Elements* (for, the *temperature* of these *Elements* make all *Bodies*) And if the SOUL bee the *temperature* of the *body*, there can be no *body* without *life*: For, if the *Soul* be the *temperature*, then, every *body* hath *life* in it, because every *body* hath his *temperatures*. And if every *Body*

dy hath *life* in it, then there is *no body* void of life: So, consequently, neither ſtone, nor timber, nor iron, nor any other thing can be without life.

II. But he did not meane, perhaps, to affirme in generall, that every *temperature* of the *body* was the SOUL; but rather, that ſome ſuch, or ſuch a *temperature*. Wee, then, demand what *temperature* it is which maketh a *living-creature*, and ſtandeth inſtead of the SOUL? For, let him name what *temperature* ſoever hee can deviſe, we will finde him out the like in things *without life*.

There are (as hee himſelfe

ſelfe hath declared in his *Booke* intituled OF THE TEMPERAMENTS) nine *temperatures*; eight *diſtempered*; and one in *good temper*; by which (as he likewiſe affirmeth) every man is tempered, whoſe *temperature* keepeth a meane. But by the other *diſtemperatures* other *living-creatures* are compoſed (every one according to the ſeverall kinde thereof) with a certaine *intenſion* and *remiſſion*, to the more and to the leſſe. Yea, and all the nine *temperatures* are found alſo more or leſſe in things *void of life*; as he himſelfe hath taught, in his booke of *ſimple-medicaments*.

More-

Moreover, if the SOUL be a *temperature*, then is the SOUL ſubject to *alteration*; for, the *temperatures* are altered according to the diverſitie of *Ages*, *Seaſons*, and *Dyets*: And, if the SOUL be altered, then wee have not at all times the ſame SOUL; but, a *Soule* varied according to our *temperatures*; ſometime the *ſoule* of a Lion, ſometime of a Sheepe, and ſometime of other creatures, which were abſurdly affirmed.

Againe, our *temperature* doth not oppoſe it ſelfe againſt any luſts of our *bodies*, but rather helps to provoke them, or effect them, for, it is that which ſtirreth

ſtirreth up the *deſires*: But, the SOUL bendeth it ſelfe againſt thoſe *deſires*; therefore our *temperature* is not the SOUL.

Furthermore, the *temperature* is a *qualitie*; and a *qualitie* may be in the *ſubject*, or abſent from it without the deſtruction of the ſame *ſubject*: Now, if our *temperature* bee our *ſoule*, it will then follow (by the reaſon afore-mentioned) that the *ſoule* may be ſeparated from the *body* (which is the *ſubject* thereof) without the deſtruction of the ſame. But, this is univerſally knowne to be falſe; therefore, the SOUL can be neither *temperature* nor *qualitie*.

None

None will imagine it more possible to change that which is of the essence of a *living-creature*, into the contrary thereof, and yet preserve the *living-creature*, then, in *fire* to change the nature of *heat* into *coldnesse*, and yet still continue the *fire*. But it appeareth plainly that our *temperature* doth alter into the contrary; (& that such as *Galen* was are they, who change our *temperatures*, by their art of *Physick*. Therefore the *soule* (which is the essence of a *living-creature*) cannot be the *temperature*.

Neither is the *Soule* a *quality* of the *body*: For, the *qualities* of every *body*

are ſubject to *ſenſe*; But the *ſoule* is not ſubject to *ſenſe*, but to *underſtanding* onely, and therefore it is not a *Quality*.

Wee know that this good *temper* of *blood* and *ſpirits*, accompanied with *fleſh* and *ſinewes*, and ſuch other things, is *ſtrength*. And, that the good *temperature* of *hot* and *cold*, *dry* and *moiſt* things, is *health*. And that the *meaſurable proportion* of the *members*, with a *freſh colour*, is cauſe of the *beauty* which is in the *Body*. Now, if the *ſoul* be a certaine *harmony*, of *health*, and *ſtrength*, and *beauty*; It muſt needs follow that *Man* as long as he hath a *Soule* in him, can neither

neither be *ſick*, nor *weake*, nor *deformed*.

But, wee ſee by often experience, that even while the *living-ſoule* continueth in them, many men are deprived, not only of *one*, but of *all* theſe good *temperatures*; inſomuch, that the very ſame man is *deformed*, and *weak*, and *ſick* all at once. Therefore, the *ſoule* is not the *good temperature* of the *Bodie*.

III. Some will aſke, perhaps, how it comes to paſſe, (*if the ſoule be not the temperature of the body*) that men are vitious or vertuous, according to their naturall *conſtitutions* and *complexions*: and they

may demand alſo, whether theſe things proceed not frō the *tẽperature*. We anſwer, that they doe indeed proceed from the *bodily temperature*: For, as there bee ſome naturally *healthfull*, or *ſickly*, by reaſon of their *conſtitution*; So, otherſome, naturally abounding in bitter *choller*, are *froward*; and ſome other *cowardly*, or *leacherous*, (more or leſſe according to their *complexions*.)

But, there bee ſome, who overcome theſe naturall inclinations, and by getting the victory over them, doe evidently manifeſt, that theſe *temperatures* may bee ſuppreſſed. Now, that which *overcometh*

commeth is *one thing*, and that which is *overcome* is *another thing*: Therefore, the *temperature* is alſo one thing, and the *ſoule* (which is the vanquiſher and orderer of inclinations proceeding from the *temperature*) is another thing, and not the ſame.

The *body* being an *inſtrument* which the *ſoule* uſeth, if it bee well fitted for the ſame, is a helper unto the *ſoule*; and ſhe the better uſeth it to her own contentment. But, if it be not every way framed and tempered for the *ſoule's* uſe, it becommeth her hinderance, and much adoe hath ſhe to ſtrive againſt the unfitneſſe of her

inſtrument. Yea, ſo much, that if ſhee bee not very wary and diligent in rectifying the ſame, ſhe her ſelfe is perverted aſwell as the *inſtrument*; even as a *muſitian* miſſeth of true muſick, when his harp is out of tune.

The *ſoule* therefore muſt be carefull of the *body*, and make it a fit *inſtrument* for her ſelfe: which may be done by ordering it according to *Reaſon*, and by accuſtoming the ſame to *good manners*; as in *Harmony*, otherwhile *ſlackning*, and ſometime *winding* up, according as neceſſity requires: By the neglect whereof, ſhee her ſelfe, may elſe (as

(as it often happeneth) become as faultie, and as perverse as her *Instrument*.

SECT. 4.

I. *The SOVL is not a* perpetuall motion *as* Aristotle *affirmes: Hee shewes what* ἐντελέχεια *is, and the defects of* Aristoles *judgement concerning the SOVL.* II. *The* Body *hath not in it selfe a possibility to live, before the SOVL commeth unto it, as* Aristole *hath also affirmed.* III. *The SOVL is neither* unmovable *of it selfe, nor* accidentally moved, *nor bredin the* Body; *as the fore said* Philosopher *hath delivered.*

ARistotle affirming that the *Soule* is ἐντελέχεια *a perpetu-*

perpetuall motion, is nevertheleſſe to bee accounted among them, who ſay that the SOUL is a *quality*. But, firſt, let me make it appeare what *Ariſtotle* meaneth by ἐντελέχεια, (which is to ſay) a *perpetuall motion*.

He divideth a *ſubſtance* into three parts: The firſt is *matter* (which is as it were the *ſubject*) and this *matter* is in it ſelfe nothing, but a *generating power*, out of which another thing may bee formed.

The ſecond part of the *Eſſence*, is *forme*, (or *ſpeciall kinde*) by which the *matter* is brought unto a certaine *forme*.

The third part, consisteth both of *matter* and *forme united* together, and *endued with life*: The *matter* being a thing in *possibility* only, and the *forme* an *actuall thing*, considerable two wayes. That is to say, either as you consider of a *science*, or of a *contemplation* according to the *science*; as a *habit*; or, as *working* by that *habit*.

It is considerable as a *science*; because, in the very *substance* of the *Soule* there is a kinde (as wee may call it) both of *sleepe* and of *waking*. This *waking* is analogically answerable unto *contemplation*; and *sleepe* represents the having of this *habit*, without any working thereby.

The *Science*, is, before *working* according to that *ſcience*; and *Ariſtotle* calls the *forme* it ſelfe πρώτην ἐντελέχειαν, that is, the *firſt continued motion*: The *working* according to this *forme*, he names δευτέραν ἐντελέχειαν the *ſecond continued motion*. As for example:

The *eye* conſiſteth of a *materiall ſubject*, and of a certaine *forme*. This *materiall ſubject*, is in the *eye* it ſelfe; even that which containeth the *ſight* (I meane the *matter* of the *eye*) and this *matter* is equivocally called the *eye*. But the *forme* and *continuall motion* of the *eye* is the operation wherby it ſeeth: A whelp before he can ſee

though

though he hath neither of the *two motions* aforementioned, hath yet, an aptneſſe to receive ſuch a *motion:* Even in ſuch maner we muſt conceive of it in the SOUL. When *ſight* commeth to the welp it perfects the *eye*; and when the SOUL commeth unto the *Body*, it perfects the *living-creature.*

So then, in *a perfect living-creature*, neither can the SOUL bee at any time without the *Bodie*, neither the *Body* without the *Soul*: For, the SOUL is not the *Body* it ſelfe; but, it is the SOUL of the *BODY*: and therefore, it is in the *Body*, yea, and *in ſuch a kinde of*

of body: for, it hath not an exiſtence by it ſelf.

Ariſtotle firſt calls the *paſſible* (*inferiour*) part of the *ſoul*, by the Name of the *ſoul*, ſevering the *Reaſonable-part* from it, whereas hee ſhould have taken the whole *ſoul* of *Man* together, and not have given his judgement of the *whole*, by a *part*, much leſſe by the weakeſt part there of.

II. *Ariſtotle* hath affirmed alſo, that the *body* hath an aptneſſe to live, even before the *ſoul* commeth unto it: For he ſaith, that the *body* hath in it ſelfe a *poſſibility* to live.

Now, the *body* which hath in it ſelf a *poſſibility* to

to live, muſt firſt be *actually* a *body*, before it receives that *form:* For, ſuch a *body* is a *matter* void of all *qualities*. Therefore it is impoſſible that the thing which is not actually it ſelf, ſhould have in it an aptneſſe whereby another thing may be made of it.

If it be a *bodie*, and hath in it ſelf, no other *being*, but in *poſſibility* only; how can that which is a *bodie* but in poſſibility, have a poſſibility of *life* in it ſelf? Though in other things, it is poſſible, that a man ſhould have ſomewhat which he never uſeth; yet in the *ſoul* it is impoſſible: For, the *ſoul* doth not ceaſe

ceaſe to worke, even in them that are aſleep; but, a man, even in ſleeping, is nouriſhed, & groweth. and ſeeth viſions, and breathes, which is the chiefeſt ſymptome of *life*.

It is hereby very plain that a Thing cannot have the poſſibility to live, but, it muſt needs have *life* actually in it: For, indeed, it is nothing elſe but *life* which doth principally form the *Soul*, (it is planted together with the *Soul*) and it is in the *bodie* by participation.

If therefore any man ſhall affirme, that *Health* anſwereth proportionably to *Life*; we will reply that in ſaying ſo, he talketh

keth not of the *life* of the SOUL but of the *body*, and ſo uſeth a ſophiſticall reaſoning: For, the *corporeall-ſubſtance* doth receive contraries one after another; but, in the *ſubſtance*, which is the *forme*, that cannot be poſſible; Becauſe, if the difference, which is the *Form*, ſhould be altered, the *living creature* would be altered alſo.

It is not therefore, the *ſubſtantiall forme*, which receiveth *contraries*; but the *ſubſtance* which is the *ſubject*; that is to ſay, the *bodily-ſubſtance*: And therefore alſo the *Soul* cannot be, by any means, the *continued motion* of the *bodie*; but

but muſt be a *ſubſtance* all perfect within it ſelfe, and *incorporeall*; for that it receiveth *contraries* one after another, (as *vice* and *vertue*) whereof the very *Forme*, by it ſelf, is not capable.

III. Furthermore, *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that the *Soul* being a *continued-motion*, unmoveable of it ſelf, is moved accidentally; and, that it is not unlikely wee ſhould be moved by an immoveable thing; becauſe we ſee by common experience, that *beautie* being a thing unmoveable doth nevertheleſſe move us.

But, though *Beautie*, which is *unmoveable* in it ſelf

ſelf, may move us, (as hee ſaith) yet, the *Beautie* ſo moving us, is a thing by nature, apt enough to be *moved*, & not ſuch a thing as is altogether *unmoveable*. Therefore, if the *body* had any ſelfe-motion, it had not been any abſurdity to ſay it ſhould be moved of that which was immoveable: But, it is impoſſible that a thing of it ſelf *immoveable*, ſhould be moved of that which is alſo *immoveable* How then ſhould the *body* attain unto *motion*, except it receive it from the *ſoul*? ſeeing it cannot have any motion from it ſelf?

It appeares, therefore, that when *Ariſtotle* went about

about to declare the firſt breeding of *Motion*, hee ſhewed us not the firſt, but the ſecond. For, if he had moved that which of it ſelf is not moved, he had then made the *firſt-motion*. But, if (otherwiſe) he move that which is moved of it ſelf, hee diſcourſeth how the *ſecond-motion* commeth.

From whence then is the firſt *motion* procured to the *bodie?* If he ſay the *Elements* are moved of themſelvess; in regard ſome of them are naturally light, & ſome heavy; It is not ſo: For, if *levity* & *weightineſſe* were kinds of *motion*; then, *light* and *heavy things* would never leave

leave moving. But, they ceaſe from moving when they have attained their proper place. Therefore, *lightneſſe* and *heavineſſe* are not cauſes of the *firſt-motion*, but *qualities* of the *Elements*.

If it were granted (that *lightneſſe* and *heavineſſe* were cauſes of the *firſt-motion*) how can the *Qualities* of Reaſoning, of Judging, and of holding Opinion, be wrought by *heavineſſe* and *lightneſſe*? If they be not effects of theſe; neither are they effects of the *Elements*; and if not of the *Elements*, then alſo not of the *Bodies*.

Beſide, if the *ſoul* be moved

moved accidentally, and the *bodie* of it ſelf; then ſhould the *bodie* be moved of it ſelf, although it had no *ſoul*; and if that were poſſible, then it might be a *living-creature* without a *ſoul*. But, theſe things are abſurd; and abſurd therefore is the former opinion.

Moreover, it is likewiſe untruely affirmed, that every thing which is moved *naturally*, is moved alſo *violently*; and that whatſoever is moved *violently*, is moved by *nature*. For, the *World* being moved naturally, is not moved violently. Neither is it true, that ſuch things as are *moved naturally*, doe

reſt

reſt naturally alſo: For, the *World*, and the *Sunne*, and the *Moone*, are *naturally moved*, and yet cannot *reſt naturally*: In like manner being naturally inclined to a *perpetuall motion*, they cannot reſt naturally: For *Reſt* is the deſtruction of the *Soul*, & of every thing which is given to *perpetuall-motion*.

It is herewith conſiderable alſo, that there is as yet no ſolution made unto that which was objected in the beginning of this Chapter, (*viz.*) how the *bodie* (whoſe nature is to be eaſily diſperſed) can be knit together, (if it be not by an *Incorporeall-ſubſtance*.)

SEC.

SECT. 5.

I. *The* SOUL *is not a* Number *according to the opinion of* Pythagoras; *nor as* Xenocrates *understands it.* II. *The error of* Eunomius *in adding to his definition of the* Soul, *these words*, created (*or* ingendred) in the Bodie; *and the absurdity thereupon insuing.* III. *The difference betweene the Workes of* Creation, *&* Providence, *&c. and the error of* Apollinarius *touching the generation of* Soules.

PYthagoras, whose custome it was, by a certaine kind of Comparison to

to liken *God*, and all other things to NUMBERS, defined the *ſoul*, alſo, to be a *number* moving it ſelf. Him, *Xenocrates* imitated; not as though the *ſoul* were number; but, for that it is in *things numbred*; and in ſuch as are multiplyed; and, for that it is the *ſoul* which diſcernes things; and, becauſe, likewiſe it putteth (as it were) upon every thing, certaine formes, and diſtinctions.

" (*For, it is the SOVLE*
" *that ſeparates one form*
" *from another*, and ſhewes
" how they differ; both by
" the diverſity of their
" *Formes*, and by the mul-
" titude of their *number*;

thereby

"thereby cauſing things "to be contained in *num-* "*ber* : And, therefore, "betweene the *ſoul* and "*numbers*, there is ſome "affinity.)

He himſelfe hath born witneſſe of the *ſoule* that it is moved of it ſelfe: And, that it is not a *number*, wee may thus prove; *Number*, is in the predicament of *quantity*; But, the *ſoul* is not in the predicament of *quantity*, but in the predicament of *ſubſtance*; Therfore, the *ſoul* is not a *number*. Yea though they would never ſo faine, that *number* ſhould bee a *ſubſtance* accounted among things comprehended in *underſtanding*, it will bee

proved otherwiſe, as it ſhall hereafter bee declared.

Againe, the SOUL hath all his parts continued one to another; but, ſo hath not *number*; Therefore the SOUL is not a *Number*. Againe, a *number* is increaſed by putting more and more unto it, but, the *Soul* taketh no ſuch increaſe. Againe, a *number* is either *even* or *odd*; but the SOUL can neither bee termed *even* nor *odd*. Againe, the SOUL hath motion of it ſelfe; but a *number* is undoubtedly unmoveable. Againe, a *number* remaining *one* and the *ſame* in nature, is able to alter no *quality* that belongeth unto

to *numbers*: But, the *Soul* remaining one and the ſame in *ſubſtance*, doth change his *qualities*, altering from ignorance to knowledge, and from vice to vertue; therefore (*all theſe particulars* conſidered) the *SOVL* is not a *number*.

II. Theſe were the ancient *Philoſophers* opinions concerning the SOUL. But *Eunomius* defined it to be a *SVBSTANCE void of body, and created in the body*, agreeing therein both with *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*. For, he took theſe words, *a ſubſtance void of body*, out of *Plato*; and theſe, *created in the body*, from *Ariſtotle*: not conſidering

(though hee was otherwiſe very quick witted) that he endeavours to knit thoſe things into *One* which can by no meanes be united together.

For, every thing that is engendred both *bodily* and in *time*, is corruptible and mortall. To this the doctrine and judgement of *Moſes* is agreeable. For, in deſcribing the Creation of things ſubject unto ſenſe, hee did not therein deliver in expreſſe words, that the nature of things intelligible were then made. But, ſome (though otherſome are not of their opinion) inſiſting upon conjectures, are of that minde.

Now

Now if any man ſuppoſe that the SOUL was made after the *body*; becauſe it was put into the *body*, after the ſame was faſhioned, he erreth wide from the truth. For, neither doth *Moſes* ſay, that the SOUL was at the ſame time created when it was brought into the *body*, neither doth any reaſon perſwade thereunto.

Eunomius therefore, might aſwell have ſaid that the *Soul* is mortall, as doth *Ariſtotle*, and the *Stoicks*, as affirme it is engendred in the *body*. For, if he will ſay the *ſoul* is an *incorporeall Eſſence*; hee ſhould have refuſed to ſay that, *it was created in the*

body; leſt hee give men occaſion to thinke the *ſoule mortall*, and utterly void of *Reaſon*.

Beſide, it ſeemes by his opinion, that the *World* is not yet repleniſhed; but, is at this preſent (as it were) no more then halfe perfected, and ſtands every day in want of ſome additions. For, there are every day added unto it, at the leaſt five times ten thouſand *intelligible ſubſtances*. And (which is moſt unreaſonable) hee ſeemeth to beleeve, that when the number of *ſoules* is finiſhed, then the whole world ſhall bee diſſolved, and the laſt not come to light before the day of the

the generall reſurrection.

What can be more contrary to *reaſon*, then to imagine that the *world* ſhall be deſtroyed, aſſoone as it is fully furniſhed? It were like the play-games of little children ſo to do. For when they have made any workes or deviſes upon the ſands, they uſually tread them out againe as ſoone as they have done them.

III. Now if any ſhall hereunto reply, that the *ſoules* are now made by *Providence* and not by *Creation*; and that there is no new *ſubſtance* brought into the world (whenſoever any *body* is repleniſhed with a *ſoule*) nor any other *Eſ-*

ſence, but the ſame multiplyed, by *Providence*, which was before; doubtleſſe, they know not the difference between *Creation* and *Providence*.

For it is the ſpeciall worke of *Providence* to preſerve the *ſubſtance* of corruptible *living creatures*, by breeding them one of another. I meane, here, all ſuch corruptible *living-creatures* as are bred by generation, and excepting thoſe which are generated by ſome *rotten-matter*; for, the ſucceſſion of ſuch, is preſerved, (by the ſame providence) by generating them of ſome other *putrifaction*.

But

But the chiefe operation of *Creation* is, to make things of *nothing*. If, therfore, the SOULS bee made one of another: It will also follow, that they are corruptible, like those other creatures, which are made successively one of another, according to their kindes. If contrariwise, the SOULS be made of *nothing*, then their making commeth by *Creation*, and in so affirming, we deny that place of *Moses*: *God ceased from all his workes*. But both of these opinions are absurd; Therefore, the *Soules* are not now made. For, that saying of the *Scripture*; *My Father worketh, &c.* by

the judgement even of *Eunomius* himſelfe, is to be underſtood not of the workes of *Creation*, but of *Providence*.

Apollinarius held opinion that *Soules* were engendred one of another, as *Bodies* are; and that the SOUL proceeds by ſucceſſion from the firſt *Man*, unto all men deſcending from him, according to the bodily ſucceſſion; therein diſſenting both from thoſe who conceive them to have beene from the beginning (as it were) ſtored up; and from thoſe alſo who thinke they are daily created. For, in contradiction to theſe tenets, they affirme, that by them God

God is set on work with Adulterers when they beget children. And they further say that these words of *Moses*, *God ceased from all his works, &c.* should be untrue, if God continueth to create *Souls*.

In answer hereunto, we have already shewed, that all things are mortall which have a successive generation one of another: For, therefore onely they generate and are generated, that the race of corruptible things might be preserved. And therefore, *Apollinarius*, must either deny the successive generation of *Souls*; or by holding such a generation, he must (consequently at

at leaſt) neceſſarily affirme that the *Soul* is mortall. Whereas hee mentions children borne in Adultery; let us leave that unto the *Divine Providence*, whereof we are ignorant. But, if we may preſume to conjecture ought of the Divine Providence, it may be conceived that God very well knowing a child ſo begotten may be ſome way profitable, permitteth ſuch a *bodie* alſo to be furniſhed with a *Soul*, as hath been teſtified unto us by the child which was begotten of *David* on the wife of *Vrias*.

SECT.

SECT. 6.

I. *The opinion of the* Manichees *concerning the* SOUL, *and the absurdity and contradictions thereof.* II. *The judgement of* Plato *touching one generall* SOUL, *and many particular* SOULS; *The office of the* SOUL; *and the difference betweene* things that live, *and* Living-creatures, *is here also declared.* III. *Of the* Transmigration *of* SOULS *according to the various fancies of the* Grecian Philosophers.

NOw, it followes that we examine the opinion of the *Manichees* con-

concerning the Soul. For, they ſay truely, that the Soul is a *ſubſtance*, both *immortall* and *incorporeall*: But, they adde alſo, that there is but one onely *Soul* for all things; and that it is parted, and (as it were) peecemeal diſtributed unto all *particular bodies*, as well to *bodies inanimate*, as to thoſe which are indued with life.

They affirme likewiſe that ſome *bodies* receive the ſame in more ample ſort, and ſome in a leſſe meaſure. *Things indued with life* in a larger proportion; *Things void of life*, in the leſſe; And, *heavenly things* in the moſt abundant manner; and that

that the *particular ſoules*, are portions of that *ſoul* which is *univerſall.*

Now, if they had affirmed the *ſoul* to have been ſo divided, as that it had not been divided into parts, but after ſome ſuch ſort as one voice is divided to the eares of many hearers, the error had been the more tolerable. But, their opinion is, that the very *ſubſtance* of the *ſoul* is divided into parts; and (which is moſt harſh) they will have it to be accounted properly among the *Elements*, and to be diſtributed together with the *Elements*, in the making up of *bodily-things*; and for the collecting of them

them againe into *one*, when they are dissolved, as water is divided into certain portions, and then mingled again all together.

They are of opinion, likewise, that (after the dissolution of their bodies) the pure *soules*, being *light*, doe ascend unto the light; and that *souls* which have been defiled by the *materiall substance* (in which they resided) doe passe into the *Elements*, and from the *Elements* depart againe into *Plants*, and *living-creatures*. And though they do thus mangle the *substance* of the *soul*, by their fancies making it in effect both *corporeall*

poreall and ſubject to perturbations, they ſay neverthleſſe, that it is *immortall*.

But, in theſe things they contradict themſelves: For, firſt, they ſay that the *ſouls* which have been defiled, doe returne back to the *Elements*, and are mingled and tempered one with another; and contrariwiſe, in the paſſing of *ſoules* from *body* to *body*, they ſay that puniſhments are inflicted on them according to their offences, joyning and ſeparating again the nature of them, (*as occaſion ſerves.*)

They hold likewiſe, that when it is light, *ſhadowes* are diſperſed; and when

when all is covered with clouds, that the *ſhadowes* are gathered together; which cannot poſſibly come to paſſe in an *intelligible Nature*. For, if a *Man* ſhould grant that *ſhadowes* are diſperſed and gathered againe; we muſt then count *ſhadowes* among things ſubject unto *ſenſe*.

II. *Plato* is of opinion that there is both one *generall ſoul*, and many *particular ſoules*. One *ſoule* for the whole world altogether, and other *ſoules* for particular things: In ſuch manner, that the whole world is indued with a *proper ſoul* of its owne, even with that *ſoul* which belongeth unto the whole *world*; and ſo

ſo alſo, that particular things are indued with their *proper ſoules*, even with the *ſoul*, which is peculiar unto every one of them.

The *ſoul* (ſaith hee) which pertaineth to the *Vniverſe* is ſtretched forth from the center of the Earth to the uttermoſt limits of the Heavens, (not as though he conceived ſuch a ſtretching forth as is incloſed in *Place*, but ſuch an extenſion rather as is conceived in our underſtanding.) And hee ſaith, that this is the SOUL which turneth about the whole *Globe*, and which holdeth in, and bindeth together all ſuch things as have

have bodily ſhape. For (as hath been already declared) all *corporeall ſubſtances* have need of ſomewhat to hold them together; and that is done by the SOUL, which giveth unto every thing the *forme*.

For, every thing that liveth, hath a proper life of his owne, and every thing that is corrupted hath his proper corruption, (ſay the *Platoniſts*.) So long as it is held, and knit together, they terme it a *Bodie*; and, when it is diſſolved, they ſay it is corrupted or deſtroyed.

They affirme, alſo, that all things *live*; but, ſay not that all things are *living creatures*. For, they diſtinguiſh

guiſh *Plants* from things *inanimate*, for that they increaſe and are nouriſhed by a *nouriſhing* and *vegitative power*. They diſtinguiſh the *living-creatures, void of reaſon*, from *plants*, by *ſenſe*; And the *rationall* from the *irrationall*, by *reaſon*.

Thus, though they affirme generally, that all things live; yet they diſtinguiſh the nature of every *living-thing*. Such things as are utterly void of a ſenſible life, doe live (ſay they) an *habituall life*, and are held together by the *generall Soul* of the *World*, which keeps them in their proper *Being*, and undiſſolved. This, they hold

hold also to be the *Soul* which governs the world; and, that, it sends into every particular thing such particular *Souls*, as were before, made for them by the CREATOR. Yea, and they say to, that the *Creator* gave unto it certaine *Lawes*, whereby it should order this whole *world*, (which *Lawes* they call DESTINIE) and that the same *Creator* vouchsafed thereunto a sufficient power to supply such things as are necessary for *Man*: whereof wee shall treat more at large in our discourse of *Destinie*.

III. All the *Greek Philosophers* who affirme the *Soul* to be *immortall*, are of opinion

nion that the SOUL paſſeth from *bodie* to *bodie*: But they differ in ſetting down of what ſort of *ſouls* they meane it.

Some underſtand it of one ſort onely; that is to ſay, of the *Reaſonable-ſoul*; affirming that it paſſeth into *Plants*, and into the *bodies* of *irrationall-creatures*: Some of theſe think this *tranſmigration* was but at certaine appointed Revolutions of Time; and ſome of them imagined the time to be caſuall and uncertaine. Some other underſtand it, not of one ſort of *ſouls* onely; but of the *Irrationall*, as well as of the *Rationall*: and ſome again, underſtand it of many

ny ſorts of *ſoules*, even of ſo many, as there are divers kinds of *living creatures*.

The Schollers of *Plato* have been ſomewhat ſingular in this opinion. For, conſidering *Plato* ſaid, that the *ſoules* of ſuch as were *furious*, and *angry*, and given to rapine, were clothed with the *bodies* of Wolves and Lions; and that their *ſouls* who ſpent their lives in *wantonneſſe*, tooke upon them the bodies of Aſſes and ſuch like beaſts: Some underſtand him as though hee had meant Lions and Wolves & Aſſes as the bare words doe ſignifie. Some perceived that he ſpake figuratively,

tively, and by the names of thoſe beaſts, underſtood the conditions or qualities of thoſe creatures. For *Cronius* in his booke intituled *Of the renewed generation* (for ſo he termes the *tranſmigration* of SOULS from *Bodie* to *Body*) will have it underſtood of none but *reaſonable-Soules*: Yea and *Theodorus* (one profeſſing the doctrines of *Plato*) in his book which affirmeth, that *one* SOUL *comprehends all the ſpecies*, is likewiſe of the ſame minde; And ſo is *Porphyrie*.

Sect. 7.

I. *The singular opinion of* Iamblicus, *touching the* Trāsmigration *of* Souls. II. *Every* Bodie *hath a* Soul *convenient for the same.* III. *The* brute creatures *doe nothing according to* Reason, *but by* naturall instinct. IV. *The judgement of* Galen *concerning diversitie of* Soules, *and a recapitulation of the severall things proved and disproved in this Chapter, concluding the* Soule *to be both* immortall, *and* incorporeall.

But, *Iamblichus* running a contrary race to these

theſe men, ſayes that wee muſt underſtand, that the *ſoul* is of the ſame ſort that the *living-creature* is; and that there be divers kinds of SOULS. He hath affirmed in his booke called MONOBIBLON, that the changing of SOULS never hapneth from *Men* to *unreaſonable-creatures*, neither from *unreaſonable-creatures* to *Men*; but from *beaſts* to *beaſts*; and from *Men* to *Men*. And in ſo ſaying he hath not only well gueſſed, but in my judgement expreſſed the very truth of *Plato's* opinion: As by many other of his Arguments may be ſhewed; but, eſpecially by theſe that follow.

No one of the motions of reaſon (ſaith he) manifeſts it ſelfe in *unreaſonable creatures*: For, neither *Arts*, nor *Learning*, nor *Conſultations*, nor *Vertues*, nor any other thing belonging to an *intelligible nature*, can bee found in them. And, therefore it is plaine that they have no part of the *reaſonable-Soul*. Though in *Infants*, which are very young, there is altogether an *unreaſonable-motion*; yet wee ſay they have a *Reaſonable-Soule*; becauſe, when they come to yeares, they ſhew forth the workes of *reaſon*. But, in the *unreaſonable-creature*, which, at no age, giveth any token of *Reaſon*, the

the *Reasonable-soule* would bee superfluous; because, the force of *Reason* would bee altogether, and at all times, useless unto him.

All men have agreed unanimously, that *God* made no superfluous creature; which being true, it cannot be that a *Reasonable-soule* should be so superfluously bestowed, as to be placed in cattle, and wilde beasts, which cannot exercise the same; lest it might bee objected as a fault in the *Creator*, to give an unfit SOUL to the *Body*: For, it is not the part of a good *workeman* (or of one who knowes the order and method of working) so to doe.

Now, if any ſhall object, that there is in *beaſts*, a certaine hidden *habit of reaſon*, whereby they are moved; and that their ſhape makes them uncapable of *artificiall workes*, as the want of a mans fingers, depriveth him of meanes to practiſe many *Arts*, wherein he is experienced, it makes nothing to the matter: For, the ſame abſurdity ſtill remaines; implying that God applyeth SOULS unto ſome BODIES, which are ſo unfit, and ſuperfluous, that they are hindered, throughout all the ages, of thoſe *creatures*, from their operations.

Beſide, they confirme their

their *propoſitions*, by things unknowne, and ſuch as are not confeſſed: For, who allowes this fancy, that, *Beaſts have in them a motion, according to an hidden habit of Reaſon?*

II. It is therefore better to hold, that a SOUL convenient for every *Body*, is fitly applyed thereunto: That beaſts alſo have nothing more, according to any *hidden habit of reaſon*, then doth outwardly appeare in their naturall and ſimple actions; That every ſort of *unreaſonable creatures* is moved likwiſe according to a proper inſtinct of their owne, to ſuch uſes, and to ſuch workes as they were or-

dained unto, from the beginning: and, that the ſhapes of their *Bodies* are likewiſe very fitly accommodated for ſuch purpoſes

Moreover, the CREATOR, becauſe hee would not leave them utterly void of help in their neceſſities, hath placed in every one of them ſuch an *underſtanding* as is *naturall*, though not *reaſonable*. In ſome he hath placed a *wiſineſſe* repreſenting *Art*, and having a ſhadow of *Reaſon*; partly for their better avoiding of ſnares and dangers, which may betide them; and partly to make all creatures to be the more naturally knit one to another; as hath beene

beene ſaid before.

III. Now, that the *brute-creatures* have not the uſe of *reaſon* in doing theſe things is evident in this, that every *living-creature* of one kinde, doth the ſame things, and all of them in one, and the ſame manner. Their practices differ not in multitude, but in this onely, that ſome uſe them, perhaps more, and ſome leſſe; for all the whole *kinde* of them, practiſe the ſame wiles.

Every Hare doth uſe the ſame ſubtleties, every Foxe is alike crafty, and every Ape imitates alike. But, it is not ſo with *Man*; For, his actions are infinitely various, becauſe,

Reason being a certaine thing which is free; and men having also many things in their power, their workings are not one and the same, as it is in every kinde of *irrationall creature*. For beasts have their motion onely by nature; and such things as are in a creature naturally, are in all of the same kinde. But, the actions proceeding from *Reason*, are after one sort in one man, after another sort in another, and not necessarily the same in all men.

But, if they should say that *mans* SOVL is driven into the *Bodies* of beasts, for a punishment of those faults which it had

had committed, when it was formerly in *man* while he lived: This demonstration of theirs (*contrary to the rules of Logick*) proveth former things, by such as come after: For, why should reasonable Souls bee cast into the Bodies of beasts which were made before man? can you say they had offended in the *Body* of *man* before they had entred at all into mans body?

Galen, that admirable Physitian seemeth to bee of the former opinion, & to suppose that in every severall kinde of *living-creature* there is a sundry kind of *soul*: For, in the beginning of the first

Booke

Booke of that *Tract* which he wrote *Of the uſe of the parts*; hee ſayes thus. "Though there be many "parts of a *living-crea-* "*ture*, ſome greater, ſome "leſſe; (and ſome that can- "not be divided into any "other kinde) every one "of them is uſefull ſome "way to the SOUL: For, "the *Body*, is the inſtru- "ment of the *ſoul*, and the "parts of *living-creatures*, "differ much from one a- "nother, becauſe there is "difference in their "SOULS.

Againe, ſomewhat af- ter that in the ſame book, he addes theſe words, ſpeaking of an *Ape*. Oh, "thou that art ſo witty

"in

"in finding faults I Na-
"ture can tell thee that it
"was convenient a ridi-
"culous ſhape of *Body*
"ſhould be given to that
"beaſt whoſe SOUL *was*
"*ridiculous*. By this it may ſufficiently be declared, that *Galen* thought a diverſitie of SOULS was planted in thoſe creatures which were of divers kindes. Thus much of theſe matters.

IV. Seeing wee have now proved (even by their owne arguments who have held the contrary) that the SOUL is neither a *corporeall eſſence*, nor a *harmony*, nor a *Temperature*, nor any other *quality*; it will neceſſarily follow,

follow, that it is a *ſubſtance incorporeall.* All confeſſe there is a Soul; and if it be neither a *Body*, nor an *accident*, it is manifeſt that it is a *ſubſtance* without a *body*; and no ſuch thing as cannot ſtand by it ſelfe without a ſubject: For ſuch things may without the deſtruction of the *ſubject* be either in the ſame, or abſent; but if the Soul be ſeparated from the body, that body muſt of neceſſity be deſtroyed.

We may uſe the ſame reaſons to prove the *Soul immortall*: For, if it bee neither a *body*, whoſe nature is ſubject to diſſolution and deſtruction, as is aforeſaid; nor a *quality*, nor

a

a *quantity*, nor any thing ſubject to corruption; then it muſt needs bee *immortall.*

There bee many other demonſtrations, both in *Plato*, and others, illuſtrating the *immortality* of the Soul, but they are full of obſcurity, and can hardly be underſtood, or borne away by thoſe who have beene trained up in the ſame ſciences.

To us the doctrine of the divine Scriptures are al-ſufficient, to prove the Souls immortality; & beare a ful credit in themſelves, becauſe they were inſpired by *God.* But, againſt thoſe who embrace not the *Scriptures*, as wee

Chriſtians

Christians doe, wee must prove by demonstration, that the SOUL is no such thing, as is subject to corruption. If it bee no corruptible thing, it must needs bee incorruptible; and consequently *immortall*. And therefore, to that purpose let this be sufficient.

CAP.

Cap. 3. Sect. 1.

I. *Of the uniting of the* Soul *and* Body, *and whether their* Natures *be altered, or confounded by their* union. II. *The myſtery of the* Soul *and* Bodie's union *illuſtrated by conſidering things conceivable in* underſtanding, *and by a ſimilitude taken from the* Sun. III. *Of the admirable proprieties of the* Soul; *and how it is properly or improperly ſaid to be in the* Body, *or in* Place, &c.

OUr purpoſe is now to enquire, how between the

the Soul and a *lifeleſſe-body* there may bee a perfect union: For, the poſſibility of this thing appeareth ſomewhat doubtfull; and, it is much the more doubtfull, if *Man* conſiſt not of theſe two parts onely, but of *underſtanding* alſo (*as a diſtinct thing*) which is the opinion of ſome. But, the greateſt doubt of all, ariſeth in this reſpect, that all thoſe things which concurre unto the making of one *eſſence*, are joyned all together in the making of that *one*; ſeeing all ſuch things as are united to the making up of another thing, are (*uſually*) ſo altered that they remaine not the ſame

ſame they were before, as it ſhall plainly be declared in our Treatie of the four *Elements*.

How then can the BODIE being united unto the SOUL, remaine ſtill a *Bodie*? or, how can the SOUL being *incorporeall*, and having a *ſubſtance* of his owne, be united with the BODIE, and become a part of the *Living-creature*, preſerving ſtill his owne proper *ſubſtance*, without corruption and confuſion?

It ſeemes to be no way elſe poſſible, but that the *Soul* and the *Body* muſt by their union one with other, either become altered one with the other, or

or corrupted with each other, as the *Elements* are; or elſe, (to avoid thoſe abſurdities) that they ſhould not be truly united; but, be ſo joyned onely as *Dauncers* are in their daunce, or lie one by the other as *Counters* in a *ſumme*, or at beſt be ſo mixed, as *wine* and *water*.

But, we have already declared in my *Treatiſe* upon the SOUL, that the *Soul* cannot be laid (as it were) along by the *Bodie*; becauſe, if it ſhould be ſo, that part onely of the *body* ſhould have *life* in it, which joyneth neare unto the *ſoule*; and that the part which the *ſoule* toucheth not, ſhould be without *life*. More-

Moreover, wee cannot ſay, that two ſundry things placed one beſide the other, (as two pieces of timber, two iron wedges, or ſuch like) are one and the ſame thing. And as for ſuch a mixture as is made of *wine* and *water*, wee know it corrupts both the one and the other; for there doth remaine neither pure *water*, nor pure *wine*, after ſuch a mixture.

Yet this mixture of *wine* and *water*, is but (as it were) a laying of them one beſide another, though our ſenſes be not able to apprehend the ſame, becauſe they are hindred from perceiving it, by the thinneſſe of the parts

parts of thoſe things which are mixed. For, the *wine* and *water* may be ſeparated againe the one from the other, by a *ſponge* dipped in oyle, or by *paper*, either of which will ſuck away the pure *water* from the *wine*. But, indeed, it is utterly impoſſible to ſeparate ſenſibly one frō the other, thoſe things which are exactly united.

If therefore, the parts of MAN be neither united, nor placed one beſide the other, nor mixed together, as aforeſaid; what reaſon ſhould move us to ſay, that one *Living creature* is made of theſe two parts, a *Soul* and a *bodie*?

It was the conſidera-

tion

tion hereof, which partly moved *Plato* to imagine that this *living creature* did not consist of *Soule* and *Body*; but, that he was a *Soule* having the use of the *Body*, and to whom the *Body* served as a *garment*. But, even in affirming that, he occasioned as much doubting; for, how can the *Soul* bee one with what is but his *garment*, seeing a *Coat*, is not all one with him that weares it?

II. But *Amonius*, who was master to *Plotinus* thus dissolved this question: even by affirming that *intelligible things* have such a nature as may both bee united unto such things as are capable

capable of them (and after the manner of such things as are corrupted together in their uniting) and yet remaine as truly without confusion or corruption, when they bee united, as those things do, which are but laid along one by another.

It is true that *Bodily things* being perfectly united together, must of necessity suffer alterations by their union, and be changed in every one of those parts which concurre thereunto; because, they are thereby changed into other *Bodies*, as are the *Elements* making *compound bodies*; or as *nourishment*, being changed into *blood*;

blood; or as the *blood* when it is converted into *Fleſh*, and other parts of the *Bodie*.

But things *intelligible*, may bee united, and yet no alteration of the *ſubſtance* thereupon enſue. For, it is not agreeable to the nature of *intelligible things*, to bee altered in *ſubſtance*; but, either it departeth away, or is brought to nothing, and ſo can admit no alteration.

The SOUL is *immortall* and therefore cannot bee corrupted, or brought to nothing; for, then it could not be *immortall*. It is alſo *life it ſelfe*; and therefore cannot be changed in the *mixture*: For, if it ſhould

be changed in the *union*, it ſhould be altered from being *life* any more; and what ſhould the SOUL profit the *Body* if it gave not *life* thereunto? All theſe arguments conſidered, it muſt be concluded that the *ſoul* is not altered by being united unto the *Body*.

Having thus proved that the *ſubſtance* of *intelligible-things* cannot be altered; it followes neceſſarily therupon, that as they are not corrupted by their *union* with other things; ſo likewiſe, the things whereunto they are united remaine uncorrupted; and that in the union of the SOUL and *Body* there is

is neither any *corruption* or *confusion* of the one or of the other.

That they are nevertheleſſe perfectly united, is manifeſted by this, that either of them partaketh of that which chanceth to the whole *living-creature:* For, the whole man grieveth as *one creature*, if any cauſe of griefe happen to the one part or the other, (to the SOUL or to the *Body*.)

And, it is as plaine, that they remaine united without *confuſion*, in that the *ſoule* being ſeparated (after a ſort) from the *Body* when wee bee aſleepe (and leaving the *body* lying in maner of a dead

Corps, and only breathing into the ſame, as it were, certaine vapours of *life*, leaſt it ſhould utterly periſh) doth worke by it ſelfe, in dreames, whileſt the *Body* ſleepeth; foreſeeing things to come, and exerciſing it ſelfe meerely in *things intelligible.*

The like hapneth when the *minde* is very ſeriouſly occupied in *cõtẽplation*, & enters into the conſideration of *intellectuall-things*. For, even then the *ſoule* endeavours by all poſſible meanes to bee ſeparated from the *body*, and to bee alone by it ſelfe that it may thereby aſcend to the knowledge of things.

For,

For, being without *body*, it ſeparates it ſelf from the whole *body*, as things which are therewithall corrupted; and yet remaineth uncorrupted as thoſe things alſo doe wherein there is no confuſion: And keeping it ſelfe *one* and *alone*, changeth that wherein it abideth, by the *life* which is contained in it ſelfe; and yet is not changed by the ſame.

For, as the *Sun*, ſo ſoon as it appeareth, changes the *ayre* into *light*; ſo making it lightſome, and ſo diffuſing it ſelfe with the *ayre*, that it is united with the ſame, and yet not confounded therewith: Even ſo, the *ſoul* being uni-

ted with the *Body*, remaines without confusion therwith; differing in this one'ly, that the *Sunne* being a *Body*, and circumscribed within the compasse of *Place*, is not himselfe in every place where his *light* is, but (as *fire* in the *wood*, or as the *flame* in a *candle*) is confined to a certaine *place*.

III. It is not so with the *soul*. For, being void of all *Body*, and not contained within the limits of any place, it passeth *all* and *whole*, through it own whole *light*, and through the whole *Body*, wherein it is; neither is any part of it illuminated thereby, wherin it is not fully and wholly

wholly preſent. Neither is it in the *body* as in ſome bottle or other veſſell, nor compaſſed in by the ſame; but the *Body* is rather in the *ſoule*, and is thereby held in and faſtned together.

For, *intelligible things* (ſuch as the *ſoul* is) are not hindred by *bodily things*; but, enter, and pierce, and paſſe through every *corporeall* thing, and cannot poſſibly bee contained within the circumference of a *bodily-place*. Things *intellectuall*, have their being in places alſo *intelligible*; yea they are either in *themſelves*, or elſe in ſuch *intellectuall things*, as are above themſelves.

The *ſoul* is otherwhile in it *ſelfe*; as, when it *reaſoneth* or conſidereth of things; and otherwhile in the *underſtanding*; as, when it *conceiveth* any thing: And when it is ſaid to bee in the *body*, it is not ſaid to be there, as in *place*; but, to be as it were in a certaine *relation* to the *body*; and to bee preſent with it in ſuch a ſenſe, as, God is ſaid to be in *us*.

For, wee ſay that the *ſoul* is bound (as it were) by a certaine diſpoſition and inclination, as the *lover* is to his *beloved*: not bound in place, or as *bodies* are bound; but by the habituall bands of *affection*. And indeed, ſeeing it hath

hath neither *magnitude*, nor *maſſineſſe*, nor *parts*, how can it be encloſed by a ſpeciall *place*? Or within what *place* can that bee contained, which hath no *parts*? Where *place* is, there muſt needs bee a *maſſineſſe*; becauſe *place* is the *Bound* which compaſſeth another thing; and hath it being in reſpect of that which it encloſeth.

Now, if any man ſhall thereupon conclude, that his ſoule is in *Alexandria*, and in *Rome*, and in every place; let him know, that even in ſo ſaying, hee includeth a *Place*. For, to be in *Alexandria*, or generally to *be here*, or *there*, or any *where*, pertaineth un-

to a *place*; whereas the *ſoul* is no where (no not in the *body*) as in a *place*; but habitually; becauſe, (as is aforeſaid) it cannot be contained within a *place*.

For this cauſe, when things *intellectuall* have any *habituall* inclination to a *place*, or to ſuch things as are in *place*; wee turne the word from his proper uſe, and ſay abuſively, that ſuch a thing is *there*, or *there*; by reaſon of the operation which it there hath; taking the name of *place*, for the *inclination*, or *working* in a *place*. And, whereas we ſhould rather ſay, *It there worketh*, we ſay, *There it is*.

SEC.

SECT. 2.

I. *Of the* union *of the* Godhead *with the* Manhood, *how far forth it hath any ſimilitude with the* union *of the* Soule *and* Body; *and wherein it is unlike thereunto.* II. *Arguments taken from* Porphyrie, *confuting himſelfe, and others, who deny the poſſibility of an* union *betweene the* Godhead *and the* Manhood, *and a diſproofe of the opinion of the* Eunomians *concerning that* union. III. *He proceeds to treat of the union of the* ſoule *and* body; *and ſhewes that as it was meerely,*

meerely, of Gods *good pleasure, to unite the* God head *to the* Man-hood; *So it was also agreeable to the Nature of* God, *that this* union *should be without* mixture *or* confusion.

THat which is last aforesaid, agrees more plainly and in more speciall manner to that *union*, which is betweene GOD the WORD, and the *Man-hood*; by which *union*, the two *Natures* being united, remained nevertheless without *confusion*; and so, also, that the *divinity* was not comprehended by the *Humanity*: And, yet, this *uniting* is not altogether

together ſuch, as is betweene the *ſoul* and the *body*: For, the *ſoul* being in the number of *multiplied things*, ſuffers (after a ſort) with the *Body*, in ſuch things as happen thereunto, and by reaſon of their mutuall neceſſities, and converſation together, both *holds it in*, and is alſo *held in*, by the ſame.

But, GOD the *Word* being himſelfe nothing altered, by that *union*, which unites the *divinity* and *humanity* together (nor by that communion which the *ſoule* and *body* have with each other) imparts his *God-head* unto them, without participating of their

their frailties; and becommeth *one* with them, ſtill remaining in *himſelfe* the ſame thing which hee was, before ſuch an *uniting*.

This is a ſtrange and myſterious *temperature* & *uniting*: For, *Hee* is tempered with them, and yet *he himſelfe* continues utterly without *mixion*, without *confuſion*, without *corruption*, and without *change*: Neither *ſuffering* any thing with them; but, only *helping*, and *furthering* them: nor being corrupted nor altered by them; but, greatly encreaſing them, without any diminution in *himſelfe*; becauſe, hee is altogether

gether without *mutation*, without *confuſion*, and without poſſibility of *changing*.

II. Hereof may *Porphyrie* himſelfe beare witneſſe, who hath moved his tongue againſt CHRIST (for, the teſtimonies of our *Adverſaries* are the moſt undeniable proofes which may be brought againſt themſelves.) This *Porphyrie* in the ſecond Booke of his *mixt queſtions* uſes theſe words.

It is not, then (ſaith he) *to be judged a thing impoſſible, that ſome* ESSENCE *ſhould be aſſumed to the perfiting of another* ESSENCE, *and be part of that* ESSENCE, *perfecting alſo*

also the same, and yet remaine still in it owne NATVRE, *both being* ONE *with that other thing, and yet preserving the* VNITY *of it selfe: yea, and (which is more then this) changing those things wherein it is, by the presence thereof, and making it so to worke as it selfe worketh, and yet nothing altered in it* SELFE.

Now, *Porphyrie* spake these things of the uniting of the SOUL and *body*: and if his reason hold good, in the SOUL, in regard it is an *incorporeall substance*, it holds true much rather, in GOD the *Word*, who is verily without *bodie*, and also utterly void of *composition*. And this doth manifestly

festly shut the mouthes of them who endeavour to contradict the uniting of the *God-head* and the *Man-hood*, as many of the Grecians have done; Jeasting, and deriding at it, as impossible, improbable, and absurd, that the *Divine-nature* should be joyned in a *temperature* and an *unity* with our *mortall-nature*; for, it is here discovered, that they may be opposed in this argument, by the testimony of such as are in most esteeme among themselves.

The opinion of some (especially of the *Eunomians*) is this, that GOD the *Word* is united to the *body* not in *substance*, but by the

powers

powers of either (*Nature:*) For it is not (say these) their *substances* which are united and tempered together; but the *powers of the BODY* are tempered with the *Divine powers.*

Now, they affirme (according to *Aristotle*) that the *Senses* are the *powers* of the *body* (meaning of all the *body* as it containes the *instruments* thereof) and therefore, in their judgement, the *Divine powers* being tempered with the *Senses*, is cause of that *uniting*: But, wee shall never be perswaded to grant unto them that the *Senses* are certaine *powers* of the *body*: For, wee have already manifestly

feſtly declared, what things belong properly to the *Body*, what things to the SOUL only; and what to the SOUL and *body* both together: And, we thereupon concluded, that the *Senſes*, which worke by the inſtruments of the *Body*, are to bee reckoned among thoſe things which are proper to the SOUL and *bodie* joyned in *One*.

III. Theſe things conſidered, it is moſt agreeable to *reaſon*, wee ſhould affirme (according to the nature of *incorporeall-things*) and as is aforeſaid, that theſe *Eſſences* of the *ſoule* and *Body* are united without *confuſion*; and in ſuch maner, that the more

Divine

Divine nature, is nothing impaired by the *inferiour nature*; but that onely the *inferiour nature* is profited by that which is *Divine*.

For a *nature* which is purely *incorporeall*, can passe without stop thorow all things, whereas nothing hath passage thorow that: By passing through all things, it is *united*; and in regard nothing passes through the same, it remaines void of *mixture*, and without *confusion*.

It is not rightly affirmed therefore (though many excellent men be of this opinion) that no reason else can be given, why the *union*, whereof wee have

have treated, ſhould bee after ſuch a manner, but, onely, becauſe it pleaſed God it ſhould ſo be: For the very nature of the things is cauſe thereof.

We may juſtly ſay, that it came to paſſe meerely by GOD's good pleaſure, and choiſe, that the SON ſhould take a *Bodie* unto *himſelfe*: But, it commeth not meerely of the good pleaſure of GOD (*though it be alſo his good pleaſure it ſhould be ſo*) but of the proper nature of the *Godhead*, that when it is *united*, it ſhould not bee *confounded* with the *Man-hood*.

Wee will ſpeake nothing of the *degrees* of *ſoules*, nor of their aſcending

ding and descending, mentioned by *Origen*. For we finde in *holy Scriptures* nothing warranting the same; neither are they agreeable to the doctrines commonly received among *Christians*.

CAP.

CAP. 4. SECT. 1.

I. *Of the* Body, *and of the* mediate *and* immediate *compoſition thereof.* II. *Of thoſe parts of a* living-creature, *every* portion *wherof taketh the name of the* whole; *and of thoſe* parts *which take not the name of the* whole. III. MAN *only hath every part belonging to the* Body *of a* perfect *LIVING-CREATVRE whereas all others are defective in ſome of the* parts; *and many in the* Situation *of them.*

RIghtly may we affirme that every corporeall Eſſence is

is a *compoſition* proceeding from the foure *Elements*, and made up of them. The *bodies* of *living-creatures* having *blood* in them, are cõpacted immediatly of the four humors, *Blood*, *flegm*, *Choller*, & *Melancholy*: But the *Bodies* of ſuch as are without *blood*, are made of the other three *humours*, and of ſomewhat in them anſwering proportionably unto *blood*.

We call that *immediately*, when any thing is made of the ſelfe-ſame things without any other thing comming between them: As the foure *humours* are made of the foure *Elements*; and thoſe things are compounded of

of the foure *humours*, which consist of like *parts*, and are parts also of the *body* (that is, things having such *parts*, every *part* of which *parts*, may bee called by the same name which is given unto the whole; as when every part of the *flesh*, is called *flesh*.)

Melancholy, is likned to *Earth*; *Flegme* to *water*; *Blood* to *Ayre*; *Choller* to *Fire*; and, every thing which is compounded of the *Elements*, is either a *Masse*, or *Moisture*, or *Spirits*.

Aristotle thought that the *bodies* of *living-creatures* were made immediately of *Blood* onely; because

cauſe the *ſeed* is ingendred of *blood*, and all the parts of a *living-creature* nouriſhed thereby.

But, becauſe it ſeemed ſomewhat abſurd to imagine that both hardeſt *bones*, and the tendereſt *fleſh* and *fatneſſe*, ſhould proceed all of one thing; It pleaſed *Hippocrates* to affirme that the *bodies* of *living-creatures*, were immediately compacted of the foure *Elements*; the thicke and ſollid parts of the more earthy *Elements*, and the ſoft parts, of ſuch *Elements* as are ſofteſt.

Oftentimes, all the foure *humours* are found in the *blood*; whereof wee have experience in *Phlebotomy*:

botomy: For, ſometime a certaine *flegme* like whey doth abound in it; otherwhile *Melancholy*, and ſometime, againe, *Choller*. Whereupon, it commeth to paſſe that all men ſeem in ſome ſort, to agree with one another.

II. Now, of the *parts* of *living-creatures*; ſome *parts* there be, every *portion* of which *parts* hath the ſame *name* which is given unto the *whole part*: Otherſome there are, which cannot bee called by the ſame *name* whereby the *whole* is called. As for example; Every part of the *Braine* is called *Braine*; In like maner of the *ſinewes*, of the *marrow*, of the

bones, of the *teeth*, of the *griſſells*, of the *nayles*, of the *thin muſcles* that binde the *Ioynts* together, of all the *skins* (*throughout the body*) of the *ſtrings* (*which are in the bloody fleſh*) of the *haires*, of the *fleſh*, of the *veines*, of the *arteries*, of the *pores*, of the *fat*, and of thoſe foure which are in maner of *Elemẽts*, yeelding matter out of which the things aforeſaid are immediately made, pure *Blood*, *Flegme*, *Melancholy*, and *Choller*. Except from theſe, the *Muſcle*, which is compounded of thoſe thinner *Muſcles* which knit our joynts together, and of the *ſtrings* which are of the nature of *ſinewes*.

The

The *parts* of the *body*, consisting of *portions*, whereof every one taketh not the name of the *whole*; are these that follow; *viz.* the *head*, the *breast*, the *hands*, the *feet*, and such other members of *Mans body*. For, if you divide the *head* into severall parts, every *part* of it is not called a *Head*: but if you divide a *sinew* into severall portions, every portion of it shall have the denomination of a *sinew*; and so shall it be likewise, if you divide (or subdivide) a *veine* or *flesh*.

Every *whole thing*, whose severall *parts* have not the same name with the *whole*, is made of such things as

impart the name of the *whole* to the parts, when they are compounded together; as the *head* is made of *ſinewes*, and *fleſh*, and *bone*, and ſuch like, which are called the *inſtrumentall parts*.

The definition therefore of ſuch things as the Greeks call Ὁμοιομερῆ, that is, *things which conſiſt of like parts*, is thus made; *They are things whoſe* parts *are like both to the* whole, *and to each other*; (as fleſh, braine, &c.) and by the word *like*, in this place, we meane the *ſame* with the *whole*; for a piece of a mans fleſh, is as truly fleſh as the whole *maſſe*.

III. Now, every *living creature*,

creature, hath not all the parts of a *body*; but, ſome of them are defective in one *part*, and ſome in others; for, ſome lack *feet*, as *fiſhes*, and *Serpents*; Some have no *head*, as *Crabs* and *Lobſters*, and certaine other *water-creatures*; and becauſe they want a *head*, the ſeat of their *ſenſe* is in the *breaſt*.

Some *living-creatures* have no *Lungs*; namely, all ſuch as breath no *Ayre*; ſome are without a *bladder*, as *birds*, and all ſuch as void not urine. And *creatures* which have *thick ſhells*, are deſtitute of ſo many *members*, that ſome of them, have but few appearances of being *living-creatures*.

There bee alſo ſome *living-creatures*, which although they have ſuch things as are in our *bodies*, yet ſeeme to want them. As the *Stag* which ſeemes to have no *choller*, becauſe hee hath it not in one place, but ſo diſperſed abroad in his entrailes, that it is no where apparant.

But, MAN hath all the parts of a *living-creature*; every part alſo, perfect; and all in ſo goodly order, that it could not poſſibly have beene better compoſed.

Beſide their want of ſome *parts*, there is likewiſe among other *living-creatures*, much difference in

in the ſcituation of the *parts*. For, ſome have their *dugs* in the *breaſt*; ſome, on their *bellies*; and ſome under their *thighes*: Some againe, have two *dugs*; ſome foure; and ſome have more. *Nature* hath ſo provided (for the moſt part) that the number of *dugges* is anſwerable to the number of young-ones which every creature brings forth at a time. But let him that would bee more exactly informed of theſe things, reade the hyſtory which *Ariſtotle* hath written of *living-creatures*.

For, it pertaineth not unto the *diſcourſe* which I now purpoſe, to treate at

large of such things; but, only to point at them, or, to speak briefly of them.

***

CAP.

Cap. 5. Sect. I.

I. *Of the foure* Elements: *of their* ſimple *and* mixt *Nature; of their foure* qualities, Heat, Cold, Moiſture, *and* Drineſſe; *of their* contrarieties, *and of the meanes of uniting them into one* body. II. *Of the* Circular motion, *and changeableneſſe of the* Elements *one into another; and a reaſon why God made them of ſuch a nature.* III. *The opinion of* Ariſtotle, *concerning the nature of the* Ayre, *&c.*

GOe we now on, to the *Elemẽts* which are conſequently to

to be next handled in this *Treatiſe*. An *Element* of the world, is a moſt ſmall part in the compoſition of *bodies*. They are theſe foure; *Earth*, *water*, *ayre*, and *fire*, and if you begin at the loweſt, and ſo paſſe to the higheſt *body* of them, they are placed in ſuch order, as I have named them.

The *bodies* of theſe *Elements*, are the firſt bodies, and *ſimple bodies*, in reſpect of other bodies: And every *Element* is of the ſame kinde, with thoſe things, whoſe *Element* it is. For, *principles* (as *matter*, *forme*, and *privation*) are not of the ſame kinde with the things which are made

made of them : But, an *Element* is neceſſarily of the ſame kinde.

Now, it is manifeſt that theſe foure, *Earth*, *water*, *ayre*, and *fire* are the *Elements*; and it is as evident that the (*foure firſt*) *qualities* (that is to ſay) *Hot*, *cold*, *moiſt*, and *dry*, bee in thoſe *Elements*, in the higheſt degree, both potentially and actually alſo. And, yet, there is not one of theſe *Elements*, which we can diſcerne by our *ſenſes*, to bee altogether void of temperature, and mixture with ſome other *Element* : For indeed, all thoſe which wee are ſenſible of, are in a ſort ſomewhat counterfeit,

feit, and participate each of other, more or leſſe; even when in their mixture, their ſeverall natures continue moſt apparant.

Moreover, every one of theſe *Elements*, hath two coupled *qualities*, which conſtitute the ſpecies, or nature of it. For, EARTH is *dry* and *cold*; WATER is *cold* and *moiſt*; AIRE is *hot* and *moiſt*; and FIRE is *hot* and *dry*. Yet, theſe *qualities*, by themſelves, cannot be *Elements*: For, *qualities* are void of *bodie*; and of things *incorporeall*, things *corporeall* cannot be made.

Neither is it poſſible, that other *bodies* ſhould be actually

actually *Elements*, wch have not actually each of these *qualities* in the highest degree: For, if those things which have these *qualities*, more or lesse, should bee *Elements*, there would be an infinite number of *Elements*; and we should never bee able to discerne the *Elements* of each particular thing: because every thing hath some *quality* in it, more or lesse.

It followes therefore necessarily, that every *Element* is a BODIE and a *simple-body*; and such a one as hath actually in it, in the highest degree, these *qualities*, HEAT, COLD, MOISTURE, and DRINESSE: because, of all *qualities*,

qualities, theſe onely and no other doe make a whole *change* in the whole *ſubſtance*. *Whiteneſſe* comming neare unto a *Body* cannot make it *white* thorow and thorow (as wee ſay) neither can ſuch a change bee wrought by any other thing; whereas *Heat* or *cold*, can warme or coole a body, not onely ſuperficially, but quite throughout the ſame.

Thoſe *Elements* are accounted *contraries*, which are directly contrary to one another, in both their *qualities*. Thus WATER is contrary to FIRE: For, *water* is *cold* and *moiſt*; and *Fire* is *hot* and *dry*. In like maner,

maner, EARTH is contrary to AIRE: For, *Earth* is *cold* and *dry*; and *Aire* is *hot* and *moiſt*.

And, foraſmuch as things which are ſo repugnant, could not bee fitly joyned one unto another, without a *middle-band* ordained to knit them together: The wiſe Creator hath placed *water* as a *meane* between the *Earth* and the *Aire* (which are contraries) induing it with her two *qualities*, *cold* and *moiſt*, that being the *medium* betweene thoſe, which extreamely differ, they might be united thereby: For, by reaſon of the *cold*, it agrees naturally with the *earth*; and

and by meanes of *moiſture*, it is fitly joyned unto the *aire*.

Againe, in the middle betweene the *water* and the *fire*, (which are alſo contraries in themſelves) hee hath placed the *aire*, which by his *moiſt-qualitie* doth very well accord with *water*, and with *fire*, by the *quality* of *heat*.

Thus, God hath linked every one of them each to other (as in a chaine) by placing betweene *things contrary*, ſuch other things as may both unite the ſaid *contraries* to themſelves, and to ſuch things alſo, as are bound one to another by them: Yea, (which is an excellent kind of band) hee

hee hath joyned together every one of the *Elements*, by the one of his *qualities* to that which went before; and by the other to that which followed after.

For example, the *water*, being *cold* and *moist*, is joyned unto the *earth* (which if you beginne at the lowest, and ascend, is next beneath it) by his *coldnesse*; and by his *moisture*, to the *aire* which is next above it. The *aire* likewise by the *moistnes* of it, is joyned to the *water*, which is next beneath it; and by *heat*, to the *fire* which is above it. The *fire* also by the *heat* thereof, is joyned to the aire which

which is beneath it; and by *dryneſſe* to the *earth*; to which, being the loweſt, it declineth it ſelfe (*as it were in a circular motion.*) The *earth* by *coldneſſe*, is united to the *water*; and by *dryneſſe* to the *fire*, which declineth towards it.

II. For, that the *Elements*, ſhould not have onely an inclination to aſcend and deſcend directly upward and downeward; but incline alſo to a *circular motion*: God bowed them (as it were) and made the two extreame *Elements*, *fire* and *earth* to turne one toward the other. For, the *fire* if it loſe *heat*, is no longer *fire*; but becommeth *earth*, as is manifeſtly

ly proved by *thunder-bolts*, which being thrown downe and cooled, are converted into ſtones: For, every *thunder-bolt* conſiſts of ſtone and brimſtone, *The ſtone is* (as it were) *the brimſtone over-baked*,) *Brimſtone* is (as it were) *fire* cooled: and no more actually hot, but, having a neare poſſibility of *heat*; and being alſo, actually *dry*: For, the *Elements* only, have the *qualities* actually; wheras, all other things have them but in poſſibility, except they come near unto ſome *Elements*.

But, to the end, that neither the *Elements* ſhould faile, nor the *Bodies* which

which are to be compounded of those *Elements*, the *Creator* did providently deviſe, that they ſhould be convertible, both one into another; and alſo, into *compound-bodies*: and that the *compound-bodies* ſhould be againe reſolved into their *Elements*. By which meanes, it commeth to paſſe, that they are continually engendered one of another, and perpetually preſerved from being waſted.

For, *Earth* being firſt diſſolved into a mirie moiſtneſſe, becommeth *water*. *Water* being thickned and congealed, becommeth *earth*. *Water* alſo, being heated and reſolved

ſolved into vapours, vaniſheth into *aire*. *Aire* being collected and condenſed, is turned into *water*. The ſame *aire* being dryed changeth into *fire*. *Fire*, if it be quenched, and *water* alſo if it be evaporated, become *aire*: For, *aire* is the quenchings of *fire*, and the moiſture ariſing from *water* being heated; even by both of theſe is the *aire* generated: For, experience doth ſhew us, that whenſoever *fire* is quenched, or *water* heated, *aire* is encreaſed thereby: Therefore *aire* is naturally *hot*; and cooled by being ſcituated ſo neare unto the *water*, and the *earth*; which coole the lower parts

parts thereof, as the *fire* heateth alſo the upper parts of the ſame. And this hapneth unto the *aire* by reaſon of the ſoftneſſe thereof; and the eaſineſſe which it hath to receive impreſſions, makes it quickly depart from its proper nature, and very apt to be changed.

III. But, *Ariſtotle* is of opinion that there bee two ſorts of *aire*; one like unto *vapours*, and generated by the exhalations of *waters*: The other, *ſmoakie*, and bred out of the *fire*, when it is quenched. The *aire* which commeth of *ſmoke*, he conceiveth to bee *hot*; and that alſo which proceedeth from vapours, when

when it is first bred; but, in continuance of time, that *aire* (as he saith) cooleth, by little and little; untill it is converted into *water*.

This supposition of *Aristotles*, that the *aire* is of two sorts, was by him devised, that he might escape some absurdities which he knew not otherwise how to avoid; and that things which are somewhat high, and farre distant from the earth, might seeme *hot*, and that such as are very low might seeme *colder*.

SECT. 2.

I. *Of the uniting of the* Elements *into a* naturall body; *what maner of* composition *it is, and why those* bodies *are againe resolved into* Elements. II. Plato's *opinion concerning the* Element *of* earth; *as also, concerning the other three* Elements. III. *Of the division of the* Elements *according to the* Stoicks. *The opinion of* Aristotle, *touching a fifth* body, *out of which hee thinks the* heavens *were made; and of the contrary opinion of* Plato.

NOw, all *Bodies* are made by the conjunc-

&c.

ction of theſe foure *Elements*, both the *Bodies* of *Plants*, and of *living creatures* alſo: to the compoſition of which *bodies*, nature drawes together the pureſt parts of thoſe *Elements*. Theſe are called by *Ariſtotle*, *naturall bodies*; being compounded, not by heaping of the *Elements* one upon another; but by tempering all together (throughout the whole) ſo much of every *Element*, as is in the *Body*, in the uniting therof; and by making of them one certaine BODIE, differing from what they were, before that *compoſition*.

For, they are ſo united,

that impossible it is to sever them, or to see *Earth* by it selfe, or *Water* alone, or *Ayre*, or *Fire*, distinctly from the rest; because, one intire thing, and a thing differing from the *Elements*, is made by the tempering of all foure of them together; As a *medicine*, consisting of foure *Ingredients*, being once made up, is a thing differing from those *Ingredients*.

But, yet the composition of a *naturall body* is not in all things like those artificiall compositions: For, the *Elements* do not make the *bodies*, by the situation of the *thinnest parts*, one by another, as it falleth

leth out in a *medicine*, compounded of foure *ingredients*; but, it is effected, rather, by altering themselves, and by uniting of all into *One*.

All *Bodies* are again resolved, also, into these *Elements*; by which means it commeth to passe, that all the *Elements* remaine continually unwasted, and are kept sufficient for the making of all things, in regard they neither are diminished, nor abound. And from hence arises this generall *proposition*, That, the *generation of one thing is the corruption of another*; *And the corruption of one, the generation of another*; not referring (*this*

perpetuity) to the *Soul*, as is aforesaid, but to the *Bodie* onely.

II. *Plato* is of opinion that the three other *Elements* are changed one into each other, and that the *Earth* remains altogether without mutation; as may appeare by his comparing of the firmnesse of *figures*, consisting of *streight-lines*, with every *Element*.

To the *Earth* he compares the *figure* called a *Cube*; because of all other *figures* that is least *moveable*. The figure *Icosadron*, which is hardliest moved of all the rest, (and consisting of twenty bases) he likeneth unto *water*. The *Pyramide*, whose motion is

is easiest of all the rest, he resembleth to *fire*. And *Octaedron*, (the *figure* consisting of eight bases) hee compareth unto the *Aire*, whose *motion* is easier then that of the *water*, and more hard then *fire*.

By these *figures*, he endevors to prove demonstratively that the three other *Elements* are changed one into another, but that no change happeth to the *Earth*: For, (saith he) three of these *figures*, that is to say, the *Pyramide*, the *Octaedron* and the *Icosaedron*, are made of *Triangles*, whose sides are unequall, whereas the *Cubicall figure* is made of *Triangles*, whose sides are

equall: now things which are made of *Triangles* whoſe ſides are unequall, being diſſolved and meeting together again, may be changed into another; but, the *Cubicall-figure* being diſſolved cannot be changed into any other; becauſe it is made of equall-ſided-*Triangles*, whereof none of the other three can be made.

In like manner none of the other *figures* can be changed into a *Cube*. And, for theſe reaſons it is neceſſary that the *Bodies* formed of theſe *ſpecies*, and the *ſpecies* whereof they are formed, ſhould in reſpect of one another be ſuch as they were.

And

And, yet, the *Earth* remaineth not altogether impassible; but, is divided by *bodies*, having thinner parts then it selfe; being after a manner altered from *Element* to *Element*, and yet not changed into those things which doe divide it: For, when it is recollected againe unto it selfe, it recovereth the state which it formerly had, as appeares by it, in the water.

For, if you cast a little *earth* into the *water*, and stir it often up and down, that *earth* dissolves into *water*; but, if you leave stirring of the same, the *water* settles, and the *earth* sinks to a residence:

The like is to be thought of the whole *earth*: and this is not a changing, but a diſſevering of ſuch things as were mingled together.

Plato affirmes that the *earth* is alſo ſevered by the ſharpneſſe of the *fire*, and being ſo diſſolved is elevated and carryed away in the *fire*: So likewiſe in the maſſe of the *Aire*, when *Aire* diſſolves it; and, in the *water*, when it is diſſolved, in the *water*.

Moreover, *Plato* mentioneth another diviſion of the *Elements*, affirming every one of them to have three *Qualities*. The *fire* to have *ſharpneſſe*, *rareneſſe*, and *motion*; The *Element* which

which is directly in the extreame thereunto, (that is to say) the *earth*, to have *dulneſſe*, *thickneſſe*, and *reſt*: So, in reſpect of theſe *Qualities*, the *earth* and the *fire*, be cleane contrary to each other; whereas, they were not ſo, by thoſe two qualities, whereof we had formerly ſpoken.

He holdeth likewiſe, that, by qualities taken from the two extreames, thoſe *Elements* were made which are in the middle betweene theſe two: For (ſaith he) two *qualities* (to wit) *rareneſſe* and *motion*, being taken from the *fire*; and *one* (that is to ſay) *dulneſſe*, being aſſumed from the *Earth*, *Aire* is thereof

thereof compoſed, whoſe effecting *Qualities*, are *rareneſſe*, *motion*, and *dulneſſe*. In like manner, two *Qualities* are taken from the *earth*, namely, *dulneſſe* and *thickneſſe*; and one from the *fire*, (to wit) *motion*, whereof proceeds *water*, which getteth alſo his forme, by *thickneſſe*, *dulneſſe*, and *motion*.

Therefore, the ſame that *ſharpneſſe* is in reſpect of *dulneſſe*, the ſame is *fire* in reſpect of *aire*: ſuch as *rareneſſe* is, in reſpect of *thickneſſe*, ſuch is *aire* in reſpect of *water*. That which *motion* is, in reſpect of *reſt*, that *water* is, in reſpect of *earth*. Look what *fire* is, in reſpect of *aire*, the

the like is *aire* in reſpect of *water*. And as *aire* is in reſpect of *water*, ſo is *water* in reſpect of *earth*. For, it is the nature of things having a plaine thin ground, to bee held together by one *medium*; (that is to ſay) by a proportion betweene them; whereas, firme and ſollid *Bodies* are not kept faſt together, but, by two *mediums*.

There are, yet other qualities aſcribed unto the *Elements*. Namely, to the *earth* and *water*, WEIGHTINESSE, whereby they doe naturally incline downeward; and to *aire*, and *fire*, LIGHTNESSE, whereby they are naturally given to

to mount upward.

III. The *Stoicks* have moreover, another way of dividing the *Elements*; for, some they affirme to be *active*, and some *passive*. By *active* they meane the more stirring *Elements*, such as are the *fire* and the *aire*: By *passive* they understand the duller *Elements*, that is to say, the *earth* and *water*.

But *Aristotle*, besides these *Elements*, bringeth in a *Fifth* BODIE, which he tearmes *Æthereall*; and this hee fancies to bee a BODIE having in it a *circular motion*; because, it pleaseth him not to say that the *heavens* are composed of the foure *Elements*:

ments: And he calls the *Fifth, a Body moved circularly*; becauſe, it is (*as he imagines*) caried circularly round about the *earth*.

Plato is of another opinion; and affirmes directly, that the *heavens* are made of *fire*, and of *earth*. His words are theſe: "*Every bodily ſhape which is made, muſt be* viſible *and ſubject unto* touching; *but, nothing can bee* viſible *without ſome* fire *in it*; *nor ſubject unto* touching *without ſome* firmeneſſe; *nor can any thing be* firm, *without* earth: *And therupon in the beginning*, God *cauſed the* body *of the* whole world *to bee compoſed of* earth *and* fire.

" fire. *Now it is not possible*
" *that two things alone*
" *should bee made to* unite
" *and agree well together,*
" *without a third, which*
" *must be as it were a* band
" *betweene them, to bring*
" *them both together; and of*
" *all* bands, *that is the chief*
" *which can most perfectly*
" *bring into an* unity, *both*
" *it selfe, and such things as*
" *are united by the same.*
" *And this, the nature of*
" proportion *doth best per-*
" *forme.*

By the *band* here mentioned, hee intends the two *middle-Elements*, taken according to the *proportion*, whereof we spake before.

SECT.

SECT. 3.

I. *The opinion of the* Hebrewes, *and of* Apollinarius *touching the making of the* heavens *and of the* earth. II. *Arguments out of* Hippocrates *against* Thales, Anaximenes, *and* Heraclitus, *who say that there is but one onely* Element. III. *The* body *being an* instrument *for the* soul, *is made fit for the* operations *thereof.*

THe *Hebrewes*, in their opinions concerning the making of the *heavens* and the *earth*, differ so much from all others, that but

but few have conceived thereof as they doe: For they affirme that they were created of no fore existing matter; according to *Moses*, who said, *In the beginning*, God *made the heaven and the earth.*

But, *Apollinarius* thinks that God made the *heaven* and the *earth*, of the *depth of waters*. For, *Moses* in his description of the *worlds* creation, doth not so make mention of the *depth of waters*, as if it had beene created; but, in *Iob* these words are to bee found; *He made the depth of waters*. Therefore, hee affirmed, that all other things were made out of that, as out of a *matter* common

common to all.

Hee doth not ſay that this *depth of waters*, was never made; but, that it was laid downe by the *Creator*, as a foundation, before any other *bodily-thing* was made, that other things might bee made thereof: For, the very name of *depth*, declares the infiniteneſſe of the *matter*.

And indeed, whether it bee this or that way taken, it is not much materiall; For even by this opinion alſo, God is confeſſed the ſole *Creator* of all things; and that hee made every thing of *nothing*.

II. Now, there bee ſome who ſay, that there is but one

one onely *Element*; either *Fire*, or *Aire*, or *Water*, "(*For Thales affirmes that* "*fire only*; *Anaximenes that* "*aire onely*; *and Heraclitus*, "*with Hipparchus Meta-* "*pontinus*, that *water* one- "ly is an *Element*) against whom it shall be sufficient to alleage what *Hippocrates* hath said in that behalfe.

"If (saith he) MAN "were composed but of "one onely thing hee "could never feele any "griefe; For, hee being "but *One thing*, nothing "could procure paine un- "to him; or if hee should "feele any griefe, there "could be but one thing "which might heale him:

"For,

"For, that which feeleth
"griefe, muſt needs bee
"in a mutation with
"ſome *ſenſe*: And, if there
"bee but one *Element*,
"there can then bee no-
"thing whereinto the *li-*
"*ving-creature* ſhould be
"*changed*: And if it were
"not *altered*, but continu-
"ed ſetled in the ſame
"ſtate, it could not poſſi-
"bly feele paine, though
"it were never ſo ſenſible.
"*He ſaith further*: It is
"neceſſary that the thing
"which any body ſuffe-
"reth ſhould proceed
"from ſome other thing:
"but if there bee but one
"onely *Element*, there can
"be no *quality*, beſide the
"*quality* of one *Element*,
"whereby

"whereby the *living*
"*creature* may be afflicted:
"And, if neither can bee
"changed nor ſuffer any
"thing, how can it bee
"grieved?

After hee had thus declared the impoſſibility thereof, he ſuppoſeth, nevertheleſſe, the ſame to be granted; and thereupon thus interreth. Grant (ſaith hee) it could ſuffer griefe, and then it will follow, that there is but one thing onely which can cure the ſame; but experience hath taught us that there is not one thing only, but many things to cure every diſeaſe; and therefore *Man* cannot be *one onely intire thing*.

It

It may be further proved, that there are foure *Elements*, by the reaſon wherewith every one of them endeavoureth to confirme his owne opinion (who affirme that there is but one onely *Element*.)

For when *Thales* affirmed that *water* onely was to bee accounted an *Element*, hee endeavoured to ſhew that all the other three were made of it; ſaying that the fæces of it become *earth*, the thin parts become *aire*, and that the thinneſt parts of that *aire* are turned into *fire*.

Anaximenes, holding opinion that *aire* onely is an *Element*; goes about to prove

prove likewiſe, that all the reſt of the *Elements* are made of *aire*.

Heraclitus and *Hipparchus Metapontinus* affirming that there is no *Element* but *fire*, uſe likewiſe the very ſame demonſtration, to make their argument ſeeme reaſonable.

Now, it will become evident by the reaſons which theſe men give to juſtifie their aſſertion; that every one of them is an *Element*: For by ſome it is demonſtrated, that all other *Elements* are made of the *fire*; by another, that all the reſt are made of *water*; and by a third that they are all of *aire*; which make it plaine that all the

Elements

Elements are changed one into another (*by their generall consent, who otherwise disagree.*) And if they can all bee changed one into another, it will necessarily follow that they must all be *Elements*; because which of the *foure* soever shall bee taken, it will appeare that even *that* is made of some other.

III. The *Body* (*which is composed of these Elements*) being an instrument for the SOUL, is divided together with the *powers* of the same: For, it was framed to be convenient and fit for them, in such maner, that no *power* of the SOUL should be hindered

through the *Bodies* defect. And therefore to every *power* of the SOUL, there are proper parts of the *Body* assigned, for his operation; as I will more particularly declare in the following *Chapters*.

The SOUL exercises the part of an *Artificer*; the BODIE is as it were his *instrument*: It is also the *matter* wherein the *actions* are conversant; and the *effect* which is wrought thereby, is the *action* it selfe. The matter is as the *woman*, the act is that which is conversant about her; either whoredome, incest, or lawfull copulation.

The *powers* of the *Soul*, are

are divided into these three; *phantasie*, *judgement*, and *memory*.

***

Cap. 6.

I. *Of the* phantaſie, *or* imagination; *what it is*; *by what* Names *expreſſed*; *and by what* inſtruments *it worketh*. II. *Of the* ſeats *and* nature *of the* ſenſes; *and why being but foure* Elements, *there are five* ſenſes. III. *The definitions of* ſenſe, *according to* Plato *and others*; *and diſtinctions betweene ſuch* faculties *in the* Soul, *as are appointed to* beare rule, *and to* obey.

EXpreſſe we will in the next place, ſuch things as concerne the

the phantaſie *or* imagination. The faculty of *imagining*, is a *power* of that part of the *ſoule* which is void of *Reaſon*, and worketh by thoſe *inſtruments* wherein the *ſenſes* are placed.

The thing ſubject to *imagination*, is that whereabout our *imagination* is converſant, and may bee called *imaginable*, as that which is felt is termed *ſenſible*.

Imagination it ſelfe (called φαντασία) is a paſſion of that part of the *ſoul* which is *irrationall*, procured by ſomething which is ſubject to our *imagination*. A *vaine imagination* (called φαντασμα) is a void paſſion

in the parts of the *ſoule* which are deſtitute of *reaſon*, being procured of no certaine thing whereof an *imagination* ſhould ariſe.

But, the *Stoick* Philoſophers doe ſet downe thoſe foure in this maner; The *imagination* it ſelfe, φαντασία; The thing whereby the *imagination* is moved, φαντασιοῦν; A voide drawing away of our *imagination*, φαντασικὸν; And that which moveth our *imagination* to bee vainely drawne away, φάντασμα.

Imagination is a paſſion repreſenting unto us both it ſelfe, and the thing moving our *Imagination*; For, when we ſee ſome *white thing*, there is ingendred ſome

ſome paſſion in the *Soule* by the reception thereof. Even as there is ſome paſſion begotten in the ſeats of the *Senſe* when it feeleth any thing; So, there is then ſomething engendred in the *Soule* when it conceiveth any thing; & it receiveth an Image or impreſſion of the thing underſtood.

The *fancie* or the thing wherby *Imaginatiã* is moved, is, any *ſenſible-thing*, which hath cauſed the *Imagination*; as it may bee ſome *white thing*, or any other obiect which may move the *SOVL*.

The Fantaſtick or void drawing away of our *Imagination*, is a needles (or

cauſuall) ſeducing (or diſtracting) of the *Imagination*, without any certaine thing which may move the ſame.

The *Fantaſme* or thing it ſelfe, whereby wee are idely drawne away, is the very attraction whereby wee are attracted, according to our vain *Imagination*; which falleth out in thoſe that are *Mad* or *Melancholy*. Betweene theſe Opinions there is no difference, but only, in the alteration of ſome *Names*.

The *Inſtruments* of the *Imagination*, are the *former Panns* of the *braine*; The *Vitall ſpirits*, which are in them; The *ſinewes proceeding from the braine*; The

nerves

nerves moiſtned by the Vitall ſpirits, and the *very frame of the places*, wherein the *Senſes* are ſeated.

There are five *ſeats* for the *ſenſes*; but all are properly but one *ſenſe*, which is the SOUL it ſelf, who, by the ſeats of the *ſenſes*, diſcernes all ſuch things as fall out in them. It diſcernes, or taketh knowledge of an *Earthy* nature, by that *ſenſe*, which is moſt *Earthie* and *Bodily*, namely the *Touching*: It perceiveth perſpicuous (or bright ſhining things) by that ſenſe which is moſt perſpicuous, that is to ſay, the *ſight*: It judgeth ſuch things as are pertinent to *aire* by that II.

ſeat which is ordained for the *aire*; for the very ſubſtance of the *voice* is *aire*, or the ſmiting of the aire: and it receiveth every *taſt* by a certaine quality of the inſtrument of the *ſenſe* of *taſting*; which attracts, by its wateriſh and ſpongy nature.

For it is the nature of every *ſenſible-thing*, to be diſcerned by ſome thing which hath a nature like unto it: and by this reaſon it ſhould ſeeme that there being onely foure *Elements* there ſhould be no more but foure *ſenſes*.

But, becauſe there is a kinde of *vapour*, and certaine ſmells which have a middle-nature betweene

aire

aire and *water*; the parts whereof are ſomewhat thicker then *aire*, & thinner then *water* (which appeares by them who are ſick of a heavineſſe in the head, by rhumes, and ſtoppings; for they drawing the aire by reſpiration, have no feeling of the vapour, by reaſon the fatneſſe of the odour is hindered by obſtructions, from approaching the ſenſe) therefore, a *fifth-ſeat* of the *ſenſe*, namely, *ſmelling*, was provided by nature, that no ſuch thing as may bee brought unto our knowledge, ſhould be hidden from the *ſenſe*.

Yet the *ſenſe* is not an *alteration*, but the diſcerning

ning of *alterations*: Indeed the ſeats of the *ſenſe* are altered, and the *ſenſe* diſcernes this alteration.

III. Now, many times the *name* of the *ſenſe*, and of the *ſeats* of the *ſenſe* are confounded. But, *ſenſe* is an apprehending of thoſe things which are ſubject to *ſenſe*: Yet this ſeemeth not to bee the definition of *ſenſe* it ſelfe, but of the workings of the *ſenſe*; And therefore ſome define it thus:

"*Senſe* is a certaine *intellectual ſpirit* extended "from the principall part "of the *minde*, unto the "bodily inſtruments. It is thus alſo defined: Senſe *is a* power *of the* ſoule, *which*

which taketh hold of ſenſible things; and the *ſeat* of the *ſenſe*, is the *inſtrument* whereby it layeth hold on ſuch things as are *ſenſible*.

Plato ſayes thus; *Senſe is that wherein the* Soule *and the body communicate together concerning outward things:* For, the very power it ſelfe belongs unto the *ſoule*; but, the *inſtrument* pertaines to the *body*; and both together take hold of ſuch outward things as may bee offered to *imagination*.

Some things in the *ſoul* were ordained to *ſerve* and be commanded: otherſome to *rule* and bear ſway. The part which hath

hath in it *understanding*, and *knowledge*, was ordained to *rule*. Those which appertaine to *sense*, and to the *motions by appetite*, as also, our *ability of speaking*, are made to *serve* and bee at command: For, our *voice*, and our *motion by appetite*, are obedient to *reason*, most speedily, and almost in a momēt of time.

For, wee *Will* and are *moved* together, and at once; so that we need no time to come betweene our *Will* and our *motion*, as we may see in the moving of our fingers. Some *naturall things* are placed under the command of *Reason*, as those which wee call *perturbations*.

Cap.

Cap. 7. Sect. 1.

I. *Of the* ſenſe *of* ſight, *and the opinions of* Hipparchus, *of the* Geometricians, *of* Epicurus, *and* Ariſtotle *concerning the ſame.* II. *The opinions of* Plato, *and of* Galen, *touching the ſame* ſenſe; *and of the cauſe of* ſeeing. III. *The opinion of* Porphyrie *alſo touching that* ſenſe.

WE finde that this word *ſight* hath a divers ſignification; for ſometime it ſignifieth the *ſeat* of the ſight; and ſometime the power of the *ſenſe*

ſenſe (it ſelfe.)

Hipparchus affirmes that the *beams* being ſhot forth from the *eyes*, take hold (as it were) of outward things with the fartheſt ends of them (even as if a man ſhould lay his hand on them) and preſents (or yeelds) thoſe things, whereof they have ſo taken hold, to our *ſight*.

But the *Geometricians* deſcribe unto us *Figures* (which are called *Cones*) broad at the firſt and growing to a narrow top, made by the meeting of the *eye-beames* in one point. And they hold opinion that the *beames* of the *right-eye*, being darted forth to the *left-ſide*, and the

the *beames* of the *left-eye* toward the *right-ſide*, the *Figure C O N O S* is made by the uniting of them in *one*; and that thereby it comes to paſſe that the *ſight* comprehends many viſible things together, at one view; and then more exactly perceives them, when the *beames* are met cloſely one with another.

And this is the cauſe, that oftentimes, when we looke upon the pavement we ſee not a piece of money lying plainly viſible thereupon, though wee ſettle our eyes upon the ſame with diligence: For, untill it ſo fall out, that the *beames* meet in that very place, where the money

ney lyeth, wee ſtill over-looke the ſame; but then, wee preſently attaine the ſight of it, as if that had beene the beginning of our looking for it in that place.

The *Epicures* think that the ſhapes of ſuch things as appeare unto us, are brought to our eyes.

Ariſtotle is of opinion that it is not a *bodily ſhape* which appeares, but a certaine *quality* rather conveyed from *things viſible*, unto the *ſight*, by an alteration of the aire which is round about.

II. *Plato* ſayes, that the *ſight* is cauſed by the meeting of all the ſeverall *brightneſſes* together (that is

is to ſay) partly by the light of the eyes, which flowing out ſome part of the way into the *aire*, which is of like nature with it ſelfe; partly by that which is retorted back againe from the *bodies* which are ſeene; and partly by the force of that which is extended out together with the *fieryneſſe* of the *eye*, affecting the *aire* which comes betweene them; and eaſily ſpreading every way, or turning to any ſide.

Galen agreeing with *Plato*, ſpeaketh of the *ſight* (here and there in ſome places of his ſeventh booke of the *agreement of parts*) much to this purpoſe

poſe. If (ſaith hee) any *part* or *power*, or *quality* of *bodies* that are *viſible*, ſhould come unto the *eye*, wee could not know the *quantity* of the thing ſeen. For, if a very great *mountaine* were the object, it were quite contrary to *reaſon*, to imagine that the ſhape of ſo huge a thing ſhould enter wholly into our eyes: yea, and the *ſpirit* belonging to the *ſight*, being darted forth could not bee able to collect together ſo much vigour, as would bee requiſite to comprehend the whole *viſible object*.

It remaines therefore that the *aire*, wherewith we are encompaſſed, is after

ter a ſort ſuch an inſtrument unto us when we *ſee*, as the *nerve* which belongeth unto the *ſight* is to the *body*; and ſome ſuch thing ſeemeth to happen to the *aire*, which encloſeth us round: For, the bright ſhining *Sun* having touched the upper limits of the *aire*, diſtributes his power into the whole *aire*: And the *ſplendor* which is caried through the ſinewes called the *optick nerves* which belong unto the *ſight*, hath his *eſſence* of the nature of the *ſpirits*: This falling into the *aire* which is dilated round about us, makes an alteration even at the very firſt injection, and

and ſhootes forth very farre: yet ſo, that it containes it ſelf undiſperſed, untill it happen upon a *reflecting body*.

For, the *aire* is ſuch an inſtrument unto the *eye*, to diſcerne *viſible obiects*, as the *ſinew* is unto the *braine*: and look in what caſe the *braine* is, in reſpect of his *ſinew*; in like caſe is the *eye* in reſpect of the *aire*, after it is quickned by the bright ſhining of the *Sun*.

Now, that it is the nature of the *aire*, to become like unto thoſe things which enter into it, appeares manifeſt by this, that whenſoever any *bright thing*, (be it red or blew,

blew, or of the colour of silver) shall bee conveyed through the *aire*, when it is light, the colour of the *aire* will bee changed according to that thing which is caried through the same.

But, *Porphyrie* in his book which hee wrote of the *senses*, affirms, that neither the making of the Figure *Conos*, neither any *shape*, nor any *other thing*, is cause of our *seeing*, but only this; that the *soul* her selfe meeting with such objects as are visible, doth perceive and know, that all those things which are seene, be contained in her *selfe*; because it is she only which holds them together, to their

III.

their preſervation. For, (*as he ſaith*) whatſoever is in the world, is nothing elſe, but the *ſoul* holding together divers *bodies*.

And it were not untruly ſaid, that the *ſoul* commeth to the knowledge of it *ſelfe*, by the view of every thing which is in the world; if his opinion be allowed: for according to his tenet, there is but one *ſoul* for all things, even the *reaſonable-ſoul*.

SEC.

Sect. 2.

I. *Of the proper object of* ſight, *and of ſuch other meanes and circumſtances as are uſefull in* ſeeing. II. *Though* colour *and* ſhape *are onely the proper objects of* ſight; *yet by* cogitation *and* memory, *it commeth to the knowledge of other* qualities *in the thing ſeene.* III. *Of ſuch* ſenſes *as are converſant about things at a* diſtance; *and in what caſes the* ſight *erres, or needs the aide of other* ſenſes.

THe *ſight* ſeeth by ſtraight lines; but it

 ſeeleth

feeleth first & principally the *colours* of things; and together with thē, discerneth also the *body* that is *coloured*, the *magnitude*, the *shape*, the *place*, wherein it is; the *distance*, the *number*, the *motion*, and the *rest* thereof; as likewise, whether it be *rough*, or *smooth*, or *unequall*, or *even*, or *sharpe*, or *dull*, or what *element* is predominant therein; and whether it be *materish*, or *earthy*; *moist* or *dry*.

Yet that which is the proper object of this *sense*, is *colour* onely; for we no way attaine the knowledge of *colours* but by our *sight*: and assoone as we behold the *colour*, we there-

therewithall do immediately perceive also the *coloured body*; the *place* wherein the visible object abideth; and the *distance*, which is between the *seer* and the thing *seene*.

Looke in how many *senses* wee receive the knowledge of *bodily things*; even in so many wee come to the knowledge of a *place*, together with the *body*; as it is in *touching*, and *tasting*: but these *two*, feele them onely when they are joyned neare unto the *body* (except in those things which we shall speake of anon) whereas the *sight*, beholds things at a great distance.

Now in that the *sight* II.

laies hold of ſuch things, as are *viſible*, when they be far off, it muſt neceſſarily follow that it receives a ſight only of the *diſtance of things*: and it is then only capable of the *magnitude* of things, when it is able at one view to comprehend the thing which appeareth; but whenſoever the *viſible body* is too large to bee apprehended at one aſpect, then the *ſight* needeth *memory* and *cogitation* to aſſiſt it.

For, the *ſight* beholding ſo great an *object* by peece-meale (and not at one whole view) muſt neceſſarily paſſe from one part thereof to another; and in that paſſage, ſo much

much onely is apprehended by the proper *faculty* of the *ſight*, as is preſent in view; the reſt which was viewed before, is kept by the *memory*, untill our *underſtanding* hath brought together, both that which was *before ſeen* and that which is preſent likewiſe, in our *ſight*.

Moreover, *ſight* apprehends the *magnitude* of *bodies* two maner of wayes; Sometime by it ſelfe alone; and ſometime again by the aide of *memory* and *cogitation*: But by it ſelfe alone, it never taketh notice of the *number* of things *viſible* if they exceed three or foure; ſeeing the number of them can-

not be diſcerned at one attempt; neither can it lay hold on the *motions* of things; neither on *Figures* which have many corners, without it have the helpe of *memory* and *cogitation* to aſſiſt it.

For *ſight* is not able to bring together, *five* or *ſixe* or *ſeaven*, or more, without the helpe of *memory*; neither can it bring together *figures* that have ſix, eight, or many corners. The *motion* alſo that commeth by paſſing from one great thing, to another, hath in the ſame, ſomewhat *preceding*, and ſomewhat *following after*; and whereſoever things are found to bee ſome *firſt*, ſome

ſome *ſecond*, and ſome *third*; there *memory* onely is the preſerver of them together: But theſe qualities, *high* and *low*, *equall* and *unequall*, *rough* and *ſmooth*, *ſharpe* and *dull*, bee communicable both to the *touching*, and to the *ſight*; for that they onely can diſcerne of *place*; and yet they ſtand in ſome need alſo of our *underſtanding*.

For, that thing onely which moves the *ſenſe* by *one only attempt*, is wrought by the *ſenſe* alone (without the helpe of *memory* and *cogitation*:) but, ſuch things as are felt at divers times are not wrought by the *ſenſe* one-

ly, but by the aide of *memory* and *cogitation*, as is aforeſaid.

Such is the nature of *ſight*, that it can pierce even unto the bottome of tranſparant things; and firſt, and ſpecially of the *Aire*: For it can paſſe quite through it. Secondly, it can paſſe through *water* when it is cleare; inſomuch that wee may ſee fiſhes ſwimming in the ſame: And; (though ſomwhat more hardly) it paſſes through *earth*, being of a glaſſie or ſuch like tranſparant nature. Yet, this is alwayes to be ſuppoſed, that theſe things muſt be *enlightned*, when they become the proper object

object of *ſight*, without the aide of any other aſſiſtant.

But let no man bee ſo deceived, as to imagine that the *ſight* may of it ſelfe diſcerne *hot things*; becauſe when wee ſee *fire*, we know that it is *hot*; for if you refer that ſpeech to the firſt function of *ſight*, you ſhall finde that when the ſight firſt beheld the *fire*, it perceived nothing but the *ſhape* and colour thereof. After that, wee comming to *touch* it, and thereby knowing the ſame to be *hot*, our memory preſerves in us the knowledge which wee firſt gained by the *touch*: and ever ſince, when wee

behold *fire* (though wee see nothing in it but the *shape* and *colour*) our *understanding* by the helpe of *memory*, conceives the *heat* of the *fire* to be in the same, as well as the things which are properly *seene*.

The like may be said of an *apple*; For seeing the whole *forme* thereof consisteth not onely in the *colour* and the *shape*, but in the *smell* also and in the *taste*; it followes not that it is the *sight* onely, whereby we know the same to bee an *apple* (*because we saw the shape and colour of it*) for, our *memory* had preserved in our *understanding* the experience which we had formerly collected from the

the *ſmell* and *taſt*; and theſe being added unto that, whereof the *eye* tooke notice, perfited our knowledge.

Therefore, when wee thinke an *apple made of waxe* to be a *true apple*, it is our *underſtanding* which erreth, and not our *ſight*; for the *ſight* failed not to informe rightly, ſo much as pertained unto her *ſenſe*; when it perceived the true *colour* and *ſhape* of an *apple*.

III. Now, theſe three *ſenſes*, *ſight*, *hearing*, and *ſmelling*, are converſant about things at a *diſtance*, and ſuch as are not joyned cloſe unto them by means of the *aire* comming between

tween them. But the *taſt* cannot poſſibly feele any thing but that whereunto it is nearely joyned; and the *touching* taketh part of both: for ſometime wee touch things bodily, without any *intermedium* betweene us and them; ſomtime againe, wee touch them with a *ſtaffe* betwixt us, and the things touched.

Moreover, the *ſight* hath now and then, want of ſome other of the *ſenſes* to witneſſe unto it the certainty of that which it perceiveth, when things are artificially wrought to deceive the *ſight*; as it falleth out in *painting*: For, it is the *painters* cunning

ning to deceive the eye, with counterfeit ſhadowings, either of an *Emboſt* or *hollow-worke*, as the nature of the things requires: To the diſcerning whereof, the ſenſe of *touching* is eſpecially uſefull, and ſometime of the *taſt* and *ſmell* alſo; as appeared in the example of the apple made of wax. Yea, and otherwhile (at no great diſtance) the *ſight* it ſelfe maketh ſome things appeare unto us to bee that which they are not: For, if a towne which is *foure-ſquare* bee but a pretty diſtance from us, it will ſeeme unto the *ſight* to be *round*.

The *ſight* erres likewiſe,

wiſe, when wee looke through a thick aire, or through ſmoake, or ſome ſuch things as otherwiſe trouble the *ſight* by the thickneſſe thereof. In like maner, when we ſee things in the *water*, being ſtirred; for in the Sea an Oare ſeemeth broken when it is whole.

So is it alſo when wee looke in or through ſome *tranſparant bodie*; as looking-glaſſes, or other glaſſes, and the like things; or when the *viſible object* is moved ſwiftly: For, a *ſwift motion* ſo diſtempers the ſight; that thoſe things are thereby made appeare to be *round* which are nothing ſo, and thoſe

to

to bee *fixed*, which are *moved*.

The ſame happeneth, when the *minde* is buſied about other matters; as when a man (purpoſing to meet his friend) paſſeth by without heeding him whom hee went to meet, (*though hee met him in the way*) by reaſon he had his minde buſied with other thoughts: But, indeed this is not properly an error of the *ſight*, but of the *minde*: For, the *ſight* beheld his friend, and gave warning; but the *minde* heeded not that which was brought unto it.

Finally, the *ſight* needeth foure things for the cleare diſcerning of all

viſible

visible objects, namely; *A whole and sound seat for that sense; a proportionable measure of motion; a fit distance; and the aire to bee pure and cleare.*

CAP.

Cap. 8.

I. *Of the* ſenſe *of* touching; *why the* ſeat *of it is in all parts of the body, and why every* living-creature *enjoyes that* ſenſe, *whereas many are defective in other of the* ſenſes. II. *Of the proper* objects *of this* ſenſe; *and of ſuch as it hath in common with other* ſenſes. III. *In which of the* ſenſes Man *excelleth; and in what ſenſes, other* creatures *excell him.*

IT was by the *Creator* of the world, ſo ordered, that hee made the *ſeats* of all the other *ſenſes* two-fold

two-fold, and confined them to a certaine circuit of place in ſome parts of the *body*; For example, hee hath made two *eyes*, two *eares*, two paſſages for the *ſenſe* ſituate in the *noſtrill*; yea, and hee hath planted in every *living-creature*, as it were, two *tongues*. In ſome they are evidently parted, (as in ſerpents) and in ſome other, they are joyned and united, as in *men*: And for this cauſe, hee made onely two *former-pans* of the *braine*, that the *ſinewes* which ſerve for the *ſenſes*, being ſent downe from either of theſe *braine-pans* might make the *ſeats* of the *ſenſes* to be *twofold*.

Now

Now, hee made them *twofold*, in reſpect of that exceeding tender love which hee bare unto us; that when the one of them tooke harme, the other which remained might preſerve the *ſenſe*. And yet, though moſt of the *ſeats* of the other *ſenſes* periſh, the *living-creature* may be *alive*: but as ſoone as the *ſenſe* of *touching* is extinct, the *living-creature* doth inſtantly periſh.

For onely the ſenſe of *touching*, among all the reſt of the *ſenſes* is common to all *livingcreatures*; and every *living-creature* is indued therewith; whereas all of them have not

not every one of the other *ſenſes*; but ſome have *theſe*, and ſome have *others*, (except thoſe which wee call *the more perfect creatures*, and they indeed have all the *ſenſes*.)

Now, ſeeing the *living-creature* loſeth life by the loſſe of this *ſenſe*; the *Creator* hath allotted unto the *ſenſe* of *touching*, not one part of the *body* onely, but almoſt the whole body of the *living-creature*: For, except the *bones*, and the *hornes*, and the *nailes*, and the *binding-ſinewes*, and the *haires*, and certaine other ſuch like things, each part of the *body* is partaker of the *ſenſe* of *touching*

Thereupon it hath ſo hapned

hapned that the *ſeat* of every *ſenſe* hath two *ſenſes* in it; one of ſuch things as are properly the object of every particular *ſenſe*, and another in reſpect of the *ſenſe* of *touching*: For the *ſight* diſcerneth *colours*, and yet is partaker both of *hot* and *cold* things; participating of *heat* and *cold* as it is a *body*, and diſcerning of colours, as it is the *ſenſe* of *ſight*. The like may be thought alſo of the *taſt*, of the *ſmelling*, and of the *hearing*.

It may hereupon bee queſtioned how the *touching* can bee ſpred over the whole *body*, ſeeing that the *ſenſes* proceed from the *former braine-*

pans:

pans : for indeed the *ſinewes* come downe from the *braine*, and being diſperſed into every part of the *body*, doe there occaſion the ſenſe of *touching*. And ſome were of opinion (becauſe the haire ſtands up as it were, with a ſudden horror, when the foot is caſually pricked with a thorne) that the *griefe*, or at leaſt, the *feeling* of the griefe, aſcended up unto the *brain*, and was there *felt*. Which being true, it might then be concluded, that there could bee no *griefe* in any part of the *body*, that were wounded, but in the *brain* only.

It were better therefore

fore to make this answer, that the *sinewes* (*which bee dispersed as aforesaid*) are the *braine* it selfe. For, they are a certaine portion of the *braine*, containing in them the *vitall spirits*, and diffusing them throughout the whole body of the *living-creature*, in such manner as *fire* is contained in *burning-iron*: And whersoever such a *sensible-sinew* is planted, it makes the part wherein it is ingrafted to be partaker of *sense*; and to be so qualified, that it may feele things. Neither were it improperly spoken, to say that not the *passion*, but rather a certaine partaking of the *griefe*, and a denunciation

ciation of the ſame is conveyed up to the *braine*, where all the *ſinewes* have their beginning.

II. Now the proper obiects of the *ſenſe* of *touching* are *hot*, *cold*, *ſoft*, *hard*, *ſlimy*, *ſtiffe*, *heavy*, and *light*: For, by *touching* only, we attaine the knowledge of theſe things; whereas theſe next following are common both to the *touching* and the *ſight*, (to wit) *ſharp*, *dull*, *rough*, *plaine*, *dry*, *moiſt*, *thick*, *thin*, *high*, *low*, yea, and *place* it ſelfe. So likewiſe is *magnitude* (when it can bee compriſed within one attempt of the *touching*) *foggineſſe*, *clearneſſe*, *roundneſſe*, (if it be but in ſmall

small things) as also the shape of other *figures*; yea, and it *feeleth* likewise the *motion* of bodies comming neare unto it, being assisted by *memory*, and *understanding*.

Moreover, it is sensible of *number*, as farre as *two* or *three*, but no farther; and those things must also be of no larger *magnitude*, then may easily bee comprehended by the *touch*. And these are better discerned by *sight* then *touching*; as are also such things as bee *equall* or *unequall* (they being of the same kinde with *smooth* and *rough* things) for *unequality* being mingled with *hardnesse*, causeth a

roughnesse; and *equalnesse* added unto *thickneſſe*, maketh a *ſmoothneſſe*.

By that which we have here delivered, it is evident that the *ſenſes* communicate each with other in many things: and that if one *ſenſe* erre, the error if it may bee rectified by ſome other *ſenſes*; As wee perceive in *Pictures*: For, the *ſight* beholdeth things as if they ſtood out from the reſt of the peece, as the *Noſe* and ſuch other parts of the *Picture*; but, by the *ſenſe* of *touching*, the error of the *ſight* is diſcovered.

As the *ſight* uſeth at all times the *aire* for a *meanes* to behold all things; So the

the ſenſe of *touching* feeleth ſome things by a *ſtaffe* (*or other inſtrument*) as by a *meane*; (to wit) *hard*, *ſoft*, and *moiſt things*, being aided by *underſtanding*, and the *diſcourſe* of *reaſon*.

III. In the ſenſe of *touching* as alſo in *taſting*, *Man* excelleth all other *living-creatures*; and the beaſts excell him, in the other three *ſenſes*: for there be divers creatures that doe ſurpaſſe *man* in ſome one of the other three *ſenſes*; but a *Dog* excelleth him in every one of theſe three, *hearing*, *ſeeing*, and *ſmelling*, as appeareth by hounds which hunt by foot.

The *whole body* (as wee ſaid before) is the *ſeat* wherein the ſenſe of *touching* is placed; but in *man* the *inſide of the hands*, and the *tops of the fingers*, are the principall *ſeats* thereof, and were appointed by our *Creator*, not onely to lay hold on things; but to be exact *inſtruments* alſo, ſerviceable to the ſenſe of *touching*. And the cauſe why the ſkin of them is ſomewhat thin; why certaine *muſcles* are laid under them throughout the inſide; and why there groweth no *haire* on them (whereof the *muſcles* are cauſe) is by reaſon they ſhould the better *feele* and take hold on ſmall things.

Such

Such hands as are hardeſt, are the more ſtrong to hold things; and ſuch as are ſofteſt are moſt apt for exact *touching*. In like maner, the *ſinewes* which are hard, be fitteſt for *motion*, and thoſe which are ſoft, more convenient for *feeling*; for the *ſinewes* alſo are inſtruments of *touching*; yea and the chiefe *inſtruments* of that *ſenſe*.

Cap. 9.

I. *Of the* Tasting; *by what* wayes, *on what* matter, *and with what* instrument *it worketh*. II. *The names of the* simple qualities *pertaining to the* tast. III. *Of the* compound qualities *belonging to the same* sense, &c.

THat the *sight* beholds things by *direct lines*; that the *senses* of *hearing* and *smelling* attain the knowledge of their objects, as well divers other wayes, as by direct lines; and that *touching* and *tasting* doe neither

neither by *direct lines*, nor by any other meanes become ſenſible of their proper *objects*, but then onely, when they come neare to ſuch things as are ſubject to their ſenſe (except in ſuch caſes as are before expreſſed,) wee have already declared.

The *matter* whereupon the *taſt* worketh is the *humors*, or *Iuices* which are *taſted*. The *inſtruments* of *taſting*, are the *tongue* (chiefly the very tip of the *tongue*) and the *roofe* of the mouth: For in theſe are diſperſed the *ſinewes* deſcending from the *braine*, and they denounce to the principall part of the *ſoule*, what that *taſt* is

which they have received.

II. The name of the *qualities* pertaining to the *taſt*, and which are found in the *Iuices*, are theſe. *Sweetneſſe*, *ſharpneſſe*, *tartneſſe*, a *binding bitterneſſe*, a *bitterneſſe leſſe binding*, a quality bringing a *bitterneſſe* by drought and heat; *ſaltneſſe*, *fatneſſe*: For theſe are the *qualities* which *taſt* diſcerneth; and it is in reſpect of theſe *qualities* that the *water* is ſaid to be void of *qualities*; becauſe if you taſt *water*, it offers none of theſe *qualities* to your *ſenſe*; whereas, if you have reſpect to other *qualities*, as *cold* and *moiſture*, they are ingraffed therein. The

two

two *bitternesses* differ from each other in their being more or lesse astringent.

III. These aforenamed are in a maner all the *simple-qualities* which belong unto the sense of *tasting*; but the *compound qualities*, are infinite; in regard there is a proper *tast* belonging to every *living creature*, and to every *plant*. There is one *tast* in swines flesh, another in Goats flesh, and when wee would know what flesh it is which commeth to be tasted, we distinguish the same by the quality of the tast, which could not be done except there were a *divers quality* in every thing that is tasted.

Now becauſe thoſe things are infinite, and utterly divers one from another, wee cannot compriſe or diſtinguiſh them under particular tearmes: For even in thoſe things, wherein ſome one of the *ſimple qualities* beareth rule, there is a plaine difference of that which is the obiect of *taſt*. For, though in *dry figs*, and in *grapes*, and in the fruit of the *Palme*, there is one predominant quality, to wit, *ſweetneſſe*, yet in every one of them the *taſt* diſcernes a difference.

CAP.

Cap. 10.

I. *Of the* Hearing; *of the object of that* ſenſe; *of the* inſtruments *thereof*; *and of ſuch* living creatures *as move not their* eares.

HItherto of the *taſt*. The *ſenſe* of *Hearing* is employed about *voices* and *ſounds*; and in them it diſcernes the *ſhrilneſſe*, the *baſeneſſe*, the *ſoftneſſe*, the *harſhneſſe*, and the *loudneſſe*.

The *inſtruments* thereof are a ſoft kind of *ſinews* which proceed from the *braine*; the *forme* of the *eares*;

eares; and chiefly that part of them which is grisly: for the *grisles* are fitted for *sounds* and *noises*.

Onely *Man* and the *Ape*, are thought to have *eares unmoveable*, and all other *living-creatures* to have *moveable eares*.

CAP.

CAP. II.

Of the Smelling; *of the* instruments *thereof*; *of the* matter *whereupon it layes hold*; *and of the difference which is betweene the* vapours, *or* fumes, *from whence the* Smell *ariseth.*

EVery one of those places which are seats of the *senses* (as wee have said before) takes hold of such things as are the proper objects of their *senses*, by meanes of a certaine likenesse and agreeablenesse which is betweene them and their *sensible objects*; and therefore

fore the *Smelling* (though it be first begunne by the *noſtrils*) is perfected at the bounds of the *former-braine-pans*, which having a naturall affinity with *vapours*, doe the more easily take hold of them.

And yet, whereas the *braine* in all other *senses*, sends downe *sinewes* into the *seat* of each sense to bee serviceable unto the *sense* therein placed; it so dealeth not with our *sense* of *Smelling*; for the bounds of the *braine* it selfe, are in stead of the *sinewes*, and the *braine* receives immediately such *vapours*, and *fumes*, as are yeelded up unto it. Of which *vapours*, the most generall difference

rence is in this, that ſome of them have a good ſmell, ſome an evill *ſent*, and ſome, that which is neither very good, nor very evill, but in a meane betwixt both.

The *good ſmell* ariſeth from *humours* exactly concocted: The evill *ſent*, is when they are ill concocted, or not at all; and the middle *ſmell*, is when they are concocted after a midling maner.

CAP.

Cap. 12.

Of the Cogitation; *of the things thereunto pertaining*; *and of the* instrument *whereby it worketh*, *&c.*

Right briefly, and according to our ability, we have ſpoken of the *imagining* faculty of the *ſoule*; of the *inſtruments* thereof, and of thoſe things wherein they agree or differ.

To the *cogitation* theſe particulars are generally pertinent; the *judgement of things*, a *conſent* unto them, a *refuſall* of them, and a *deſire* unto them;

But,

But, thoſe which are ſpecially pertinent, are *conſideration*, *vertues*, *knowledges*, the *reaſon* of *arts*, *deliberation*, and *choice*.

This is that *part* whereby wee attaine the *foreſight* of things to come, in viſions or dreames; and therein onely, the *Pythagorean* Philoſophers (following the *Iewiſh* opinions) thinke true prophecying conſiſteth.

The *inſtruments* of *cogitation*, are the *middle-pan* of the *braine*, and the *vitall ſpirits*, which are in it.

CAP.

Cap. 13.

I. *Of the* memorative *part of the* Soul, *and the definition of* memory *according to* Origen *and* Plato. II. *The difference betwixt* remembring *of things contained in* sense *and of things contained in* understanding; *as also what* recordation *is.* III. *Of the* instruments *of the memory; and* demonstrations *evidently shewing where the fountaines of the* senses, *of the* cogitation, *and* memory *are to be found.*

THe seat of *memory*, which the *Greekes* cal *Mnemoneuticon*, is

is the cauſe and *ſtorehouſe* both of *memorie* and *recordation*, or *remembrance*.

Memory (as *Origen* ſaith) is a certaine appearance left in the *minde*, by ſome *ſenſe* which had wrought actually before. *Plato* taketh it to be a *preſervation* of things both *felt* and *conſidered*: For, the *minde* takes hold of things which are ſubject unto *ſenſe*, by the *ſeats* of the *ſenſe*, and therof is *opinion* begotten. But, it layeth hold on things *intelligible* by *underſtanding*; and thence ariſeth *conſideration*. And when the *minde* retaines the Prints both of things in *opinion*, and of thoſe alſo which are in *conſideration*,

tion, we then ſay, that it *remembers* them.

II. It is likely that *Plato* doth herein meane, by the name of *conſideration*, not the principall *conſideration*; but a certaine *cogitation*: For things contained in *ſenſe*, are remembred by *themſelves*; but, things contained in *underſtanding*, are *accidentally* remembred. The *remembrance* of things thought upon by us, doth remaine in us upon the *heed* of ſome *appearance* which was before in our *imagination*: And we *remember* thoſe things which are properly contained in our *underſtanding*, in reſpect that wee have learned them,

them, and heard them; but as for their *ſubſtance*, wee have no *memory* thereof.

For indeed, the apprehending of things contained in *underſtanding*, proceeds not from any preceding *imagination*; but commeth to us by *learning*, and by a *naturall notion*.

If we be ſaid to *remember* ſuch things as we ſaw, or heard, or knew heretofore, by ſome occaſion or meanes: This word *heretofore* (having relation to the *time paſt*) makes it plaine, that ſuch things as are *made* and *deſtroyed* againe, and ſuch as have their *being* in *time*, are compre-

comprehended in *memory*; and that our *memory* consisteth of things *absent*, but is not procured (or moved) by those *absent things*.

Recordation (or *remembrance*) called by the *Greekes Anamnesis*; is when *forgetfulnesse* hath interrupted our *memory*; for it is a recovering of *memory*, which was lost, when it failed by *forgetfulnesse*.

Memory is lost, either altogether (and for ever) or else, for a space onely; and when it faileth but for a space, we call the recovery thereof *remembrance*.

But there is another kind of *recordation*, which is

is not occasioned by the *forgetfulness* of such things as proceed from *sense* or *understanding*; but from the forgetfulnesse of those things which wee have even by *naturall notions*. By *naturall notions* (or things naturally conceived) I meane such as every man hath in him without any teacher; as *that there is a God*. This *Plato* calleth a *recordation* of *Ideas*; and what is meant by *Ideas* I will hereafter shew.

Such things as appeare unto the *imagining part*, are from thence conveyed unto the *cogitation*; and the *cogitation*, or *discoursing part* (when it hath once

once apprehended such things & judged of them) sends them to bee stored up in that part of the *soule*, wherein *memory* is resident.

III. The *instruments* used by the *memory*, are the hinder *braine-pan*, called by the *Greekes* παρεγκεφαλίδα, and πτρακρανίδα, and the *vitall spirit* there placed.

But seeing we have affirmed, that the beginnings and roots of the *senses*, are the *former pans* of the *braine*; The seat of the *cogitation*, the *middle pan*; And of the *memory*, the *hinder-pan*; it will bee necessary for us to prove evidently that these things are so. Lest we seeme to give

give credit to that which hath been ſpoken, without any reaſon to be rendred for the ſame.

A plaine *demonſtration* thereof may bee taken from the *parts* themſelves; for, if by any meanes the *former braine-pan* be hurt, the *ſenſes* are much hindred; but the *cogitation* remaineth ſound. If only the *middle-pan* be harmed, the *cogitation* is maymed; but the *ſeat* of *ſenſe* keepes the *ſenſes* whole. If any hurt befall both to the *former* and *middle-pan*, both *ſenſe* and *cogitation* decay. If the *hinder-pan* be onely diſordered, the *memory* alone periſheth, and neither *ſenſe* nor *cogi-*

tation receive harme. But if the *former*, the *middle*, and the *hinder braine-pans* be all together out of order, the party so disturbed is maimed, in *sense*, in *cogitation*, and *memory*, all at once; and the whole *living-creature* is in danger of destruction.

This is made evident also by many diseases, and accidents which are symptomes of diseases, and especially in frantick men. For in some of them their *cogitation* onely is hurt, and their *senses* are preserved whole.

Such a frantick man, is mentioned by *Galen*, who being in a place wherein a *wool-winder* was at work by

by him, roſe up, and taking certaine glaſſe veſſels which hee found in the roome, ran to the window, and aſked ſuch as paſſed by, whether they would have ſuch or ſuch glaſſes caſt downe unto them, calling every veſſell by the right name: And when they who ſtood below ſaid they would have it ſo, hee threw them all downe, one after another.

Then hee aſked them whether they would have the *wool-winder* throwne downe alſo; they (thinking he had but jeſted) replyed *yea*: whereupon he tooke up the *wool-winder* and hurled him headlong from a high place.

This man had his *senses* whole enough; for hee knew which were the *glasse-vessels*, and which was the *wool-winder*; but his *cogitation* was diseased.

Others there be, who deluded by a vaine *imagination*, suppose that they see such things as indeed are not seene; whereas in other things, they are not without the direction of *reason*. In such as these, the *former braine-pans* are only diseased, and the *middle-pan* uncrased; For, by those diseases which follow every part, the course of their operation is accordingly hindred; and the *living creature* is hurt in respect of that operation,

on, to the working whereof the part diſeaſed is naturally ſerviceable. As for example, if the *feet* bee hurt, our *walking* is hindered; for that is the work whereunto the *foot* ſerveth.

Cap. 14.

I. *Of the* Reaſon, *from whence we have the denomination of* reaſonable-creatures. II. *Of our* ſpeech, *and of the ſeverall* inſtruments *thereof.*

HEre is one *diviſion* of the powers of the *ſoul*, (together with which, there are ſome parts of the *body* likewiſe divided) whereunto is added another *diviſion*, and after another maner: For the *reaſonable part* of the *ſoule* is divided into *reaſon* which is unexpreſſed in us, and that which is uttered by our *ſpeech.* The

The *reaſon* unexpreſſed (or ſetled in us) is a *motion* of the *ſoule* engendred in that part of the *minde*, wherein conſiſteth our diſcourſe of *reaſon*, without any utterance by *voice*: Thereby oftentimes (although wee ſay nothing) wee throughly reſolve, and ſet downe with our ſelves, the whole reaſon of a thing; and otherwhile diſcourſe in our *dreames*: And it is chiefly in reſpect thereof that we are called *reaſonable-creatures*; yea much rather in this reſpect, then for that which is uttered by our *ſpeech*.

For albeit ſome are deafe and dumbe from

their births, or loſe their voices by ſickneſſe and diſeaſes, yet *reaſonable-creatures* they are, nevertheleſſe.

II. The utterance of *reaſon* is by the *voice* in the variety of tongues; and the *inſtruments* uſed in the *voice* are many; namely, the *muſcles* which are in the middle of the *ſides*, the *breaſt* it ſelfe, the *lungs*, the *winde-pipe*, the *throat*, (and in all theſe, thoſe parts eſpecially which are *griſly*) the *returning ſinews*, the *cover* of the *wind-pipe*; yea, and all the *muſcles* which move theſe parts, are *inſtruments* of our *ſpeech*.

The

The *inſtruments* of our *various utterance* are the *mouth*: (for therein the *ſpeech* is moulded and faſhioned) and the *tongue* and the *meſil-pipe* (which are there in ſtead of that wherewith wee ſmite the ſtrings of a Lute or ſuch like inſtrument) the *roofe* of the mouth alſo, which is as the belly of the *Lute*, that receives and gives back the *ſound*. The *teeth*, and the various *openings* of the *mouth*, doe ſtand in ſtead of *ſtrings*: yea, and the *noſe* alſo doth ſomewhat further the plaineneſſe, and the pleaſingneſs of *ſpeech*, as appeares in thoſe that ſing.

Cap. 15.

I. *Another* diviſion *of the* ſoule, *being* threefold. II. *An* eightfold diviſion *thereof according to* Zeno. III. *A* fivefold, *and* twofold diviſion *of the* ſoul *alſo according to* Ariſtotle.

VNto thoſe aforegoing, there is added yet another *diviſion* of the *ſoule*, into the *powers*, the *kindes*, and *parts* thereof; namely, into a *vegitative power*, which is the ſame wherby plants (and ſuch like) doe grow; and this is called alſo a *nouriſhing*, or *paſſive power*,

power, ſecondly into a *ſenſible power*; and thirdly into that whereby it exerciſeth *reaſon*.

II. *Zeno* the *Stoick* aſſignes unto the *ſoule eight parts*; the *reaſonable part* is the *firſt* and principall; the *five ſenſes* make up *ſixe*, the faculty of *ſpeech* the ſeaventh, and the eighth hee affirmes to bee that *power* whereby things are ingendred one of another. But *Panetine* the philoſopher (contradicting this opinion) affirmes that the *uttering* of our *ſpeech* is a part of the motion which is in our *appetite*; and that the power of *ingendring* is a part of *nature*, not of the *ſoule*, wherein hee hath ſaid

said very truly.

III. *Aristotle* in his *Physicks* hath divided the *Soule* into five parts; namely, that which is *vegitative*, *sensitive*, *movable* in *place*, that which belongs to *appetite*, and that which is *intellective*.

He calls that *vegitative*, which *nourisheth*, *encreaseth*, *breedeth*, *maketh*, and *formeth* bodies; for under the name of *vegitative* he comprehends the intire faculty of *growing*; calling the whole after the name of that part thereof which is the chiefest therein, and from whence all the other parts of the *growing power* have their essence.

This is *Aristotles* opini-

on

on in his *Physicks*; but in his *Ethicks* he makes but a twofold division of the *Soule*; that is to say, into *parts rationall*, and *irrationall*. Of the *reasonable-part* I have already treated; now therfore I will speak of that which is *unreasonable*.

CAP.

Cap. 16.

I. *Of that unreasonable part of the* soule *which containes the* appetite : *of* concupiscence *also*; *of* anger, *and of their severall* instruments. II. *Of the divers acceptations of this word* affection, *and the definition of an* affection, *and of an* operation *or* act. III. *The difference betweene an* operation, *and an* affection *or* passion, &c.

SOme hold opinion that *irrationality*, or to be voide of *reason* is an intire thing by it self, as though there were a

soule

ſoule void of *reaſon*, which were not a part of the *rationall ſoule*: and for theſe cauſes they thinke ſo;

Firſt, for that it is found alone by it ſelfe in unreaſonable *living creatures*; For thereby it ſeemes unto them to be perfect of it ſelfe, and no part of the *reaſonable ſoule*. Secondly, they ſo imagine, becauſe it appeares unto them one of the greateſt abſurdities which may be, to affirme that a power *void of reaſon* ſhould be part of a *Soule indued with reaſon*.

However, *Ariſtotle* affirmes it to be both a *part*, and a *faculty* of the *reaſonable ſoule*, dividing it into two parts, (as I ſaid before)

fore) and calls those two by this one cõmon name, the *appetitive-faculty*: To which belongs also the *motion* of our *appetite*; for *appetite* is the beginning of *motion*, as appeares in every *living creature* having a *desire* to something; for their *desire* causes them to move forward, according to their *appetite*.

This *unreasonable part* of the *soule* doth either disobey, or obey *reason*: And that part which is obedient unto *reason*, is divided into two parts, *concupiscence*, and *anger*.

The *instrument* of the *concupiscence* by which it commeth into *sense*, is the *Liver*. But the *instrument* of

of *anger* is the *heart*, which being a hard part receives a ſtrong motion, and is ordained for a hard ſervice, and for great reſiſtances; whereas the *Liver* being a tender entrail, is made the inſtrument of tender *concupiſcence*.

Theſe things are ſaid to be obedient unto *reaſon*, becauſe *nature* hath ordained them to obey *reaſon*, and to bee moved, as *reaſon* commandeth, in all ſuch men as live anſwerable to that which *nature* (originally) requires. And theſe are certaine affections, which conſtitute our *Eſſence*, as it hath *life* in it; For *life* cannot bee maintained without theſe.

But

II. But whereas this word *affection* hath divers acceptations, wee muſt firſt diſtinguiſh the variety of ſignifications which it hath: for either it pertaineth to the *body*, as when it is ſick or ulcerated, in which caſes we ſay it is ſo or ſo *affected*; or elſe it belongs to the *ſoul*, of which we now ſpeake, and whereunto *concupiſcence* and *anger* doe pertaine. But univerſally and generally, in reſpect of the intire *living creature* conſiſting of both parts, it is called an *affection*, and followeth either in *griefe* or *pleaſure*.

For *griefe* doth follow our *affection*, but the very *paſſion* or *affection* it ſelfe, is

is not *griefe*: for if that were true, then whereſoever *paſſion* were found, there ſhould be *griefe* alſo: but *things void of life* may be *patients* and ſuffer, yet feele no *griefe*. Therefore it is not neceſſarily conſequent, that whenſoever wee are *affected* unto a thing, we ſhould alſo bee grieved, but then onely when wee feele the thing which hapneth unto us. Yea, and that which falleth unto us muſt bee a thing of ſuch moment likewiſe, as may bee perceived by our *ſenſe*.

But this is the definition of ſuch *affections* as are in the *ſoul*. *An* affection *is the motion of our power of* appetite,

appetite, *ſubject unto* ſenſe, *provoked by the appearance of ſome good or evill.* Or elſe it may bee defined thus: *An* affection *is a motion of the* ſoule, *void of* reaſon, *ſuppoſing either ſome good or ſome evill thing.*

Affection in generall is by ſome thus defined; Affection *is a motion in one thing, by the commotion of another.* The *operation* (or *action*) is a *motion* working that which is wrought. And therefore *anger* is an *operation* of that part of the *ſoule* wherein *anger* is; but it is an *affection* of both parts of the *ſoule*; and beſide that, of all our *body*, when our *body* by reaſon of *anger* is violently drawn thereby

thereby to any furious act: for this motion chanced in one thing, by the *commotion* of another thing, which was the definition of an *affection*.

III. An *operation* (or action) after another sort, is called an *affection*; when it disagreeth from *nature*; for the *operation* is a *motion* according to nature, but the *affection* is repugnant unto nature: And therefore, an *operation* when it is not moved according to nature, is called an *affection*, whether it bee moved of it selfe, or of some other: As for example, the *motion* which is from the heart in the pulses, is an *operation*; but that unseasonable

ſonable *motion* which commeth by feares or feavers, is an *affection* or paſſion. For that great panting proceedeth from the heart it ſelfe unnaturally; and from thence alſo commeth naturally the moderate beating of the pulſes. Therefore it is no marvaile if one and the ſame thing bee called both an *affection* and an *operation*. For in reſpect they bee certaine *motions* proceeding from the paſſible part of the *ſoule*, they bea kinde of *operations*; but in this reſpect, that they paſſe meaſure, and are not agreeable to *nature*, they are not *operations*, but *affections*.

Thus

Thus you ſee the *motion* of that part of the *ſoule* which is *irrationall*, to bee an *affection* in both ſignifications; and that nevertheleſſe, every motion of the *paſſible part* is not called a *paſſion* (or *affection*) but thoſe which are moſt vehement, or which (at leaſt) proceed ſo far, that they may bee felt. For, thoſe which are ſmall, and which cannot be felt, are not to be called *affections* (or paſſions) while they are in that degree; becauſe there muſt bee a convenient quantity (or magnitude) to make it a *paſſion*.

And for this reaſon, that clauſe; *whoſe motion is perceived by ſenſe*, is annexed

nexed to the definition of an *affection*; even because ſmall *motions*, whereunto the *ſenſe* is not privy, doe not make an *affection*, as I ſaid before.

CAP.

Cap. 17.

I. *Of the* concupiſcence, *and of* pleaſure *and* griefe, *which are the two parts, whereinto the ſame is divided; and of another fourfold diviſion thereof.* II. *Of the* meanes *whereby evill* affections *are ingendred, and the* meanes *alſo how they might bee cured.*

THat part of the *ſoule*, which (as we have ſaid before) is *irrationall*, and yet obeyeth *reaſon*, is divided into theſe two; namely, the *concupiſcible*, and *iraſcible* part. The *concupiſcence* is

againe divided into *pleaſure* and *griefe*: For if our *concupiſcence* attaines to that which is deſired, it breedeth a *pleaſure*, and if it miſſeth of the ſame, it engendreth *griefe*.

This *deſire* may another way be divided into four parts, the *cōcupiſcence* it ſelfe being one of the foure. For of thoſe things which *are*; ſome be *good*, ſome *evill*, ſome *preſent*, and ſome *expected*; and after this maner, if two bee multiplied, the parts in the diviſion of the *concupiſcence* will be foure: For you ſhall there find things *good*, things *bad*, things *preſent*, and things *expected*.

Now

Now *good* expected, is this *deſire*: *Good* when it is *preſent*, is *pleaſure*. *Evill* when it is *looked for*, begetteth *feare*; when it is *preſent*, it bringeth *griefe*. If therefore you have reſpect to *good things*, therein conſiſteth *pleaſure* and *deſire*; but if you reſpect *evill things*, of them proceed *feare* and *griefe*. And for theſe conſiderations, ſome have divided *affection* into theſe foure parts; *deſire*, *pleaſure*, *feare*, *grief*. We call thoſe things *good* and *bad*, that are either ſo indeed, or elſe reputed to be ſuch.

II. *Evill affections* are ingendred in our *minde*, by theſe three things; *Evill*

education, *unskilfulneſſe* (or ignorance,) and by an *evill conſtitution* of Body.

For, if wee be not well *educated*, even from our childhood, ſo that wee may learne to maſter our *paſsions* in the beginning, wee ſoone fall into an immoderation almoſt incurable. By reaſon of *ignorance* alſo, a certaine perverſe judgement is foſtered in the reaſonable part of our *ſoule*, which makes us think *evill things* to be good; and *good things* to be evill. And by meanes of an *ill complexion* (or *conſtitution*) of *body*, ſomewhat is likewiſe occaſioned to our harme; For they in whom *choller* abound are inclined

inclined to *fretfulneſſe*; and they who exceed in *heat* and *moiſture*, are prone to *laſciviouſneſſe*.

Wee muſt endeavour therefore, to cure an *evill cuſtome* by enuring our ſelves to *good cuſtomes*; we muſt remove *ignorance* by learning *knowledge*; & we muſt labour to rectifie the evill *conſtitution of our bodies*, by ſuch bodily things, as may ſo much as is poſſible help to bring it into a *meane temperature*; which may be effected by a *good dyet*, by *exerciſe*, and by *phyſick*, if need be.

CAP. 18. SECT. I.

I. *Of the* pleaſures *both of* minde *and* body; *their*

variety, *and different natures*. II. *Of such* pleasures *as are to be pursued by* good men, *and which are properly accounted* pleasures. III. *What* pleasures *(according to the opinion of* Plato) *are true or false* pleasures: *how* good pleasures *are named*; *how* defined *by some* Philosophers; *and what defects are in their* definition.

RIghtwell may *pleasure* be divided into *corporeall* and *mentall-pleasures*: For, some belong onely to the *minde*, as to be delighted in *knowledge*; or in the *contemplation* of things. Others

thers are called *corporeall-pleaſures*, becauſe they proceed from the conjunction of *ſoul* and *body*, and they are the *pleaſures* which wee have in *eating*, *drinking*, *carnall-copulation*, and the like.

There is no *pleaſure* proper to the *body* alone: For they that ſeem to be ſuch, are *paſſions* rather then *pleaſures*; as certaine *cuttings*, and *flawings*, qualities pertinent to the temperature of the *body*: For, all *pleaſure* hath *ſenſe* joyned with it, and (as we have ſhewed before) all *ſenſe* belongeth to the *ſoule*.

There be divers kindes of *pleaſure*: Some are

good, ſome naught; ſome falſe, ſome true; ſome pertaine to the *minde* only; ſome depend upon knowledge; ſome belong to the *body*, and are judged by the *ſenſe*.

Among *pleaſures* tryed by *ſenſe*, ſome be naturall, and ſome not ſo. To that *pleaſure* which is in *drinking*, the *griefe* which commeth by *thirſt*, is oppoſed; but to the *pleaſure* which ariſeth from *contemplation*, there is nothing oppoſite; And by theſe things it is manifeſt that the name of *pleaſure* hath many ſignifications.

Among thoſe which we call bodily or corporeall *pleaſures*, ſome are both

neceſſary

neceſſary and *naturall*; and without them it is impoſſible to live; ſuch are the *pleaſures* which we take in *eating* and *drinking* what is competent, and in neceſſary *clothing*. Some are *naturall*, but not *neceſſary pleaſures*, as naturall and legitimate *copulation*: For though this bee neceſſary for the preſervation of the whole *kinde*; yet it is not ſo neceſſary to the life of any one man, but that he may live in his *virginity* without it; but ſome *pleaſures* are neither *neceſſary* nor *naturall*; as drunkenneſſe, laſciviouſneſſe, and feeding in exceſſe.

For theſe neither aſſiſt in propagating the ſuc-

ceſſion of our *kinde*, as lawfull *copulation*, neither become profitable for the maintenance of our life; but are (on the contrary) harmefull unto us.

II. Hee therefore that would live according to the law of *God*, muſt purſue thoſe pleaſures onely which are both *neceſſary* and *naturall*. But he that will content himſelfe in the ſecond order of *vertues*, may take in hand both the forementioned *pleaſures*, and therewith ſuch alſo as are *naturall* but not *neceſſary*; obſerving a conveniency in *meaſure*, *manner*, *time*, and *place*, the reſt hee muſt by all meanes eſchew.

Thoſe

Thoſe *pleaſures* are generally to be accounted *good*, which are neither intangled with *griefe*, nor occaſion *repentance*, nor procure other *harme*, nor depart from the *mean*, nor draw us from *good workes*, nor bring us into *bondage*. But thoſe are properly *pleaſures*, wch are in ſome ſort exerciſed in the conſideration of *God*, and of *knowledge* and *vertue*: And theſe are to bee placed amõg thoſe *pleaſures* which ought earneſtly to be purſued, above all the reſt which are profitable unto us; not becauſe they are pertinent unto our *being* (or for the continuation of our kinde) but for that they

they conſtitute our *well-being*, and make us to bee honeſt, to bee *lovers*, and *beloved* of *God*, and to have the utmoſt perfection of *man*; which perfection conſiſteth in the *ſoule* and *Vnderſtanding*.

Theſe *pleaſures* are neither the remedies to avoid diſeaſes, as eating, drinking, and thoſe other which doe ſupply our wants; neither have they any *griefe* at all, preceding them, following them, or contrary unto them; but are pure, immixt, and free from every material compoſition, becauſe they pertaine onely to the *ſoule*.

III. For according to *Plato's* opinion of *pleaſures*, there

there bee ſome of them falſe, and ſome true. Thoſe are falſe, unto the procuring whereof, *ſenſe* and a *falſe opinion* is needfull; and ſuch alſo as have *grief* annexed unto them. *True pleaſure* is that which pertaines to the *ſoule* onely, even the *ſoule* by it ſelfe, together with *ſcience*, *underſtanding*, and *prudence*; and ſuch *pleaſure* as is pure without any mixture of *griefe*, or ſubſequent *repentance* at any time.

Some call ſuch *pleaſures* as enſue upon *contemplation*, and good actions, not *paſſions*, but *ſweetneſſes*; and others call them *Ioy*, as by a proper name.

They define *pleaſure* to be

be *a generation into a nature ſubject unto ſenſe*. But this definition ſeemeth to agree onely to *corporeall pleaſure* : Seeing by that *pleaſure*, the wants of our *body* are ſupplyed and cured, together with ſuch griefes as we ſuſtained by thoſe wants. For when we be *cold* or *thirſty*, wee are delighted in the *warmth*, and in the *drinke*, whereby that *griefe* is cured, which proceeded from *cold* and *thirſt*.

Therefore theſe pleaſures are not *good* naturally or of themſelves, but accidentally : for, as *to be in health*, is *good naturally* and by it ſelfe, whereas *to be healed*, is but an *accidentall*

dentall good; ſo theſe *pleaſures* are onely *accidentally good*; becauſe they are but remedies for the curing of other things. But the *pleaſure* taken in *contemplation* is *good naturally*, and of it ſelfe; becauſe it is not uſed in reſpect of any want.

Hereby it is plain, that all *pleaſure* is not ordained to ſupply *wants*; and if this be true, that cannot bee a good *definition*, which defines *pleaſure* to be *A generation into a nature ſubject unto ſenſe*; for it comprehendeth not all pleaſure; but leaveth out the beſt, even the *pleaſure* that is in *contemplation*.

SECT.

Sect. 2.

I. *A definition of* pleaſure *according to* Epicurus, *and another definition equivolent thereunto.* II. *A definition of* pleaſure *according to* Ariſtotle. III. *Of the ſundry ſorts of* pleaſures; *of their* operations; *of ſuch as are proper to* man *as he is* man; *and of ſuch as are common to him, with other* living creatures.

EPicurus the Philoſopher defines *pleaſure* to be *The taking away of every thing which may grieve a man:* and in ſo defining it he ſayes the ſame thing with him, who affirmes

affirms it to be *A generation into a nature ſubject unto ſenſe.* For hee ſayes that *our deliverance from that which grieveth us is pleaſure*: But ſeeing no *generation* conſiſts of the ſame proprieties, with thoſe things which proceed thereof, we muſt not thinke that the *generation* of *pleaſure*, is *pleaſure*; but, ſome other thing beſide *pleaſure*. For the *generation* it ſelfe is converſant about ingendring; but of all things which are *begotten*, there is nothing which is at once in *begetting*, and perfectly *begotten*; ſeeing it is evident that the *acting* and the *finiſhing* of an *act*, are diſtinct things, perfected

cted by degrees. But that which taketh pleaſure is delighted all at once; therefore *pleaſure* cannot be a *generation*.

Furthermore, every *generation* is a making of things which are not formerly in being; but *pleaſure* cõcerneth ſuch things as have their being already; therefore *pleaſure* cannot be a *generation*. Again, *generation* may bee ſaid to be ſpeedy or ſlow; but ſo is not *pleaſure* ſaid to be.

Moreover, of *good things*, ſome be the *habit*, ſome the *operation*, and ſome the *inſtruments*. The *habit*, as *vertues*; the *operation*, as the *action* agreeable to *vertue*. Again, the

habit

habit is as the *faculty of ſeeing*; the *operation*, as the *ſeeing it ſelfe*; and the *inſtruments* whereby wee worke, as the *eye*, *riches*, and ſuch like.

Now all the *powers* of the *ſoule* which are converſant about good or evill things, are the faculties of ſome *habits* or other. Therefore, if *pleaſure* bee a good thing, and not an evill thing; theſe are the onely things in which it can bee converſant. But it cannot bee a *habit*; neither is it as a *vertue*; for then it could not be ſo eaſily changed into *griefe*, which is contrary thereunto: neither as it is contrary to *privation*; ſeeing

seeing it is impossible that a *habit*, and a *privation*, should meet in the same subject; as *pleasure* and *griefe* may. For there bee some who take pleasure, and are grieved both at once; as they who are gently scratched when they itch; therefore *pleasure* is not a *habit*.

Neither is *pleasure* an *instrument*; For *instruments* are ordained in respect of other things, not in respect of themselves, now *pleasure* is not for any other thing, but for it selfe only, and therefore it cannot be an *instrument*.

II. *Pleasure* must be therefore an *operatiõ*; & indeed *Aristotle* defines the same to

to be an *operation of a habit that is agreeable unto nature*: but by this definition, *felicitie* ſhould bee *pleaſure*, (ſeeing *felicitie* is ſuch an *operation* as he defineth;) and ſo his definition is falſe.

Therefore *Ariſtotle* thus correcteth his *definition*; *Pleaſure* (ſaith hee) *is the end of the operations of a living-creature, which are void of incumbrance, and agreeable to nature*: So *pleaſure* may bee, as it were, wrapped up, and coexiſt, together with *felicity*; but *felicity* cannot be *pleaſure*.

Now every *operation* is not a *motion*; for ſome *operation* is practiſed without *motion*, ſuch was the *operation*

tion which God uſed in the firſt creation; for the *firſt mover* of all things is *unmoveable*; ſuch alſo is the *operation* of *contemplation*, which man uſeth; for it is exerciſed without *motion*; becauſe the ſubject of *contemplation* is alwayes one and the ſame; and the minde of him that contemplates, alwayes firmly ſetled upon that object of *contemplation*.

If then, the *pleaſure* that is in contemplation (and which is the greateſt, the principall, and the onely true *pleaſure*) be exerciſed without *motion*; it is plaine that ſuch *pleaſures* as have the feweſt *motions*, are by ſo much the better, and the

the greater, as their *motions* are the fewer.

III. *Pleaſures*, together with their *operations* are diverſly diſtinguiſhed; for there be ſo many *pleaſures*, as of their *operations*: when the *operations* are good, the *pleaſures* are good alſo; and if the *operations* bee naught, ſuch are the *pleaſures*.

That there bee ſundry ſorts of *pleaſure* in reſpect of every *ſenſe*, it is very manifeſt; for there be many pleaſures both in *touching* and *taſting*; and great diverſitie alſo in the pleaſures of the *ſight*, of the *hearing*, and of the *ſmell*: and the purer *ſenſes* are they which keepe the fartheſt

fartheſt diſtance from their objects, which delight them, as the *ſight*, the *hearing*, and the *ſmell*.

There bee two ſorts of the *operations* of the *minde*, the one in *practiſe*, the other in *contemplation*; and therefore it is evident, that there are two ſorts of *pleaſure* which follow theſe *operations*; and that thoſe which follow the *contemplation* are more pure, then thoſe which follow the *practiſe*.

The pleaſures of the *minde* (or underſtanding) are proper to *man* as hee is *man*; but they which pertaine to the *ſenſe*, are common to him with other *living-creatures*, in reſpect

respect of his being a *living-creature*.

Now seeing it is thus, and that some are delighted with such *pleasures*, as pertaine to *sense*, and others with some other *pleasures*; those *pleasures* onely are to be accounted good of their owne nature, which are judged good, not of *evill men*, but of *good men*: For in doubtfull matters, every common fellow is not a competent judge; but he that is both skilfull, and regulateth himselfe according to the rule of (undepraved) *nature*.

CAP. 19.

I. *Of* Griefe, *and the severall* kindes *thereof; and how farre a* good man *may be subject thereunto.* II. Excesse *chanceth only in* bodily pleasures, *not in those which are* mentall.

ALL *Griefe* is of one of these kindes; namely, *astonishing griefe*, called by the greeks ἄχος, *care*; tearmed ἄχθος, *envy* and *pitty*.

Astonishing griefe, is that which bereaveth us of the use of our voice; *care* is a *griefe* burthenous unto us. *Envy* is a griefe, springing from the *wel-fare* of other men;

men; and *pitty* is a griefe arising from the adversity of others.

Every *griefe* is evill in respect of it owne nature; for albeit a good man bee sometime grieved, when hee seeth good men oppressed, or his children, or his country spoiled, hee grieveth not for the sorrowes sake, as if it were good in it selfe to grieve; but for a respect unto other circumstances: Hee that is delighted in *contemplation* is not moved with such things, because he hath altogether estranged his minde from earthly affaires, and devoted himselfe wholly unto *God*. And hee that is otherwise

a good man, is moved by the circumſtances of *griefe* in ſuch a meane, as never brings him into ſubjection thereunto; but rather ſubdues them unto himſelfe.

If you make the compariſon betweene an *evill thing*, and a *good thing*, *griefe* is then contrary unto *pleaſure*, which is uſed meaſurably; but if the compariſon be betweene *evill* and *evill*, *griefe* is the contrary to an immoderate *pleaſure*.

II. But theſe *Exceſſes* happen onely in the *pleaſures* of the *body*: For the *pleaſure* which is taken in *contemplation*, (even when it is in the higheſt degree, and hath attained unto perfection)

perfection) admits no exceſſe; neither is there any *griefe* ſet in a contrariety thereunto; nor doth it ſerve to cure any preceding *griefe*.

Cap. 20.

I. *Of* Feare, *and the ſixe parts thereof; with their* definitions *and* differences. II. *The* cauſe *of* feare, *and the* inſtrument *of that* griefe.

NExt *griefe* (in generall) wee will deſcribe *Feare*, which is divided into ſixe parts; *Sloth*, *Baſhfulneſſe*, *Shame*, *Amazednesſe*, *Carefulneſſe*, and *Terror*.

Sloth is when we *feare*

leſt we ſhould be compelled to *worke*. *Amazedneſſe* is a *feare* which ariſeth in us when ſome huge and unuſuall thing appeareth. *Terror* is a trembling, or ſhuddering, occaſioned by ſome *dreadfull object*. *Carefulneſſe* is when wee feare loſing that which we *have*, or of miſſing that which we *deſire*; for by the feare of theſe things, wee are brought into a carefull agony. *Baſhfulneſſe* is the *feare* of ſome rebuke or diſgrace; and is a very honeſt *paſſion*. *Shame* is a feare begotten in us upon the remembrance of ſome evill which we have committed: And where this is found there is remaining

ning ſome hope of goodneſſe and amendment.

And this is the difference betwixt *baſhfulneſſe*, and *ſhame*, he that is aſhamed is troubled through *feare* of ſuch things as hee hath done; but he that is *abaſhed* feares leſt ſome reproach may befall him: But the old writers uſe the words indifferently, calling *ſhame baſhfulneſſe*; and *baſhfulneſſe ſhame*.

The *cauſe* of *feare* is a cold that generally ſurprizeth us, by reaſon our whole heat (by the ſudden apprehenſion of ſome thing) is driven unto the heart, as to the principall part; even as the people flie to their Governours, when II.

when they are frighted.

The *inſtrument* which this *griefe* uſeth, is the *belly* (or *mouth* of the *ſtomach*) For there the biting is firſt felt: And *Galen* in his third book of *Demonſtrations*, writeth to this purpoſe;

When men are grieved (*ſaith hee*) choller *flowes plentifully into the ſtomach, which cauſeth a biting; and that* griefe, *and biting never ceaſeth untill they have vomited out the choller. They feele this biting underneath the griſtle which is in the middle of the breaſt; which griſtle is like a ſword, and thereof is called ξιφοειδὴς, but the heart lyeth much higher. For the Stomach is*

is placed under the midriffe, and the heart above it.

The old writers did uſe alſo to give the name of the *heart* to the mouth of the *ſtomach*; as namely, *Hippocrates*; & *Thucidides*, when hee talketh of the *plague*. His words be theſe, *And when it came with ſome ſtrength unto the heart, (meaning the ſtomach) it made it give up; and there came from it as many purgations of* choller, *as have been named of the Phyſitians.* For, that which is *turned up*, and forced to *vomit*, is the *mouth of the ſtomach*, and not that bowel which we call the *heart*.

Cap. 21.

I. *Of* Anger, *and of the* names *and* nature *of the three ſeverall parts thereof*, Choller, Wrath, *and* Fury. II. *The true office and uſe of* anger.

SUch a heating of the blood, about the heart, as is cauſed by an exhalation of *choller* troubling the ſame, is termed *Anger*, and therefore it is named alſo *choller*, and *wrath*: And ſometime it is a deſire of *revenge*; for if we have beene injured, or but ſuppoſe our ſelves injured, we are then *angry*; and that paſſion is uſually mixed, both of *anger*, and of

of a *desire* which wee have to be *revenged*.

Anger is of three sorts or *species*. The first is called by the *greekes* χολη and χολος; for it is but the first *heat*, or beginning, (as it were) of *anger*, and may be named in English *choller*, or an *angry displeasure*. The second is μηνις, so called of the greek word μηνω, which implies a *delaying*, or *tarrying*, or *a thing laid up in memory*, and meaneth a continuing, or *inveterate anger*. The last is κοτος, derived of a word signifying to *lye in waite*; and is a *revenging anger*, waiting opportunities of *revenge*.

II. *Anger*, is appointed to waite upon reason; and when

when any thing is done wherewithall *reaſon* may juſtly be diſpleaſed, *anger* immediately taketh hold thereof (as ſhee ought to doe) if *reaſon*, and *anger* keep their limits and naturall courſe.

Cap. 22.

Of that irrationall part *of the* Soule, *which is not obedient unto* reaſon.

Let us now ſpeake of that part of the ſoul, *which is not ſubject unto reaſon*: For having declared that part which is obedient unto *reaſon*, wee ſhall in good order proceed to thoſe faculties which are diſobedient there-

thereunto; namely the faculty of *nouriſhing*, of *ingendring*, and of the *pulſes*.

The faculties of *nouriſhing* and *ingendring* are tearmed *naturall*; and the faculty of the *pulſes*, is called *vitall*.

Cap. 23.

I. *Of the* nouriſhing *power of the* ſoul, *and the foure faculties thereof.* II. *Of the ſeverall* evacuations. III. *Of the ſeverall* inſtruments, *of* nouriſhment, *and of the particular* offices *of thoſe* inſtruments.

ALL the naturall faculties of the *nouriſhing power*, are

are theſe foure; an *attractive appetite*, a *retentive power*, a *diſtributing*, and an *expulſive* or avoiding *faculties*: for every part of the *living creature*, doth naturally *draw* unto it ſelfe ſuch nouriſhment, as is convenient for the ſame: when it is attracted, it *preſerveth* it: when the ſame is kept a due time, it *changeth* the ſame into it ſelfe; and then *expelleth* whatſoever proveth to be ſuperfluous.

Theſe are the *faculties* which order the nouriſhment of the parts of the body; and by theſe it groweth to an augmentation both in breadth and height.

The

II.

The wayes or paſſages, by which all *ſuperfluities* bee avoided, are, by the *belly*, by *urine*, by *vomits*, by *ſweats*, by the *mouth*, by the *noſtrils*, by the *eares*, by the *eyes*, by *breathings out*, and by *inviſible pores*, and unknowne paſſages.

All the firſt *evacuations* are manifeſtly perceived, as that excrement called the *eare-waxe*, by the *eares*; the *teares* and the *gumme* (which wee call the *ſpethyme*) by the *eyes*; and that moiſture alſo which maketh bleare-eyed: the *out-breathings* likewiſe, by which a ſowltry heat is evaporated from the heart. But by thoſe which we

we call *unknowne paſſages*, there breathes out (inſenſibly) a moiſture over all the body, wherewith many *humours* are evacuated, from the very depth and drawing together of the arteries; and they are conveyed through the ſkin where it is rarified.

III. The *inſtruments* of the *nouriſhing faculty*, are the *mouth*, the *ſtomach*, the *belly*, the *liver*, all the *veines*, the *intrailes*, both ſorts of *choller*, and the *reines*.

The *mouth* prepares the food before-hand for the *belly*, dividing it into ſmall parts, by the *teeth* and *tongue*: for in *chewing* the *tongue* is very helpfull in

in gathering the meat together, and in applying it unto the *teeth*; and as the women which grinde corne, thruſt the graines unto the milſtone with their hands; ſo the *tongue* is as it were a hand to aſſiſt in the *chewing* of our meat.

The food being thus wrought before-hand, is conveyed into the *belly* by the *ſtomach*; which is a place not onely ordained to feele what wee want, but to bee a paſſage-way alſo, to convey the meat unto our *bellies*: for the *ſtomach* riſeth up when wee eat or drinke, and (drawing unto it that which we ſwallow down) ſendeth

tendeth it i to the *belly*.

When the *belly* hath receiued the same; it severs that which is profitable for *nourishment*, from that which is woody, stony, or unfit for nutriment. That which is good, is there changed into *humours*; which are thence caried up to the liver by *veines* ordained for that purpose, and which are as it were certaine riuulets to convey it thither.

These *veines* are in the *liver*, in the maner of *rootes*, drawing thither from the *belly*, the juyce of our food, even as the roots of *plants* draw nourishment from the earth: And the *belly* may bee re-

sembled

ſembled unto the *earth*, which miniſtreth nouriſhment unto the *plants*: The *veines* like rootes, carry the *humour* from the *belly*, from the *intrailes*, and from the great *double-skin*, which faſtneth our *bowels*, unto the *back*, unto the *gates* and to the *bunches* of the *liver*.

The *liver* it ſelfe may be compared unto the ſtemme or body of the *plant*. The *veines* which iſſue by divers wayes from the *hollow veine*, ſpringing from the flatt parts of the *liver*; are like ſprigs, and boughs. After the *liver* hath received the *humour* from the *belly*, it both concocts it, and makes

makes it alſo like unto it ſelfe: for the *liver* conſiſting of ſuch fleſh as hath a neare allyance unto *blood*, eaſily converts that *humour* into *blood*.

This *blood* is cleanſed by the *ſpleen*, by that *bladder* which receives the *gall*, and by the *reines*: for the *ſpleene* attracts unto it all the dregs of the *blood*, and is nouriſhed thereby. The *bladder* (called the *gall*) which receives the *choller*, drawes unto it ſelfe, the *ſharpneſſe* which remained in the juyce of our food. The *reines*, doe as it were ſtraine out that thin humour which is like whey, and the *ſharpneſſe* alſo which remaineth

neth in that *humour* : After all which, the *blood* becomming pure and good, is distributed for a nourishment unto all other parts of the body, by such veines as are dispersed abroad into every mẽber.

By this meanes every part of the *body* drawing *blood* unto it, retaineth and converteth so much thereof as is proportionable, into it own *substance*; the rest it sendeth to the *next part*, and so to the *next*, that it may yeeld nourishment unto them.

Thus, all the *body* is in every part *nourished*, and hath *growth* and *continuance* by the *blood*, which is distributed from the *liver*:

ver: And this part is termed *irrationall*, and said, not to bee obedient unto *reason*; because that which it performeth, is not executed according to our *choice* (or as we our selves will) but naturally, and according to it owne nature.

Cap. 24.

I. *Of the* pulses, *and of their* offices. II. *Of the excellent and usefull disposition of the* sinewes, *the* veines, *and* arteries, *and of the severall* fountaines *of these.* III. *Of the mutuall benefit and assistance also, which* these three *are to each other.*

The

THe motion of the *Pulses* is called a *vitall power*: For, having beginning from the *heart* (and especially from the left portion thereof, which is called the place of the *spirits*) it distributes unto every part of the body, an ingraffed and a *vitall-heat*, by meanes of the *arteries*; even as the *liver* distributes *food* by the *veines*.

If therefore the *heart* be inflamed above the due measure which nature doth require; the intire *living creature* is forthwith brought into an unnaturall heat: and is in like maner *cooled*, if the

heart

heart be cooled beyond a juſt proportion; becauſe the *vitall-ſpirit* is diſperſed from the *heart* by the *arteries*, into every part of the *body*.

II. For it is ordered in ſuch maner, that (for the moſt part) theſe three; the *veine*, the *artery*, and the *ſinew*, bee ſo divided, that they goe all together, proceeding from the three *principall parts*, which governe the intire *living creature*.

From the *braine*, which is the fountaine both of *motion* and of *ſenſe*, proceeds the *ſinew*. From the *liver*, which yeeldeth a beginning to the *blood*, and the *nouriſhing-faculty*, come

comes the *veine*, which is the veſſell wherein the *blood* is caried. And from the *heart*, which is the root of our *vitall-faculty*, comes the *artery*, which is that veſſell wherein the *ſpirits* are conveyed.

III. Theſe three accompany one another, and receive profit and aſſiſtance each from other. For the *veine* adminiſters a certaine *nouriſhment of blood* to the *ſinew*, and to the *artery*. The *artery* imparts naturall *heat*, and *vitall-ſpirits* to the *veine*, and therefore it is not poſſible to finde either an *artery* altogether voide of a thin kinde of *blood*; or a *veine* without *ſpirits*, of a va-

poury nature.

The *artery* is forcibly opened and contracted againe, with a certain harmony and proportion; having the beginning of that motion from the *heart*. And when it is opened, it ſucks and draws a thin kinde of *blood*, from the *veines* that are neare unto it; which *blood* being reſolved into exhalations, becommeth a nouriſhment to the *vitall-ſpirits*: when it is cloſed againe, it empties the *ſowltry heat* which is in it, by certaine *inviſible pores*, throughout the body; even as the heart ſends from it ſelfe, the *ſowltry heat* which oppreſſeth it, by evaporati-

ons

ons, both at the *noſtrills*, and the *mouth*.

CAP. 25.

I. *Of the* propagating, *or* generating faculty, *and how farre the ſame is in mans power*. II. *The* inſtruments *of* propagation, *and their offices*. III. *The opinions of* Ariſtotle, Democritus, *and* Galen; *concerning the* ſeed *of the* Woman.

EVen the faculty of *generatiõ* pertaineth alſo to that part of the ſoule, which is not obedient unto *reaſon*. For we yeeld *ſeed* in our dreame (or ſleepe) whether we will or no; and

our desire of *copulation* is so naturall, that the *desire* is moved in us, even against our wills. But the *act it selfe* is indeed, and without question, in our owne power, and pertaineth to the *minde*; for it is brought to passe by those *instruments* which are serviceable to the *naturall appetite*; and to abstain from our *appetite*, or to master the same, was (*by God*) naturally placed in our power, (*and may be so continued, if timely endeavour hath not beene omitted.*)

II. The instruments of a *potentiall generation*, are first the *veines* and *arteries*: For in these the *first humor* (that is not fully perfected into

into *ſeed*) is ingendred, and the blood there changed, even as milke in the dugs. And foraſmuch as they were firſt made of *ſeed*, this *humour* is a nouriſhment unto thoſe *veſſels*; and the *veines* and *arteries*, doe concoct the *blood* into a moiſture, like unto *ſeed*, that they might be nouriſhed thereby: And when they have due nouriſhment, that ſerveth for *generation* which remaineth.

For it is firſt caried up into the head by a large circuit, and from thence brought downe againe, by two *veines* and two *arteries*. Therefore, if a man cut the veines which are

about, or neare the eares, it makes the *living-creature* unfit for *generation*.

Of these *veines* and *arteries*, is compacted that folded skin, which riseth like a swollen *veine*, in the *Cod*, and where this moisture (comming neare unto the nature of seed) falleth into either of the *Testicles*.

There is one *veine*, and one *artery* full of *seed*: In these it is perfected, and is driven forth by the folded *seminall veine*, which is behinde the *Testicles*, by a *winde*.

That *winde* proves that an *artery* sends it forth; and that it is caried by a *veine*, may appeare by those

thoſe who are overmuch addicted unto Venerie: For they that uſe *carnall-copulation* overmuch, therby waſting their *ſeed*, and that *ſeminall humour*, which commeth near unto the nature of *ſeed*, (if they further provoke themſelves) pure blood is then ſtrained from them.

III. *Women* have the ſame parts which *men* have: this only is the difference, *men* have them *outwardly*, and they *inwardly*. But *Ariſtotle* and *Democritus* were of opinion that the *ſeed* of the *woman*, is no way uſefull in the generation of children. For they conceive that which proceeds from the *woman*

to bee a ſweating of the place, rather then any ſeed of *generation.*

But *Galen* condemning *Ariſtotles* opinion, affirmes that *women* have their *ſeed* alſo, and that the mingling of both *ſeeds* together is the cauſe of conception; and thereupon (ſaith hee) their accompanying together in that act is termed Μῖξις, a *copulation.*

Yet he judgeth not the *ſeed* of the *woman* to be ſo perfect as the *mans*; but to be moiſter, and ſomewhat leſſe concocted, and as it were a nouriſhment unto the ſeed of the *man.* Of that ſeed, thoſe parts are compoſed which are about the utmoſt places of

of the wombe, and which is called Ἀλαντοειδὴς (*skin wrapped about the skin wherein the infant lieth*) and ordained for a veſſell to receive the ſuperfluities of the childe.

In all ſorts of *living-creatures*, the *Female* takes the *male* when ſhee may conceive; and ſuch as are able to conceive at all times (as hens, doves, and women) are at all times deſirous to accompany the *male*: But *women* only accept of the *males* company when they have conceived; for all other creatures uſually reject the *male* after conception. As for *hens*, they are daily trodden, becauſe they do

lay almoſt every day.

Women, as they bee at their own liberty in other things; ſo they are at liberty alſo to accompany with men after conception; whereas *living-creatures* void of *reaſon*, are governed not of themſelves, but by nature; admitting ſuch a *meaſure*, and ſuch *times*, as are dictated unto them, by a naturall inſtinct.

Cap. 26.

This Chapter mentioneth other diviſions *of the* faculties *belonging to a* living-creature.

Diviſion is made of thoſe *faculties* which pertain unto

to a *living-creature* in another maner: For it is affirmed that ſome faculties are *mentall*, ſome *naturall*, and ſome *vitall*.

They which are *mentall* are in our owne choice and *election*; they which are not in our *election*, are *naturall*, and *vitall*. The *faculties* belonging unto the *minde* are two, the motion of *appetite*, and of *ſenſe*.

To the motion of our *appetite*, theſe *faculties* are appertaining; *Progreſſion* from place to place, the *motion of the whole body*, *ſpeech* and *reſpiration*: For it is in our power to doe, or to omit theſe things. But the *naturall*, and *vitall* *faculties*

faculties are not in our power; for they goe forward, nill we will we; as the faculty of *nouriſhing*, of *growing*, and of *propagation*: all which are *naturall faculties*, and ſo doth likewiſe the *facultie* of the *pulſes*, which is *vitall*.

As for the *inſtruments* (of theſe *faculties*) mentioned by others, wee have already treated of them, wee will therefore ſpeake of the *inſtruments* of thoſe things which belong unto our *appetite* (or *choice*)

Cap. 27.

I. *Of the* motion *proceeding* voluntarily *from us: of the* place *where it aſſumeth beginning; and the*

the inſtruments which it uſeth. II. *The wiſe* providence *of the* Creator, *inuniting together things* naturall *&* mentall,&c.

THe *motion* which belongeth to our *aſſent* (or choice) and proceedeth voluntarily from us, taketh beginning from the *braine*, and from the *marrow* of the *chine*, which is it ſelfe a part of the *braine*.

The *inſtruments* thereof are the *ſinewes* that ſpring from theſe, the *ligaments*, and *muſcles*. The compoſure of theſe *muſcles*, is fleſh, and the *ſtrings in the blood*; which are like *ſinewes* and *griſles* wrapped

wrapped up together, with *ſinewie-ſtrings*. And ſome are of opinion, that they are *ſenſible*; becauſe that *ſenſe* proceedeth from the *ſinewes*, wherewithall they are folded up.

The *griſly-end* of the *muſcle* is compounded both of a *ligament*, and of certaine ſmall *ſinewes*; yet this *griſly-end* differs from a *ſinew* in this, that every *ſinew* hath *ſenſe* in it, and is *round*, and ſomewhat *tender*, and aſſumeth alſo his beginning from the *braine*: whereas this *griſly end*, is *more hard*, ſometime alſo *flat*, having likewiſe his originall from the *bone*, and is in it ſelfe void of *ſenſe*.

The

The *hands* are an *instrument*, ordained to lay hold of things, and so convenient for the exercise of *arts*, above other members, that if the *hands*, or but the *fingers* only should be taken away, wee are made unapt for almost every *art*. And therefore *man* onely received *hands* from his *Creator*, because he onely is indued with *reason*, which makes him capable of *arts*.

The *feet* are *instruments* ordained for going; for by them wee remove and passe from *place* to *place*. And *man* can sit firmely without a prop, because he only makes two *right-angles* by the bowing of his

his legs; the one *inward*, the other *outward*.

Whatsoever things therefore (in man) are moved by *sinewes*, and *muscles*, belong to the *minde*; and hee hath a free liberty in the use of them; Among these (as we have already shewed) the *senses* and the *voice* are to be accounted; and therefore this hath beene hitherto a *discourse*, probably setting forth, as well those things which are *mentall*, as those which are *naturall*.

II. For the *Creator* according to his exceeding wise fore-sight, hath folded up things *mentall* with such as are *naturall*; and things *naturall*, with such

ſuch as appertaine unto the *minde*. And whereas the avoiding of ſuperfluities belongs to the *expulſive faculty* (which is counted one of thoſe that is *naturall*) that wee might not behave our ſelves filthily in avoiding our *excrements*, without regarding the *time*, the *place*, and ſuch other *circumſtances* as are comely; he hath appointed the *muſcles* to bee as it were *Porters*, to order our *evacuations*; and of things which were of themſelves meerely *naturall*, hee hath made them to be *mentall*, and ſuch as depend upon the rule of the *minde*. And thereupon, when wee are provoked

ked unto any *evacuations*, we are able (if cauſe bee) to containe them very often, and very long.

Certaine *ſinewes* which bee ſoft and ſenſible, are ſent downe both from the *middle-pan*, and alſo from the two former *pans* of the *braine*: Other *ſinewes* which are harder, and ſerve us for *motion*, proceed from that *brain-pan*, which is in the hinder part of the head, and from the *marrow of the back*.

Among theſe, thoſe are the harder which come from the *ſpinall-marrow*: and of them, thoſe are the hardeſt of all, which proceed from the loweſt parts of the *marrow of the back*:

back: For by how much farther the marrow of the *chine* deſcendeth from the *braine*; ſo much the more hard is the *chine-marrow* of it ſelfe, and the ſinews alſo which doe ſpring from the ſame.

And as we have received the *ſenſes* double; ſo the *ſinewes* have a two-fold ſpringing alſo from us. For every joynt of the *chine* ſends forth a couple of *ſinewes*; one iſſuing toward the right ſide, and another toward the left; yea, and almoſt our whole body is divided alſo into two parts, the one on the right, and the other on the left ſide. Thus likewiſe are our *feet*, our hands,

hands, the *ſeats* of our *ſenſes*, and other parts divided.

Cap. 28.

I. *Of* reſpiration; *of the* inſtrument, *of the* uſe, *and of the* cauſes *of that* faculty. II. *Of the* compoſure *and* uſe *of the* Lungs, *and of ſuch other parts as are aſſiſting to* reſpiration. III. *Of thoſe parts of a* living creature, *which are made for* themſelves *alone*; *for* others, *and for* themſelves; *or altogether for* others.

HERE *wee will treat of reſpiration*, which is alſo a worke

worke belonging to the *minde*: For by the *muſcles* the breaſt is opened, which is the principall inſtrument of *reſpiration*. Our *ſighing* alſo, and our thick drawing of breath, when any great ſorow happeneth unto us, is an evidence, that the operation hereof belongeth unto the *minde*.

Moreover, the variations, and alterings of our *breathing*, whenſoever need requires, are in our power: For if we be grieved in any part ſerviceable to *reſpiration*, or in ſuch parts as are moved by the motion of any of theſe; as the *midriffe*, the *liver*, the *ſpleene*, the *ſtomach*, the

ſmall-

ſmall-guts, or the *loweſt-gut*, we then breath ſhort and thick. Wee breath ſhort, that we may not over-vehemently ſmite the grieved part; we breath alſo thick, that the often breathing may ſupply what is wanting in the length of our blaſt.

When our leg is wounded, wee ſet it forth very leiſurely in our going; which is done to the ſame end, for which we breath ſhort; and therefore as to goe from place to place belongs unto the *minde*, ſo doth alſo this operation of *reſpiration*. But although we ſhould reſt and not goe at all it were poſſible for us to live a long time,

time, whereas it were impoſſible for us to hold our breath the tenth part of an houre, without death; becauſe the naturall heat which is in us, would bee choaked up and quite extinct by a *ſowltry fume*. For it is as if a man ſhould cover a fire within a ſmall veſſell, having no vent; which would be immediately ſtifled and quenched by it owne fume.

For this cauſe it is very neceſſary that when wee are aſleepe, our *ſoul* ſhould worke nevertheleſſe in this part; becauſe if it ſhould be idle therein (though for a very ſmall time) the *living-creature* would periſh: And in this

this it is againe manifeſted, how the endeavour of the *minde* and of *nature* are knit together.

For the *minde* exerciſeth *reſpiration*, by an *artery* which is a *naturall inſtrument*; and it is alwaies in motion, that neither it owne work, nor the work of the other *arteries* may be intermitted. This not being perceived by ſome, (to wit, *how the minde and nature joyne together in this worke*) they ſuppoſed *reſpiration* to bee onely a *naturall faculty*.

Three things cauſe *reſpiration*, the *uſe*, the *power*, and the *inſtruments*. The *uſe* is twofold: one for the preſervation of our

our *naturall heat*, and the other for the nouriſhment of the *vitall-ſpirits*.

The preſervation of our *naturall heat* conſiſteth both of *drawing in*, and *breathing out* of aire. For the drawing in of the breath doth not onely *cole*, but (in a mediocrity) ſtirreth up *heat* alſo. The *breathing out* of the aire, drives away the *foggy heat* which is about the *heart* (whereas nouriſhment of the *vitall-ſpirits*, is *reſpiration* onely) for the *heart* is dilated abroad, and a certaine portion of aire is attracted thereunto.

The *power* (*which is a cauſe alſo of reſpiration*) is that which it hath from

the *ſoule*: for it is the *minde* which moves the inſtruments of *reſpiration*, by meanes of the *muſcles* (and eſpecially by the breaſt) wherewith our *lungs*, and the ſharp *arteries* (which are alſo a part of the lungs) are moved.

For that part of the ſharp *artery*, which is griſtly, is the inſtrument of the *voice*; the *ligaments* thereof which are like ſkinnes, are inſtruments of *reſpiration*: and that which is compoſed of both together (which is the forementioned *artery*) is the inſtrument both of *reſpiration*, and of the *voice*.

II. The lungs therefore are

are a compoſition folded up together, and conſiſting of theſe foure, a *ſharp artery*, a *ſmooth artery*, a *veine*, and of a *ſpumie fleſh*; which *fleſh* doth fill up all the void places of the folded ſkin, as it were a moiſt bed, (*or the herbe Sleve*) both of the two *arteries* and of the *veine*; ſo that it becommeth both a *ſeat* for them, and a *band* keeping them together.

The *fleſh* of the *lungs*, doth naturally cõcoct the *ſpirits*; as the *liver* concocts the *humour* which commeth from the *belly*: And as the liver, with his vtmoſt edges or ſkirts, ſpreads it ſelfe about the *belly*, becauſe it needeth

the *ſoule*: for it is the *minde* which moves the inſtruments of *reſpiration*, by meanes of the *muſcles* (and eſpecially by the breaſt) wherewith our *lungs*, and the ſharp *arteries* (which are alſo a part of the lungs) are moved.

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The *fleſh* of the *lungs*, doth naturally cōcoct the *ſpirits*; as the *liver* concocts the *humour* which commeth from the *belly*: And as the liver, with his utmoſt edges or ſkirts, ſpreads it ſelfe about the *belly*, becauſe it needeth

heat; ſo the *lungs* incloſe even the very middle of the *heart*; becauſe it needeth ſome cooling by *reſpiration*.

To the *ſharp artery* the griſtle of the *winde-pipe* is immediately joyned, being compounded of three great *griſtles*, whereunto the throat is annexed, and which are continued unto the *mouth* and *noſtrils*, by both which, we draw the aire that is without us. From the mouth it aſcendeth by a bone like unto a ſieve, or like a ſponge, which is full of holes, that the *braine* may not be harmed, if there bee any exceſſe in the qualities of the aire, or if too much winde

winde ſhould enter into it at once.

Here hath alſo the *Creator* placed the *noſe* both for *ſmelling* and *reſpiration*, according as hee hath ordained the *tongue*, for the *voice*, for the *taſting*, and for *chewing*.

Thus the moſt principall parts, ſerving both for the very *being* of the *living-creature*, and for the neceſſary uſes of this life, are divided together with the *powers* of the *minde*: and if any thing hath beene formerly omitted, it may bee underſtood by that which is now expreſſed.

III. Now as it falls out in all other created things, that

ſome are made onely for their *own ſakes*; ſome for *themſelves* and *others* alſo; ſome onely for the *ſakes of others*; and that ſome things fall out accidentally, together with ſuch things as are made; Even thus you ſhall find it to be alſo in the parts of a *living-creature*.

For all the forenamed *inſtruments*, of thoſe three principall things which governe the *living-creature*, are made for their *owne ſakes*: For thoſe things are eſpecially and principally made which are named according to their proper nature; and are ingendred in the wõb even of the ſeed it ſelfe, as the *bones* are. But

But the *yellow choller* is made both in reſpect of it ſelfe, & ſome other thing; For it helpeth *concoction*, ſtirreth up to the avoiding of *excrements*, and (in that reſpect) is in ſome ſort, one of the parts that ſerveth for *nouriſhment*. Moreover, it miniſtreth unto the body a certaine *heat*, as doth our *vitall-faculty*; and in reſpect of all theſe things, it ſeemeth to bee made for it owne ſake: But in that it purgeth our *blood*, it ſeemeth after a ſort, to be made in reſpect of the *blood*.

The *ſpleen* alſo helpeth *concoction*; and that not a little: For being tart, and of a ſharp aſtringent na-

ture; it bindeth the belly by powring out into the ſame, the avoidance of a black moiſture; Yea, it ſtrengtheneth it alſo; aſſiſteth *concoction*, and purgeth the *liver*: For which cauſes, that part alſo ſeemeth to have beene ordained in reſpect of the *blood*.

The *reines* likewiſe are a purgation for the *blood*, and a cauſe of the deſire which we have to *carnall copulation*: For the *veines*, which (as we have declared before) doe fall down into the *cods*, paſſe along by the *reines*; and from thence carry with them a certaine ſharpneſſe, which provoketh *luſt*, even as a certaine

certaine ſharp moiſture which is under the ſkin, procureth an itch. And looke how much the fleſh of the *ſtones*, is tenderer then the other ſkin of the body; by ſo much the more, (being tickled by that ſharpneſſe) are they ſtirred up to the ejaculation of *ſeed*.'

Theſe things therefore and ſuch like, are made both for their owne ſakes, and alſo in reſpect of *other things*. But the *kernels*, and the fleſh are *only* ordained in reſpect of *other things*. For the *kernells* doe ſerve to cary up and underprop the *veſſels*, that they may not be broken when they are lifted

up, or ſtretched forth with any violent motions. And the *fleſh* was made to be a covering to the other parts; that it might coole the *living-creature* in the *ſummer*, by being as it were, a morning dew thereunto, and that it might in the *winter* bee as it were a quilt of wooll to the parts of the *body*.

The *skin* was ordained as a covering, both for the tender *fleſh*, and all thoſe parts that are inward. The *fleſh* is of a nature hardened like a ſcar, by reaſon of the aire which compaſſeth it about, and by meanes of thoſe other bodies wherewithall it is converſant.

The

The *bones* are an underſetting to the whole *body*, and eſpecially the *chine of the back*, which is termed the *foundation* of a *living creature.*

The *nailes* are moſt commonly uſed to ſcratch withall, by every *living-creature* (which hath nails) and they are alſo for ſundry particular uſes, to divers *living-creatures.* For they are given to many for a *defence*; as to thoſe which have crooked *talons*; and they be as it were an *inſtrument* to execute anger.

Many have them both for a weapon of defence, and alſo for a ſtrengthening to their feet, as horſes;

horſes; and all ſuch as divide not the hoofe. But *nailes* are beſtowed on men, not onely to ſcratch themſelves withall, and that they might by ſo doing, diſperſe the ſharp moiſture which is under the ſkin: but that they might alſo take the firmer hold of ſmall things. For by help of them a very ſmall thing may be taken up; becauſe their meeting one againſt another at the very ends of the fingers, enables to the taking of firme hold.

The *haires* grow out accidentally with other things, by the meeting together of ſuch fumy vapours as aſcend out of the body;

body; and yet the *Creator* made not their accidentall generation, without ſome profitable uſe; for they ſerve both to cover and beautifie *living-creatures*: They are a *covering* for *goats* and *ſheep*; they are an *ornament* unto *men*; and they are both a *covering*, and an *ornament* to *Lions*.

CAP. 29.

I. *Of things done* voluntarily, *and againſt our* will. II. *Of the definition of an* action; *and of the* circumſtances *which accompany, and follow an* action III. *Of the marks both of a* voluntary, *and* involuntary action.

I Have often made mention of things done *voluntarily*, and by *constraint*, of which somwhat must be now expressed, lest errors may be occasioned through want of an exact knowledge of these.

But hee that undertaketh to discourse of things done *voluntarily* and *against our will*, must in the first place set downe some assured rules, and certaine tokens, wherby it may be well discerned whether the thing done, be (unquestionably) *voluntary*, or *against our will*.

Seeing therefore that every *voluntarie* thing consisteth in some *action*; seeing moreover, that all those things which are

ſaid to be done *againſt our will*, conſiſt in *action* alſo (as ſhall bee anon declared) and ſeeing likewiſe, ſome think that the thing which is done *againſt our will*, conſiſteth both in *action* & *paſſion*; we will (before we proceed further) define what an *action* is.

II. An *action* is the actuall doing of any thing with the uſe of *reaſon*.

After all *actions*, there followeth either *praiſe* or *diſpraiſe*. Some *actions* are exerciſed with *pleaſure*, and ſome with *griefe*. Some are to bee *choſen* by the doer, and ſome are to be *avoided*. Of the which are to bee choſen, ſome are at all times to be made choice

choice of; ſome at one time rather then at another. The ſame *circumſtances* are conſiderable in ſuch *actions* as are to bee eſchewed alſo; and this moreover is obſervable, that ſome *actions* are *pitied*, ſome *pardoned*, ſome *hated*, and ſome *puniſhed*.

III. Now then, let theſe be the markes to diſcern the things which are *willingly done*; namely, that *praiſe* or *diſpraiſe* alwaies follow them; that they are done with *pleaſure*; and that the *actions* are to bee choſen by the doers of them, either at all times, or at thoſe times in which they are done. The notes of *involuntary actions* are theſe; They are vouch-

ſaſed *pardon*; or they are *pitied*, or they are done with *griefe*, and they are not done by our *owne choice*. Theſe things being thus defined and ordered; wee will firſt ſpeake of ſuch things as are done *againſt our will*.

CAP. 30.

I. *The* definition *of an* involuntary act. II. *The ſolution of certaine* queſtions *concerning* mixt actions, *and an* adviſe *what is to bee done, when we know not what* action *to chooſe*. III. *Things done by* inconſtancy, *by* intemperancy, *or* anger, *are not to be reputed things done* againſt our will.

Such

SUch things as are done againſt our *wil*, are either done by *conſtraint*, or of *ignorance*. The *beginning* of thoſe actions which are done *againſt our will*, by *force*, is without our ſelves; that is, ſome other thing, and not we our ſelves is the cauſe thereof: and therefore this is the *definition* of that thing which is done *againſt our will*, by force. *It is an action not having the beginning thereof in him which doth it; and he which is forced thereunto doth nothing to further the ſame of his owne will.* Wee meane, in this place, by the *beginning*, the *cauſe-effecting* the thing done.

II. Hereupon it may bee

queſtioned, when Shipmen caſt their lading into the ſea, when they are endangered by a tẽpeſt; (or when a man is contented to ſuffer or doe ſome diſhoneſt thing to ſave his *friend* or his *country*) whether theſe actions may be ſaid to bee done *againſt their will*, or no. And according to this clauſe added to the *definition* (*Hee that is forced, doth nothing to further the matter of his owne will*) theſe actions do ſeeme to be *voluntary*; becauſe to the executing of ſuch things, the *actors* doe of themſelves move their *inſtrument all parts*, even of their owne accord.

Such is their caſe who caſt

caſt their lading into the Sea; and theirs who offer themſelves to abide any ſhame or danger to bring to paſſe a greater good, as did *Zeno*, who bitt off his owne tongue, and ſpit it out into the face of *Dionyſius* the tyrant, becauſe he would not utter unto him what was to bee kept ſecret; or as did *Anaxarchus* the Philoſopher, who choſe to be tormented unto death, by being rowled up together like a wheele, rather then hee would diſcloſe the ſecret of his friend unto *Nicareon* the Tyrant.

Therefore, generally, when a man either chooſeth a leſſe evill, through feare of ſome greater evil;

or, when a man accepts the leſſe Good, in hope of a greater Good, (which he cannot otherwiſe attaine according as hee would) that thing which in ſuch caſes he doth or ſuffereth, is not utterly *againſt his will*: for he *doth* or *ſuffers* by his owne adviſe, and choice; and ſuch things are to bee made choice of at that time, though they be not to bee choſen of their owne nature.

Theſe are mixt *actions*, partly *voluntary*, and partly *againſt our will*: For, they are *voluntary* in reſpect of the *circumſtances*; but they are *involuntary*, in regard of the *actions* themſelves; and were it not

not for the *circũſtances*, no man would make choice of doing ſuch things.

Moreover the *praiſe* or *diſpraiſe* which followes ſuch actions, declare them to be *voluntary*: for neither *praiſe* nor *diſpraiſe* follow ſuch things as are done abſolutely by *conſtraint*.

It is not eaſie to diſcerne what things are to be choſen before others, in ſome difficult caſes: But for the moſt part, wee muſt chooſe rather to abide griefe, then commit any ſhamefull act; as did both *Ioſeph*, and *Suſanna*; and yet this holds not alwayes. For doubtleſſe *Origen* fell groſſely when he choſe

choſe to ſacrifice unto Idols, rather then to undergo that diſhoneſtie which the *Æthiopians* would have put upon him.

We ſee therefore, that the diſcerning of ſuch things is not eaſie; and we finde alſo, that it is very hard for them that have choſen, to continue in that which they have reſolved upon; becauſe perills *to come* doe not ſo amaze or diſcourage us, as thoſe torments which are *preſently inflicted*.

It ſo happeneth oftentimes, that they who have *choſen well*, doe depart from their owne *choice* by perſecution; as it hath happened unto ſome, who when

when they ſhould have ſuffered *martyrdome*, fell back from their ſtout and reſolute beginnings, by being through tenderneſs unable to endure the tri. als, and the torments of adverſity, when they were inflicted upon them.

III. Let no man imagine therefore, that either an inconſtant *falling away* from a well choſen reſolution, or an intemperate *luſt*, or an *angry rage*, are to bee accounted among ſuch offences as are to bee judged things done *againſt our will*; by reaſon there is an *efficient cauſe* of thoſe actions *without our ſelves*: For though the beauty of an harlot made them that ſaw

ſaw her to ruſh into the execution of an intemperate luſt; and though ſuch as are furiouſly angry, were ſo provoked thereunto by another man, that the firſt beginnings therof may bee truly affirmed to have beene *without themſelves*; yet the actors of ſuch things doe worke by *themſelves*, and by their *inſtrumentall parts*: for which cauſe their *actions* come not within the definition of things done by *conſtraint*; even in regard they offered unto themſelves the *occaſions*, and *beginnings* of thoſe actions: and ſuffered themſelves to bee eaſily incaptivated by *paſſions*, through an

evill *converſation*.

Therefore all they who doe ſuch things, are worthily reprehended, as men *voluntarily* given to evill: and the *evill* is manifeſted to be *voluntary*, when they *delight* alſo in the *deed*; becauſe every thing done by *conſtraint*, hath *griefe* annexed thereunto.

Thus much of things done *againſt our will*, by *force*; we will now treate of ſuch *involuntary actions*, as are done through *ignorance*.

Cap. 31.

I. *Of things done* againſt our will, *through* ignorance; *and of thoſe actions which* are, *or* are not *altogether* involuntary.

II. *The* definition *and*

markes of things done quite againſt our will; *and the difference between things done thorow* ignorance, *and thoſe which we doe being* ignorant. III. *A catalogue of ſuch* particulars, *the* ignorance *wherof makes an action to be* involuntary.

BY *ignorance* many things are done by us, whereof we rejoyce after the deed: As when a man killeth his enemy at unawares (or againſt his will) and yet is glad that he is ſlaine. Theſe, & ſuch like things, are neither accounted *voluntary*, nor altogether *involuntary*.

Some things alſo are done

done through *ignorance*, for which we grieve after they are done: And those are usually called things done *against our will*, after the doing wherof we become grieved for the act. And by this it appeares that there be two sorts of things done by *ignorance*; the one not *voluntary*, & the other *quite against our will*.

It is our purpose therefore, to treat at this time of such things as are *altogether against our will*: because that which wee call *not voluntary* (as aforesaid) may rather be reduced to those things which *are voluntary* in regard it is mixt of both.

For though it hath *a beginning*

ginning by *conſtraint*, yet the *end* is *voluntary*; becauſe by the event, that becomes *voluntary*, which was firſt *againſt our will.*

II. Therefore a *thing done againſt our will*, is defined in this manner; *That is an involuntary act, which is not only againſt our wil, but hath alſo griefe & repentance annexed thereunto.* Moreover, it is one thing to doe an act *through ignorance*, and another thing to doe it, *being ignorant*: For if that thing which cauſed the *ignorance* be in our power, we doe it *being ignorant*; but not by *ignorance.*

For example, he that is accuſtomed unto *drunkenneſſe*, or to *anger*, and

in his *wrath* or *drunkenneſſe*, committeth an evill; he hath (indeed) *drunkenneſſe*, or *anger*, as a cauſe of thoſe things which are done by him: But nevertheleſſe thoſe things were *voluntary* (for it was in his power not to have beene drunke (or ſo inraged) and therefore in not ſuppreſſing thoſe inordinate appetites, hee himſelfe was cauſe of his own *ignorance*; and may in that regard be ſaid to have done that evil *being ignorant*; but cannot be truly ſaid to have done it *through ignorance*: Neither is his act to bee accounted as done, by *conſtraint*, but voluntarily; for that cauſe he who is

doth commit ſuch things is juſtly reprehended by good men: Even becauſe his drunkenneſſe (which occaſioned that act) being *voluntary*, makes the act which was therby occaſioned, to be voluntary alſo.

But we are ſaid to doe things *through ignorance*, when wee our ſelves gave no cauſe of that ignorance; and when the deed was by *chance*. As if a man ſhould ſhoot in an uſuall ſhooting place, & happen to hit and ſlay his father walking thereabout.

It is plaine by that which is aforeſaid, that the actions of ſuch a man are not to bee accounted as done *againſt his will*, who

is ignorant of ſuch things as it behooveth him to know; or which reputes evill things to bee good: For this *ignorance* proceeds from his owne wickednesse; and as his *actions* are vitious, ſo his *ignorance* alſo is to be accounted as a *vice*, for which he is worthy of reprehenſiõ. And *reprehenſion* is due only to thoſe things which are *voluntarily done.*

For the *ignorance* of *generall* (or *univerſall*) *things*; or of ſuch as are in *choice*, is not accounted to bee a thing *involuntary*; but the ignorance of *particular things* onely, is eſteemed ſuch: For we may be ignorant of *particular things* againſt

againſt our will. But of *univerſall things*, our *ignorance* is accounted *voluntary*; becauſe ſuch an *ignorance* cannot bee in us without our owne fault; except we are *madmen*, or Idiots.

III. This being thus determined, it now reſteth to be declared, what thoſe *particulars* are of which we ſpeake; and they are the ſame which the *Rhetoricians* call the parts or circumſtãces of things done. (To wit) WHO, WHOM, WHAT, WITH WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, in WHAT MANER, for WHAT CAUSE, (*To which may bee added according to our Engliſh game u-*

ſed for an exerciſe of wit, WHAT FOLLOVVED, or the *event* of that which was done.)

The *perſons* are either *he who did it*, or *he to whom the thing was done*; as if the *Sonne* ſhould ſmite his *Father* at unawares. The *thing done*, is the *action it ſelfe*; as if I intended to to give one a little blow on the *eare*, and thereby ſtruck out his *eye*. The *inſtrument*; as whē one flings a *very ſtone*, and thinkes it but a *pommy ſtone*. The *place*; as when at the turning of a *lane* two meet, and one unexpectedly overthrowes the other. The *time*; as if in the *night* a man ſhould kill his *friend*;

friend, ſuppoſing him his *enemy*. The *manner*; as if he ſhould give one a ſmall blow, without any great violence, and yet thereby ſlay him (for he knew not that one could have dyed by ſo ſmall a ſtroke.) The *cauſe*; as if one ſhould miniſter a *medicine* for a *cure*, which might prove *deadly* and *kill his patient*.

Of all theſe *particulars* together, no man can bee ignorant, except hee that is mad (or a *very Idiot*.) But whoſoever is ignorant of the moſt of theſe, or in the principall of them, is accounted to doe things through *ignorance*. And the principall among ſuch *circumſtances*, are;

Wherefore

Wherefore it was done; and *What was done*. That is to ſay; the *cauſe*, and the *matter it ſelfe*.

Cap. 32.

I. *Of things done* voluntarily; *and the definition of ſuch* actions. II. *Whether things which have a* naturall courſe, *as* concoction, *and the like, may be termed* voluntary, &c. III. *They who acknowledge not thoſe actions to be* voluntary, *which proceed from the* paſſions, *doe thereby take away the* morall-vertues, &c.

OF thoſe things which are done by *conſtraint*, there

there being two ſorts; the one done through *ignorance*, and the other by *compulſiõ*; the thing which is *voluntary*, doth on the contrary anſwer unto theſe two, and is neither done by *compulſion*, nor through *ignorance*.

That action is done without *compulſion*, whereof the *beginning* was in the *doers*; and an action is voide of *ignorance*, when none of thoſe *particular circumſtances*, are unknown, *in which*, and *by which*, the deed conſiſteth: And therefore wee joyne both together, and thus define it;

That is voluntary, whereof the beginning is in the doer,

doer, who knoweth all those particular circumstances, wherein the deed consisteth.

II. It may now be questioned whether *naturall things* (as our *concoction*, and our *growth*) bee to be accounted *voluntary*: but, wee answer (as is before shewed) that such things are neither *voluntary*, nor of *constraint*; because both *voluntary* things, and such as are by *constraint*, are esteemed among such things as are in our power; but our *concoction*, and our *growth* are not in our power: therefore though wee are ignorant of the particular circumstances; yet for that they are not in our power, they are neither

neither to bee accounted things *voluntary*, nor of *constraint*.

But it hath been declared before, that things done of *wrath* or *concupiscence*, are *voluntary*; For when these passions are moderated, they are commended who so governe them; and such as offend in them, are for the same reproved, or hated. Moreover, *pleasure* or *griefe* ensue upon the doing of them; and the *beginnings* of these actions also, was in the *doers themselves*, because they were made able so to have governed their appetites, that they might not have beene lightly transported by them.

them, if they had endeavoured according to their power.

By practiſe and cuſtom ſuch paſſions may be corrected; for if it were true, that they were abſolutely by *conſtraint*, then doubtleſſe neither *unreaſonable creatures*, nor *infants*, doe any thing *voluntarily*, (but by *conſtraint*; becauſe they are moved by their *appetite*.)

But that is not ſo, for we ſee them goe to their food of their owne accord without any compulſion thereunto. It is *they themſelves* which make ſpeed unto it *of themſelves*; yea, and *not of ignorance*, aſwell as *not of compulſion*: For, they

they know their food; they are glad of it, when they ſee it; they preſently haſt toward it upon ſight thereof, as unto a thing knowne; and are grieved if they miſſe of the ſame.

By this, a *voluntary* thing is aſſuredly knowne from that which is *involuntary*; even by the delight which followes the obtaining that which is deſired; and by the griefe which followes, if the deſire be made fruſtrate: for even beaſts doe *voluntarily covet*; yea, and are *voluntarily angry* alſo, in regard *anger* hath ſome pleaſure annexed thereunto.

III. He that will not acknowledg thoſe things to be

be *voluntary*, whereunto we are moved by *anger*, and a vehement *appetite*; even he taketh away the *morall-vertues*; ſeeing they conſiſt in a *mediocritie* in reſpect of *paſſions*. If our *paſſions* bee of *conſtraint*; then they alſo are forced actions which are done according to *vertue*; becauſe the doing of them belongeth to our *paſſions*. But no man will account that to bee of *conſtraint*, which is done by *reaſon*, by *choice*, by *our owne motion*, by *our owne deſire*, with a *knowledge* alſo of the *particular circumſtances* and by having the very *beginning* of the action in *our ſelves*, which are evident

dent proofes that the thing done is *voluntary*, as hath been formerly declared.

And now seeing wee have in many places made mention of our *choice*, and of such things as are in our *power*, wee will next discourse of such things as are in our *choice*.

Cap. 33.

I. *Of such things as are in our* choice, *and what difference there is betwixt them, and* things voluntary. II. Choice *is neither the concupiscible, nor the irascible* appetite, *nor* will, *nor* opinion, *nor* consultation. III. *The definition of* choice,

choice, *and about what it is converſant.*

OF our *Choice*, the queſtion may perhaps bee aſked whether it be not all one with that which wee call *voluntary*; becauſe every thing done by *choice* is *voluntary*. To which we anſwer, It is not ſo; for they are not *termini convertibiles*, which they ſhould be, if a thing done by our *choice*, and a thing *voluntary* were all one.

The thing that is *voluntary*, is larger then that which is by *choice*; for all *choice* is *voluntary*; but every thing that is *voluntary*, is not done by *choice*; as

as appeares in *children*, and in *unreasonable-creatures*, who doe many things *voluntarily*, but not by *choice*.

Though our friend commeth upon us unexpectedly, and so well contenteth us with his comming, that we are glad of it, yet we cannot say that it came to passe by our *choice*: and though hee that casually findes treasure, did willingly enough hit upon it, because it was a profitable booty; yet he did not deliberately think upon such a thing before, therefore it may be from these things concluded, that a thing *voluntary*, and our *choice* is not all one.

Neither

II. Neither is our *appetite* and our *choice* all one. For our *appetite* is divided into these three, *desire*, *anger*, and *will*. Now, that our *choice* is neither *anger*, nor the *desire of a thing*, it is made evident by this, that man doth therein not agree with *irrationall-creatures*; whereas he doth agree with beasts in *coveting*, and in *anger*: And if in these last mentioned he agree with beasts, and differs from them in having a *choice* of things; then it is manifest, that our *choice* is one thing, and that our *desire* and our *anger* are other distinct things.

The same is proved by *inconti-*

incontinent men, who are overcome by their luſt, and proſecute the ſame contrary to their owne *choice* and *judgements*; For even the incontinent mans *judgement* diſliketh his luſt (& maketh choice of better things) whereas if his *choice* and *appetite* were all one, neither of them would bee contrary unto the other.

That *choice* and *will* are not all one, may bee proved by this; that our *Will* doth not agree unto all things, whereunto our choice (or judgement) doth aſſent. For we have a *will* to be *in health*, or to be *rich*; but to be in *health*, or to bee *rich* is not in our *choice*. Our

Our *will* hath place even in things *impoßible*; but our *choice* cõſiſteth in thoſe only wch are in *our power*. We may ſay that we *would be immortall*, but we cannot ſay, that *to bee immortall* is at our *choice*. For our will extendeth unto thé *end it ſelfe*; but our *choice* can reach no further then to the means which are in poſſibility to attaine that end: and there is betweene them the ſame proportion which there is betweene the thing ſubject unto our *will*, and that thing wherabout we enter into *conſultation*; for the ſubject of our *will* is the *end* of that which wee would have, and

and our *conſultation*, is about the *meanes*, whereby wee may accompliſh that *end*.

Wee *chuſe* thoſe things onely which may be effected by us; but our *will* extendeth unto ſuch things as are not in our power to accompliſh; as when would that ſuch or ſuch a *Commander* ſhould obtain the victory.

It is then well enough proved that our *choice* is neither the *concupiſcible*, nor the *iraſcible appetite*, nor our *will*; and aſwell by the ſame arguments, as by other alſo, it may bee made manifeſt; that it is not *opinion*. For opinion extendeth not onely to

things which are in our power, but to things *eternall.*

Moreover, we ſay that an *opinion* is either *true* or *falſe*; but to ſay our *choice* is either *true* or *falſe*, is an abſurd ſaying.

Opinion concerneth likewiſe *univerſall things*; but our *choice* is converſant in *particulars*: For, our *choice* is of things to be undergone, (enjoyed or done) which are *particular things.*

Neither is our *choice* all one with our *conſultation*: For *conſultation* is an adviſing about ſuch things as are to be done (ſuffered or enjoyed) and that thing is to bee choſen which in

conſultation

conſultation is preferred: yea, our *conſultation* debates of things yet in queſtion, whereas our *choice* reacheth to that which is already concluded moſt worthy.

III. Wee have hitherto declared what this *choice* is not; and we will now ſhew you what it is.

Doubtleſſe *choice* is a thing mixt of *conſultation*, *judgement*, and *appetite*; being neither the one nor the other, but a certaine compound of theſe. For as wee ſay that a *living-creature*, is a compound of *ſoul* and *body*; and neither a *body* by it ſelfe, nor a *ſoule* alone; but a thing made up of both toge-

ther; even ſo ſay wee alſo of this our *choice*.

It is plaine by the very Etymologie therof, that it is a certaine *counſelling*, or *conſultation*, with an *approbation* of ſome one thing before the reſt; and that it is not altogether the ſame with *conſultation*: For we are then onely accounted to have made *choice*, when one thing is taken before another. And no man preferreth any thing in *choice*, before he hath *conſulted*, neither accepteth before hee hath *judged*.

And ſeeing we are not willing to execute or admit of all theſe things, which wee well approve of;

of; then that which is preferred after *consultation*, is in *choice*; and contained under our *choice*, when it taketh an *appetite* thereunto. Hereupon it necessarily followes also, that our *choice* is conversant in the same thing about which our *consultation* is imployed.

Out of all which it may be concluded, that our *Choice is an appetite, consulting of such things as are in our power*; or a *Consultation with an appetite unto those things which are in our power*. For, when wee *chuse*, we *desire* that which was preferred, after our *consultation*.

But seeing wee have

ſaid that *choice* and *conſultation*, are converſant about the ſelf-ſame things; we will declare next, what it is, about which this *conſultation* is occupied; and about what things wee *conſult*.

Cap. 34.

I. *Of* conſultation, *and wherein it differs from a* queſtion. II. *The definition of* conſultation, *and an illuſtration thereof, by ſhewing what things are not proper ſubjects of* conſultation. III. *Of the proper* objects *of* conſultation; *and of ſuch other things as are pertinent thereunto.*

Keeping

KEeping *close unto our chiefe purpose*, wee thinke it best (before we declare about what things wee *consult*) to determine wherein a *consultation* differs from a *question*. For a *consultation* and a *question* is not all one; though he that consults calls things into question by his consultation; but they differ very much. For wee seeke and aske, whether or no the Sunne be greater than the earth: but no man saith I *consult* whether the *Sun* bee greater than the *Earth*.

A *question* is more generall, and as it were *genus* to *consultation*; and the nature of it extends further;

For, every *conſultation* is a kinde of *queſtioning*; but every *queſtion* is not a *conſultation*, as hath been formerly declared.

Our *conſideration* is converſant ſometime in *conſultation*; as when I conſider whether I ſhould *goe to Sea*, or not: and ſometime it is converſant in debating things in the mind: as when I conſider the *liberall ſciences*; for it is not proper to ſay wee *conſult* of the Sciences. But the uſe of theſe words without diſtinction, hath made many to erre, and to conceive thoſe things to bee the ſame, which are very different. Which difference being now diſcovered,

red, wee will proceed to declare what the things are whereof we *conſult*.

We conſult then of thoſe things which are in our power; even of ſuch as may bee brought to paſſe by us; and whoſe event is not manifeſt: That is, ſuch as may fall out divers wayes.

We define it to bee *of thoſe things which are in our power*, becauſe our *conſultation* is onely of thoſe things which are to be undertakē by us; which things are in our power: For we doe not *conſult* of that kinde of Philoſophy, which is called *contemplative*; neither of GOD; nor of things which fall out of *neceſſity* (by *neceſſi-*

ty I meane thoſe things which fall out alwayes after one maner, as the *Circuit of the yeare.)*

Neither doe we *conſult* of thoſe things which *are not alwayes permanent*, and yet fall out to bee *alwayes alike*, as *of the riſing and ſetting of the Sunne.* Neither of thoſe things which fall out *naturally*; yet *not alwayes alike*, but ſo for the moſt part onely; as; *that a man of ſixty ſhould have gray haires*; or that *a man of twenty ſhould begin to have a beard.*

Neither *conſult* wee of thoſe things which chance naturally, but ſometimes thus, and ſometimes otherwaies, and not after any

any certaine time or measure; as of *showers*, and *droughts*, and *haile*: Neither is *consultation* of those things which doe fall out by *chance*, and seldome, one while *more*, and another while *lesse*: For in respect of these things, this *clause* was added, *that the thing* (consulted of) *should be in our power.*

The *definition* saith further, that it must bee of *things which may be done by VS.* Because we doe not *consult of all men*; neither of *every thing*; but of those which are in our power to consult of: For we *consult not* how the common wealth of our enemies may be governed; nor of them

them who dwell very far from us, (albeit this bee a thing which may be consulted of among themselves.)

Neither doe we *consult* of all things that *may bee done by us*; nor of all things that *are in our power*. And therfore these words, *which have an uncertain end* were added to the definition: for if the thing bee manifest, and confessed, we *deliberate* no more thereof.

Neither is there any *consultation* of such works or actions as are according to *Science*, and *Art*: For, all their principles are determinately knowne, except a few *Arts* which are termed

termed *conjecturall*, as *Phyſick*, and the art of *Exorciſing*, and of *governing*.

For, we doe not onely *conſult* of theſe things; but of ſuch alſo as are under our hand, and may be executed by us; they having ſuch an uncertaine end, that the ſucceſſe may be as well *that*, as *this*.

But it hath been declared that our *conſultation* is not of the *end*; but of things which tend unto the *end*: For our *conſultation* is not of *being rich*, but of the *meanes* how to *berich*.

To ſpeake all in briefe; wee doe *conſult* of thoſe things onely which are doubtfull, and may be either III.

ther ſo, or not ſo: and of thoſe things we muſt alſo treate, that in our *diſcourſe* nothing be wāting which may make things evident.

Thoſe *qualities* are called *faculties*, whereby we are enabled to the performance of any thing. For, whatſoever we doe, wee have the *faculty* of it; and thoſe things wee cannot performe, whereof the *faculty* is not in us. Therefore our *action* dependeth upon our *faculty*, and our *faculty* upon our *eſſence*: yea the *action* proceedeth from our *faculty*, and our *faculty* from our *ſubſtance*, and is in our *ſubſtance* And as I ſaid before, theſe are three things depending one

one upon another. The *thing able*; the *faculty by which it hath ability*; and *the thing which is to be done.*

The thing *able to doe it* is a *ſubſtance.* The *faculty* is that whereby wee have ability to doe it. The *thing to be done*, is that, whoſe nature may be practiſed upon, by our *faculty.*

Of *things that may bee done*, ſome are *neceſſary*, & ſome *contingent.* Thoſe are termed *neceſſary* which cannot poſſibly be hindered; or thoſe, the contrary whereof is unpoſſible: And that is *contingent*, which may bee hindered, or whoſe contrary may poſſibly fall out.

For

For example; It is *neceſſary* that a man ſhould breath as long as hee liveth; for it is impoſſible a man ſhould live and not breath. It is *contingent* that there ſhould be raine to day; for it is poſſible that this day it ſhould not raine, which is contrary to the other.

Againe, things *contingent* are ſaid to fall out ſometimes *often*, ſometime ſeldome, and ſometimes indifferently, in this maner or in that. They are *frequent*, as to have gray haires at threeſcore; they are *ſeldome*, as not to have gray haires at that age: And they are *indifferent*, as it is equally in our choice

choice to *walke*, or not to *walke*; or ſimply to doe any act, or not to doe it.

Now our *conſultation* is of thoſe things onely which may indifferently come to paſſe, or not come to paſſe; and a thing is ſaid to fall out equally or indifferently, when wee may in like ſort, doe as well the contrary thereof as the thing it ſelfe: For, if we could not doe both equally, wee ſhould not *conſult* thereof. Becauſe no man *conſults* either of things *confeſſed*, or *impoſſible*. For if wee were able to doe but one of thoſe things which are *contrary*; that ſhould be received without ambiguity; and the

the contrary ſhould not, becauſe *impoßible.*

Cap. 35.

I. *Of* deſtiny, *and of the abſurdities, impieties, and blaſphemies which follow their* opinion, *who aſcribe the cauſe of all things to the* motion of the Starres, *or* fatall neceſſity. II. *Of them who affirme that ſome things are both neceſſitated by* deſtiny, *and yet in* mans power. III. *An* examination *of the* opinion *afore mentioned.*

OUr opinion is that they who aſcribe all things which are done, to the *motions* and

and *conſtellations* of the Starres, doe not onely oppoſe the vulgar notions of humane *reaſon*; but teach alſo (in effect) that all *gouernance* in commonweales, are to no purpoſe. For indeed, *lawes* are in vaine, and *judgements* ſuperfluous, becauſe they puniſh innocent men, without cauſe.

If their opinion bee true, it is alſo a thing unreaſonable to *reprehend* or *praiſe* any man: yea, if every thing come to paſſe by *deſtiny* (or by an inavoidable *decree*) our *prayers* are fooliſh, and ineffectuall bablings; and there is neither place nor uſe for *providence* or *piety*.

Moreover

Moreover (if this were true) what account is to be made of *man*? or what is he more then an *instrument* serviceable to the *motions* of the superiour bodies? Seeing, as they affirme, he is moved by the celestiall *influences* not only to the performance of all bodily actions; but to every thought also which is in his *minde*.

They that are of this opinion doe generally take away (together with such things, as should bee left in our power) the nature likewise, of all *contingent* things; and in a manner subvert and destroy the whole world; making the *Stars* injurious

ous homicides, and cuckold-makers, or at leaſt the cauſers of all adulteries and murthers.

Nay *God* who is the *Creator* of the *ſtarres*, is (*by this blaſphemous opinion*) made to beare the blame of all which is ill done, rather then the *ſtarres*; becauſe hee made them ſuch as ſhould neceſſarily, and inavoidably, bring, and lay evills upon us.

Thus, their abſurditie extends not onely to the ſubverſion of *commonweales*; but maketh *God* alſo to bee the author of all ſinne; and the cauſe of all miſchiefes: Which abſurdity & blaſphemy is both impoſſible for them to prove;

and intollerable for us to heare.

II. Some there be who affirme, that *things may bee in our power*, and that there may be *deſtiny* alſo. For, ſome things (ſay theſe) is given by *deſtiny* to every thing that is made, as to the *water* to coole; to every *plant* to beare ſuch fruit as is according to its kinde; to a *ſtone* to ſinke downeward; to *fire* to mount upwards; and to *living-creatures* to accept or to be deſirous of things *agreeable unto them*. And when nothing (without us, or belonging to *deſtiny*) oppoſeth it ſelfe againſt that which we endeavour; then it becomes perfectly in

in our power to proceed; yea and then (ſay theſe) we ſhall aſſuredly effect it.

They who affirme this are *Chryſippus*, *Philopater*, and many other men of great ſufficiency and eſteem among the Stoicks, and all which they have ſaid (what ſhew ſoever it makes of ſomewhat elſe) proves nothing but this; that *all things are done by deſtiny*.

III. For though they have ſaid that our *attempts* are given unto us by *deſtiny*; and that they are ſometimes hindered by *deſtiny*, and ſometime left at liberty; yet (*the matter being well obſerved*) it is plain that all things are done by *deſtiny*;

deſtiny; even thoſe things (*for ought they have yet ſaid*) which they would pretend to be in our owne power. And wee will uſe againſt them no other *arguments*, to declare the abſurdity of their opinion, then ſuch as they themſelves have made uſe of.

As long as the ſame *cauſes* continue, it is neceſſary (as they themſelves have ſaid) that the ſelfe-ſame *events* ſhould alwayes fall out; and it is impoſſible that a thing ſhould chance ſometimes in one maner, and ſometimes in another faſhion, when that thing is decreed from eternity how it ſhall come to paſſe.

If

If this bee ſo, as they have ſaid, it is inavoidably neceſſary, but that the endeavour of a *living-creature*, ſhould in all reſpects and altogether fall out in that one maner, which is agreeable to the unchãgeable courſe of *deſtiny*; becauſe the ſelfe-ſame cauſes (doe continue and) beare rule in it. And if our *appetite* and our *endeavour*, doth follow *fatall neceſſity*; where then is that thing which (*they ſay*) is in *our power*; ſeeing the thing that ſhould bee in *our power*, muſt be *free?*

It is free; if (notwithſtanding the continuance of the ſame *cauſes*) it bee ſtill in our power, to *endeavour*,

deavour, or not to *endeavour*. But if our very *endeavouring* of a thing, bee subject unto a *fatall necessity*; it is plaine, that even those things which belong to our *desire* and *appetite* doe fall out by *destiny*, although they bee done by us, according to our *nature*, our *desire*, and our *judgement*.

For if it were possible that the same thing should not come to passe which did come to passe (*by the course of destiny*) then that proposition of theirs would be false, which affirmes that, *as long as the same causes doe continue about any thing, it is necessary that the selfesame effects*

should

should ensue.

The like shall happen also to *unreasonable-creatures*, and to *things without life* : For, if they say our appetite is in our power; because wee have it of nature, (*and for no other respect*) why should they not say aswell that *fire* hath *burning* in its own power (seeing *fire* burneth naturally) according as *Philopater* hath in some sort affirmed in his booke of *destiny*.

These arguments considered, wee may affirme, that those things which we doe (being compelled thereunto) by *destiny*, are not things in our owne power. For wee may as

truely ſay, that the *harp*, the *flute*, and all other creatures that are *unreaſonable*, or *void of life*, have in themſelves a power to doe ſome things that wee doe by the uſe of them; which were abſurdly affirmed.

Cap. 36.

I. *Of their opinion, who ſay that all was fore-appointed by* deſtiny; *and yet that the effects of* deſtiny *are prevented by* praiers. II. *A* quære, *how* prayer *only, ſhould bee in our power, when all other things are* foredecreed. III. *Of the inequality, and injuſtice, of this fained* deſtiny.

From

FRom theſe, wee will proceed to examine the opinion of the *Ægyptian* wiſe men, who ſay that the *deſtiny* proceeding from the conſtellations hath true effects; and yet may be prevented by *prayers* made for the averting thereof.

For they teach that there be certaine meanes ordained whereby men may pacifie the *Starres*, and mitigate their force: and that there are other *powers*, *ſuperiours* to them, which are able to change or governe them: and that *prayers*, and *ſupplications* unto the *gods* for pacification, were deviſed

to that purpoſe.

We will ſhew you, that in ſaying thus, they place *deſtiny* among *contingent things*: Now *contingent things* are *indefinite*; and *indefinite things* are *unknowne*: therefore by theſe mens opinion, all *divination* is overthrowne: and that eſpecially which is by *caſting nativities*, whereof they make moſt account of all other, as of a thing forceably and infallibly true.

If they tells us that the events of the *figures (which they ſet)* are very manifeſt, and well known to thoſe who are ſkilfull; and that *God* hath hindered the ſame, when the *figure*

figure hath not effect according to his proper vertue; we will reply, that it is absurd to account *praier, and the service of the gods* only, to be in our power; and no other thing.

For we will make this *quare*, and aske them how it come to passe, that all other things (which are to bee done or accepted by men) should depend upon such or such a *constellation*, or affection of the *starres*; and that *prayer* onely should bee in our power? For it is not onely doubtfull whether this thing it selfe be so; but as doubtfull also, for what *cause*, and upon what *necessity* it should be. II.

If there bee an *art*, and an orderly way whereby men may attaine to those pacifications, which may hinder such things as are effected by *destiny*: It may be questioned, whether all men may attaine this *method*, or some few only. If all may aspire unto it, then there is a possibility, by that meanes to give their *destiny* an utter overthrow, as soone as all have learned that *art*, which prevents and hinders the effects thereof.

If some onely may attaine this meanes, and not others; we would willingly know what maner of man, and who he is, that shall determine of this thing.

thing. For if *deſtiny* it ſelf bee the cauſe, that ſome ſerve GOD, and ſome do not ſo; even that will bee another proofe, that all things are done by *deſtiny*, whereas it appeared by their opinion before mentioned, that our *praying*, and *honouring of the Gods*, is in our power, not only no leſſe then *deſtiny*; but much more alſo.

Now if it be not *deſtiny* but ſome other thing which is cauſe thereof, then that thing ſhall rather be *deſtiny*: For all the force of *deſtiny* conſiſteth in this, that we either *may* or *may not* obtaine that which we petition for in our *prayers*. If we *may*, then

is *destiny* of no *force*; and if wee *may not prevaile by prayer*, then all is subject unto *destiny*: and it will so fall out, that in some, all things are done by *destiny*, and that in some other, *destiny* effecteth nothing at all. (*because prayer is prevalent for some and not for others.*) And this is evident, that whosoever determines hereof, he is the *chiefe destiny*: and so it will be another way declared, that all things are done by *destiny* (*mediately or immediately.*)

III. Moreover, (if truth were in this opinion) hee which doth distribute things shall be *unjust*, whether it bee *destiny* or some other

other *divine power* : Seeing the way of ſerving the *gods* is not equally and worthily diſtributed. For why ſhould one be judged worthier then another? Seeing all are the inſtruments of *deſtiny*; and ſeeing no man doth any thing by a foreintended purpoſe of his owne: or, rather, ſeeing there is no man which hath any thing left unto his owne *choice* (*according to their doctrine.*)

For in things which are ſo done, none is either *juſt* or unjuſt; and therefore neither *worthy*, nor *unworthy of favour* : and whoſoever maketh his diviſion unequally (*in things of*

of ſuch nature as theſe) to them, whoſe caſe is al one, he (*even whoſoever he bee*) is *unjuſt*.

Cap. 37.

I. *Of thoſe who affirme wee have power to* chuſe *what is to be done; and that the event of our* choice *depends on* deſtiny. II. Providence *and not* deſtiny *orders the event of things.* III. *The ſtrife betweene* reaſon, *and* luſt *is made void, if all things be done by* deſtiny

NOw they who affirme, that the *choice* of thoſe things which are to bee done, is in our power, and that

that the *event* of the things choſen depends on deſtiny (which is the opinion even of the wiſeſt of the *Grecians*) their judgement, is partly right, and in ſome part erroneous: For, whereas they place in *our power* the *choice* of things to be done, and yet allow not the events of the ſame things, to be altogether at our diſpoſe, they doe very rightly: but in that they attribute them unto *deſtiny*, they doe not well. and their error ſhall eaſily be diſcovered.

For firſt they impute imperfection unto *deſtiny*, in ſaying it hath ſome *part*, but not *all power*: And

liſh that they cannot direct their owne choice? whether commeth it of *deſtiny* or no, that they are ſuch?

If it proceed not of *deſtiny*; then *fooles*, and *blockheads*, are without the compaſſe of *deſtiny*; and if they have their blockiſhneſſe by *deſtiny*, then doth it neceſſarily follow that our *choice* alſo is not in *our power*: for if the lack of *choice* be contained under *deſtiny*; then it muſt needs be, that the *faculty of chuſing, and the thing to be choſen*, muſt be contained under *deſtiny*. And ſo they run backe againe to them who affirm, that all things are done by *deſtiny*.

The

The ſtrife likewiſe, which is betweene *reaſon*, and *luſt* in the *continent*, and *incontinent man*, is to no purpoſe, if all things be ſubject unto *deſtiny*: For, if it bee determined by a *fatall neceſſity*, that ſuch a thing muſt be done and that ſuch a thing muſt not bee done, what uſe is there of that *ſtrife in us* (*which is aforementioned?*) III.

But if it bee not onely fatally determined, that we ſhall doe ſuch a thing; but ſo ordered alſo, that wee ſhall doe it thus, or thus; what elſe doe they affirme, who are of this opinion, from this, that even our *choice* is in the number of thoſe things which

And ſecondly, they erre in making it a *ſequell* to our *Iudgement*, in ſaying, that the worke of *deſtiny* followes our *choice*. For, if that be ſo, then *deſtiny* ſeemeth not to *moue us*; but rather to be *moued by us*: And then, *Man* is to bee preferred, as having a greater power then *deſtiny*; becauſe he maketh it, by his *choice*.

II. It is better therefore to ſay, that *Prouidence* is cauſer of the *event* of things; becauſe it is wrought rather by *prouidence* then *deſtiny*, and ſeeing it is the property of *Prouidence*, to diſtribute unto *every one*, that which for *every one* is moſt expe-

dient.

dient. By this meanes alſo, the *event* of the things which are *choſen*, doe fall out ſometime in one maner, and ſometime in another, according to that which is moſt expedient.

If *deſtiny* be (as the *Stoicks* define it) *A certaine concatenatiõ of cauſes which may not be avoided*; or a faſt knitting together of cauſes which may not bee altered, and brings to every thing (& conveyes to and fro) ſuch effects onely, as are according to the *motions*, and *neceſsity* of *deſtiny* it ſelfe; and not ſuch effects rather, as are moſt expedient: What will they ſay then, of ſuch as are blockiſh, and ſo fooliſh

liſh that they cannot di. rect their owne choice? whether commeth it of *deſtiny* or no, that they are ſuch?

If it proceed not of *deſtiny*; then *fooles*, and *blockheads*, are without the compaſſe of *deſtiny*; and if they have their blockiſhneſſe by *deſtiny*, then doth it neceſſarily follow that our *choice* alſo is not in *our power*: for if the lack of *choice* be contained under *deſtiny*; then it muſt needs be, that the *faculty of chuſing, and the thing to be choſen*, muſt be contained under *deſtiny*. And ſo they run backe againe to them who affirm, that all things are done by *deſtiny*.

The

III. The ſtrife likewiſe, which is betweene *reaſon*, and *luſt* in the *continent*, and *incontinent man*, is to no purpoſe, if all things be ſubject unto *deſtiny*: For, if it bee determined by a *fatall neceſſity*, that ſuch a thing muſt be done and that ſuch a thing muſt not bee done, what uſe is there of that *ſtrife in us* (*which is aforementioned?*)

But if it bee not onely fatally determined, that we ſhall doe ſuch a thing; but ſo ordered alſo, that wee ſhall doe it thus, or thus; what elſe doe they affirme, who are of this opinion, from this, that even our *choice* is in the number of thoſe things which

which are ſubject unto *deſtiny*? For, it is our *will* and our *choice* which oppoſeth our *luſt*, getting the victory in the *continent*, and which is overcome in the *incontinent*. And ſo, that which they firſt propoſed, as their *opinion*, is overthrowne; and by that meanes our *choice* ſhall in no caſe bee in our *owne power*.

Cap. 38.

I. *Of* Plato's *opinion concerning* deſtiny; *and how he agrees or diſſents from the* truth. II. *Of the force of* prayer, *and of the power which the* Godhead *hath over* deſtiny. III. *The opinion of*

of the Stoicks *touching the deſtruction, and reſtauration of the* world, *when the* planets *returne to the* point, *in which they ſtood at the* Creation.

EXamine we will in this *Chapter*, the opinion of *Plato* concerning *deſtiny*; for he ſpeakes of a twofold *deſtiny*; one in *ſubſtance*, and another in *operation*.

He calleth *deſtiny* in *ſubſtance*, a certaine *life*, or *ſoule*, belonging to the *whole world* together; and *deſtiny* in *operation*, a certaine *divine law*, by an inevitable *decree*, which hee calleth θεσμὸν ἀδράστειαν, a *holy*

holy decree, that cannot be eſcaped; & he ſaith it was given by the firſt & higheſt *God*, unto the *ſoul of the world*, for the univerſall garniſhing of all things; and for the governing of all things which are made.

That which he calleth *deſtiny in operation*, he termeth alſo *Providence*. For whatſoever is done by *deſtiny*, is done alſo by *Providence*; though (on the contrary) all things which are done by *Providence*, are not effected alſo by *deſtiny*.

For, this *divine law* (which hee ſaith is both *Providence* and *deſtiny*) comprehends all things in it ſelfe; ſome of *purpoſe*, and

and otherſome *not of ſet purpoſe*. It comprehends the chiefe, or *antecedent cauſes* (which are as it were *principles*) even of *purpoſe*; as *our condeſcending unto any thing*; our *judgement*, and our *appetite*, or *deſire*. But whatſoever followeth like things of *neceſſity*, is *beſide purpoſe*; and that *choice* of things, to be done, which is in *our power*, is of *purpoſe*.

Now after thoſe things be determined, which are in *our power*; upon the ſelf-ſame things (as it were beſide purpoſe) follow, ſaith he, the workes of *deſtiny*. As for example; It is in our power to ſet ſaile; and wee have purpoſed ſo to doe;

doe; but ſaith he, when it is determined that wee will *put to ſea*, other things may follow thereupon, namely, the *ſuffering of ſhipwrack*; which was not purpoſed at all.

Therefore, hee calleth thoſe things *beſide purpoſe*, which follow, and are conſequẽt to thoſe things (that is to ſay) to thoſe *beginnings*, and *actions* which are purpoſed by us. So then the *principall things*, and ſuch as are in *our power*, bee done of *purpoſe*: whereas the things that follow upon them, are *beſide* our *purpoſe*; and not in our power; but ſuch as neceſſarily follow.

For he affirmes not that things

things effected by *deſtiny*, are determined from *eternity*; but they happen afterward, when things which are in *our power* have gone before. And hereunto agree thoſe cõmon ſayings; That *the fault is in the chuſer, and God is blameleſſe*: that, *there is none to over-maſter vertue*; and, that *there bee divinations*. For all this intends nothing elſe, but to ſhew, that our *choice*, and ſome actions according to our *choice*, are in our *power*; and that their *events*, with ſuch things as happen afterward upon thẽ, ſhould neceſſarily pertain to *deſtiny*.

That this is not truely affirmed,

affirmed, appeares by what is formerly expreſſed. And yet when hee calleth *deſtiny* the *Ordinance* and *will* of GOD, making all things to bee ſubject unto *Providence*, he differs not much from the *divine Scriptures*, which teach that *Providence* alone, is the *governeſſe* of all things.

But he diſſenteth farre from them, when he ſayes that the *events* doe *neceſſarily* enſue upon thoſe things which are in *our power*. For wee ſay that things wrought by *Providence* are effected, not as *neceſſary*, but as *contingent*: becauſe, if they followed of *neceſſity*, then the greateſt

teſt part of our *prayers* would be in vaine; and according to his opinion our *prayers* would bee availeable for nothing, but to procure proſperous *beginnings* to our actions, or to petition that wee may *chuſe* what is beſt. For after we have preferred one thing before another, all our *praying* ſhould be fruitleſſe, becauſe all things by his opinion enſue of *neceſsity*, which doe afterwards follow.

But wee affirme, that *prayer* is forcible even in reſpect of thoſe *events*. And wee ſay, that it is in the choice of *Providence*, whether wee ſhall ſuffer *ſhipwrack* or no (*when wee* II.

have purposed to set saile) and that nothing falleth out so *necessarily*, but that it may either be so, or not so, as GOD pleaseth. For, he is not concluded under any *necessity*; neither is it lawfull to say, that his *Will* is confined by *fatall necessity*; seeing he is the *Creator* of *necessity* it selfe.

It is hee who laid that necessity upon the *starres*, by which they are constrained to keep the same *course*. It is hee that set bounds unto the *Sea*, and who hath appointed a *necessary limitation* to *universall* and *generall* things; which if they will call *destiny*, because in all respects, and altogether it so falleth

falleth out of *neceſsity*; as that in ſucceſſiō all things which are *made* ſhould alſo be *deſtroyed* (*and the like*) wee will not much contend about the ſame; becauſe we will not conteſt for the bare *names*.

But GOD himſelfe is not onely without the compaſſe of all *neceſsity*; but he is alſo the *Lord* and *maker* thereof: For, in that he himſelfe is the abſolute power of all things; and a *nature* wherein all power is comprehended; hee doth nothing as one ſubjected either to the *neceſsity* of *nature*, or *decree* of *Law*. But all things are in his hand, to doe, or not to doe; even

those things which were otherwise *necessary*.

And that this might plainely be declared, hee stayed once the *courses* of the *Sun*, and of the *Moone*, which are moved of *necessity*, and keep alwayes one constant *motion*: thereby shewing, that nothing done by *necessity* doth confine him; but that according to his power all things are *contingent*.

Yet he made such a day but once (as wee finde it in holy Scripture) that he might onely set forth his *power*, and not dissolve that strong *law* which was made by him at the first, that the motion of the *Starres* should bee *necessary*. So

So likewiſe, he did preſerve ſome from death, as *Enoch*, and *Elias*, who were naturally mortall, and liable to corruption; that by all theſe things we might perceive his *power* and his *will* to be irreſiſtible.

III. But the *Stoicks* have taught, that when the *Planets* have wheeled about unto the ſame *point*, both in *longitude*, and *latitude*, wherein every one of them ſtood at the *Creation*, they ſhall within a certain limitation of time cauſe all to be ſet on fire, and deſtroyed. And then (as they alſo affirme) the *world* beginning anew, ſhall be reſtored unto the

ſtate wherein it was before.

Yea, they ſay further, that foraſmuch as the *ſtars* ſhall have againe the ſame courſe; every thing that was in the former circuit ſhall come to paſſe againe without any alteration. *Socrates* ſhall be as hee was againe, and *Plato*, and every particular man; having the ſame friends, and the ſame Citizens; and that the like things ſhall befall every one; yea, that every man ſhall take in hand the ſame worke which he formerly wrought; and that every City, Village, and field ſhall bee brought to the like ſtate againe: And that the whole *Vniverſe* ſhall

ſhall be reſtored unto the former condition againe; not one time onely, but as often as the *revolutions* of the *Planets* do come about to the ſame point, which *revolutions* they thinke ſhall be *infinite* and without number.

They ſay alſo, that the *gods* are not ſubject to this corruption; and that when they have obſerved one whole *revolution*, they know by that *circuit*, all things that ſhall come to paſſe in every ſucceeding *round*. For, there ſhall be (as they dreame) no new thing; but every thing which was before, ſhall bee reacted after one and the ſame ſort, without any

alteration in the leaſt thing.

And ſome have ſaid, that from this *reſtauration*, the *Chriſtians* tooke occaſion to conceive the *reſurrection*: but they were much miſtaken; for the *Chriſtian verity* doth aſſure us, that the *Reſurrection* ſhall bee perfected but once, and not according to the *revolutions* of the *Starres*.

Cap. 39.

I. *Of* freewill. II. *Of thoſe who deny* freewill; *To what cauſes they muſt of neceſſity aſcribe all things; and what may be inferred thereupon.* III. *The many* abſurdities *which will follow,*

follow, if it be denied that man *hath* freewill.

MAny are of opinion, that there is nothing at all in our power; and therefore the *diſcourſe* of *freewill*; namely of that which *is in our power*, doth firſt occaſion this queſtion; *Whether any thing be in our power or no*: Then a ſecond queſtion, to wit, *What thoſe things bee which are in our power*; or wherein *freewill* conſiſteth: and thirdly, it gives occaſion to inquire, *Why God our maker, made us with freewill.*

That we may diſcourſe orderly of theſe things, we will ſpeake firſt to the

first *question*; and prove that there is something in our power, even by the confessions of those who have denied the same.

II. They affirme, that of things which are made or done, either GOD, or *necessity*, or *destiny*, or *nature*, or *fortune*, or *chance* is the *cause*.

But the proper worke of GOD, is either *substance* or *Providence*. The work of *necessity* is in the *motion* of those things which are alwayes of one sort. The worke of *destiny*, is in those things which are to be perfected by it of *necessity*; for in it, things are effected of *necessity*. The workes of *nature* are *generation*,

ration, augmentation, corruption, plants, and *living-creatures.* The worke of *fortune* is in things that are very *rare,* and *unexpected.*

For they define *fortune* to be the concurrence, and meeting of two *causes,* which had their beginning from our *will* and *choice,* and yet produce in the end somewhat else then was intended by the thing done. As when hee that is digging of a ditch, findes treasure: For neither hee who there laid the treasure, had any purpose it should be so found; neither had the finder any intent to dig for treasure; but the purpose of the

one

one was to take it thence when he himself thought fit; and the intention of the other was to make a ditch; and there fell out another thing beside those which were purposed by them.

The workes of *chance* are such as befall *unreasonable*, and *inanimate* creatures, without *nature*, or *art*.

Now if a man bee neither the *cause*, nor *beginning* of his owne actions, under which of these may we containe the things which are done by him?

It is not lawfull, nor comely to ascribe unto GOD those actions of men which are uncleane, or

or unjuſt. Neither may we aſcribe them to *neceſſity*; becauſe they cannot be truly accounted among thoſe things which continue alwayes after one maner. Nor may wee impute them to *nature*; for the workes of *nature*, are *living-creatures* and *plants*. Nor to *fortune*, for the actions of men are not *rare* or *unlooked for*. Nor belong they to *chance*; becauſe things *caſuall* belong to *inánimate* and *irrationall creatures*.

Therefore it remaineth undeniable, that the *man himſelf* which worketh, & accõpliſheth ſuch, or ſuch things, is the beginner of his owne actions, and hath

hath *freewill*.

III. Moreover, if man bee the beginner of no action of his owne, all *conſultation* is ſuperfluous in him; for to what end is *deliberation*, if hee have no action in his owne power? But it muſt needs be a very abſurd thing to affirme that to bee ſuperflous in *man*, which is beſt, and moſt honourable in him.

If then he doe *conſult*, he *conſults* about the doing of ſome thing; for all *deliberation* doth concerne the execution of ſome action.

Moreover, of whatſoever things the *faculty of doing the ſame*, is in our power; the *acting* alſo of thoſe

those things, and the exercising of that *faculty* is in our power. But, *a faculty to worke according to the vertues*, is in our power; therefore the *vertues* also, are in our power.

Now that the *faculties* to worke according to *vertue* are in our power, it is very elegantly declared by *Aristotle* where he treateth of the *morall vertues*. That saith he; which wee learne by *practise*, we *practise* when wee have learned it: For while we learn to *master* our *pleasures*, we become *temperate*; and when we are *temperate*, we become the *masters* of our *pleasures*.

Wee may argue also in this

this maner: It is confeſſed of all, that *practiſe* and the exerciſe of things are in our power: But *practiſe* beareth ſway in *habits*; for *cuſtome* is as it were a purchaſed *nature*. If then practiſe rule the *habit*, and if *practiſe* bee in our power, then the *habit* alſo muſt be in our power: yea, and the *actions* alſo, whoſe *habits* are in our power, (and which are effected according to thoſe *habits*) muſt bee in our power alſo; becauſe the *actions* are conformable to the *habits*.

Hee then which hath the *habit of juſtice*, will do juſt things; and hee that hath a *habit of injurie*, will doe

doe injurious things. Therefore God hath given us a power to bee *juſt* or *unjuſt*.

Our *counſelling* alſo, and our *exhorting* of one another, doe declare that there bee ſome things in our power; for no man doth exhort us not to bee *hungry*, or not to *thirſt*, or to *flye in the ayre*; becauſe theſe things are not in our power. Therefore it is manifeſt, that thoſe things whereunto our exhortations doe ſerve, are in our power.

Moreover, if nothing be in our power, then our *lawes* are ſuperfluous; but every nation uſeth ſome *lawes* naturally, as knowing,

ing, that they have power to doe ſuch things as their *lawes* injoyne : And many nations have aſcribed the making of their lawes to the *gods* (as the inhabitants of *Crete*, to *Iupiter*; and the *Lacedemonians* to *Apollo*) therefore the knowledge that ſuch things are in our power is naturally diſperſed amõg all men.

The like may be inferred upon the *praiſes*, or *diſpraiſes which follow thoſe things of which wee make choice of*; and of all thoſe other circumſtances (aforementioned) which diſprove that all things are done by *deſtiny*.

Cap. 40.

I. *Of ſuch things as are in* our power; *and wherein our* freewill *conſiſteth.* II. *A reproofe aſwell of them who conceive that mans* freewill *extendeth to every thing; as of thoſe who deny him to have any* freewill *at all.* III. *The* beginnings, *or choice both of* good *and* evill things, *are in our power, but not their events: that ſo, neither divine* Providence, *nor humane* faculties, *might bee ſuperfluous.*

EVidently enough appeares it, that ſome things are in *our*

our power, and that wee have ſome actions at our diſpoſe. It now remains that we declare, *What things they are which bee in our power.*

We ſay *in generall*, that all things which wee doe *voluntarily* be in our power; becauſe it could not elſe be truly verified that the things were done *voluntarily*, which were not in our power: and becauſe *generally* all thoſe things whereupon enſueth *praiſe* or *diſpraiſe*; and thoſe alſo wherein we uſe *exhortation*, or *law*, are in *our power*; as is afore declared.

But things which are *properly in our power*; are all ſuch

ſuch things as belong unto the *minde*; and thoſe whereof we may conſult. For our *conſulting* of them doth imply, that it is in our power to execute that which is propoſed and conſulted of. And wee have declared in the former part of this *treatiſe*, that *conſultation*, and *deliberation*, fall out in ſuch things onely as are *contingent*: and that ſuch things only are *contingent*, which may fall out either this way, or that way, or in a contrary manner.

It is our *minde* which maketh choice thereof; & it is the beginning of our action; & thoſe are *contingent* things, which are in our

our power: *To be moved, or not to be moved; To attempt, or not to attempt; To desire things unnecessary, or not desire them; To lie, or speake truth; To give, or not to give; To rejoyce in such things as we ought, or not to rejoyce*; and all such other things like unto these, wherein consist the works of *vice* and *vertue*: For herein consisteth our *free-will*.

The *Arts* also are accounted among such things as may alike fall out, or not fall out: For, every *Art* brings forth such things as may both be done, and left undone; and such things also, as have the beginning in the *doer*,

doer, and not in the *things themſelves*, *which are done:* But neither thoſe things which are *eternall* (and in that reſpect, *things of neceſsity*) neither any other things which are done of *neceſsity*, can be ſaid to be done by *Art*.

Nor is any of thoſe things ſaid to be done by *Art*, which are *contingent*, and may bee done otherwiſe, if they have their *efficient cauſe* in themſelves; as in *living-creatures*, and in *plants*, which are made by *nature*, not by *Art*. If therefore the *efficient cauſe* of things made by *Art*, is *without themſelves*; then who is cauſe of the things made by

by *Art*, but the *Artificer* which made them? And if the making of them belong unto him, then is he the *beginning*, and *cauſe* of his owne *actions*. And therefore alſo, the working according to *Art*, and *vertue*, and all *actions of mans minde*, and of *reaſon*, are in *mans power*: and what actions they are, I have declared already.

II. Now the moſt part of men, ſuppoſing that wee are ſaid to have this *free-will* in every thing which wee doe or poſſeſſe, are therefore offended at this opinion; and not without cauſe. But, ſome there be, having more acuteneſſe, who bringing this text

text of *Scripture* to refute us (namely, *The wayes of man are not in his own hand*) say thus unto us.

Good friends, how is the *will* of *man* free, seeing his *way* is not in his owne hands? and seeing the thoughts of men are so vaine, that they cannot bring to effect those things which they have devised?

Many such like things they object, not knowing in what *sense*, wee speake of *freewill*. For we affirm not that it is in our power to be *rich*, or *poore*, or alwayes in *health*, or of a strong *constitution* of nature; or to *rule*; or generally to have those good

things, which wee count as *instruments* to worke things by; or such as are called the *gifts of fortune*; neither doe wee account those to be at our dispose which have their event from *Providence*: But wee affirme those actions onely to be in our power, which are according to *vice*, or *vertue*; as also, our *motions* or *choice* of things; or else such things whereof wee may doe the contrary, aswell as the things themselves.

For a certaine *will* or *choice* goeth before every action, and not onely the *deed*, but the *affection* also is condemned; as may plainly appeare in that

place

place of the *Gospell*, which saith, *He who lookes upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery already with her in his heart*. And we read that *Iob* sacrificed unto God, for such offeces as his children might commit in *thought*. For indeed the *beginning*, either of *sin*, or of *doing uprightly* is in our *will*; whereas the *doing* of the thing it selfe, is otherwhile permitted by *Providence*, and otherwhile hindered.

III. For, seeing there are some things in *our power*, and a *Providence* beside; it is necessary that such things as are done should bee done by them both: Because, if they were

done by either of them alone, the other ſhould be to no purpoſe. Therefore in regard all *actions* are mixt, it will ſometime happen that they ſhall be in our power; another while, that they ſhall bee as providence alone directeth; and ſometimes againe, both according to *Providence*, and as wee *would* alſo.

And whereas likewiſe there is ſometimes a *generall*, and ſometimes a *particular Providence*; it is neceſſary that the ſame ſhould fall out in *particular* things, as it doth in things *generall*. For if the aire about us bee dry, our bodies are dryed alſo, though

though not all alike. And if a mother be given to riotous fare, or a diſtempered dyet; even thereby ſhall her children become diſtempered in body, and perverſe in ſuch things as they attempt.

It is plaine therefore, by what hath beene ſaid, that men may fall into a diſtempered eſtate of body, either by the generall diſtẽperature of the aire; or by the dyet of parents; or when they ſpoil themſelves by their owne voluptuouſneſſe; and that they may be diſtempered ſometime by ſuch occaſions as take their beginnings from themſelves; in ſuch maner, that *Provi-*

dence ſhall not altogether bee the cauſe of ſuch things.

If then, the *Soul* ſhall yeeld her ſelfe to be overſwayed by the *temperature* of the *body*, and give place to *wrath*, or *luſt*; or bee preſſed downe by *outward things*, as *poverty*; or lifted up, by *riches*, or the like: if any evill commeth to the ſame thereby; it ſo hapned thereunto by the *ſelfe-will* of that *Soul*. Seeing, if ſhee had not voluntarily yeelded her ſelfe to thoſe diſtemperatures, ſhe might have overcome them, and beene in good caſe. For through well ordering the *affections* of the *minde*, by a convenient

ent *dyet*, and a good *converſation*, ſhe might have altered that *temperature*, rather then have beene perverted thereby.

This is manifeſt by the example of ſuch as are in a *good condition*, and that all ſuch as are not in a *good eſtate*, doe *ſin* voluntarily (*and not by conſtraint*:) And that it is in our power, either to conſent, and yeeld our ſelves unto our *bodily diſtemperatures*, or to reſiſt, and overcome them.

Nevertheleſſe, there be many who pretend theſe *diſtemperatures* to bee the cauſe why we doe ſuch or ſuch things; and ſo impute their wickedneſſe,

not unto their owne *will*, but to *neceſsity*. And therefore they cõclude (though very abſurdly) that the *vertues* alſo, are not in our power.

Cap. 41.

I. *Of the cauſe why* man *was made with* freewill; *and that if it had been otherwiſe, he had neither beene capable of the* contemplative, *nor* practike faculty, *nor been a* reaſonable creature. II. *Of the* mutability *of* men *and* Angels: *and of the cauſes thereof*; *and of ſome inferences thereupon proving* freewill. III. *It is not through any* naturall defect *that* men *are vicious*.

vicious, but by their owne will: *And it is here ſhewne alſo, that* man *without* freewill, *could neither have any* vice *nor* vertue.

SOmewhat remaines to be declared, whereby it may bee manifeſt why *man* had *freewill* beſtowed upon him.

We affirme, that immediately, together with *reaſon* this *freewill* entered into us; and that together with *nature*, there is ingraffed into created things a *mutability*, and *alteration*; eſpecially in thoſe things which are a *ſubject* made of *matter*. For there is a *mutation* even in the

very *beginning* of every thing which is made; and all *making* proceedeth from an alteration of the *materiall subject*.

This is evident to any man who consideratelie beholds the *plants*, and *living creatures*, which have their abiding either in the *earth*, in the *water*, or in the *aire*: For there is in all those a continuall *mutability*.

Moreover, that our *freewill* enters into us, together with *reason*, hath beene made plain enough by those things which we have said, to prove that some thing is in *our power*; as will appeare to them who have heeded what

was

was delivered to that purpoſe. But becauſe the ſequell of this *treatiſe*, doth for ſome reſpects require the ſame; perhaps it will not be impertinent to repeat ſome part of that which was formerly declared.

Our *reaſon* is divided into *contemplation*, and *practiſe*. *Contemplative reaſon*, is that which concerneth (univerſally) the nature of things, as they bee really; and *active reaſon*, is that whereby wee *deliberate* of things, and ſets downe the right way of putting them into execution.

The *contemplative part* is called the *minde* (*or the principall*

principall part of the ſoule) and the *active part* is termed *reaſon*. The one is likewiſe called *wiſdome*, and the other *prudence*.

Now every one that *deliberates*, doth for this cauſe *deliberate*, even for that the *choice* of ſuch things as are to be done, is in his power; and to the intent that hee might by *deliberation*, make choice of that which is moſt worthy; and that after he hath ſo choſen, he might execute the ſame.

It is therefore neceſſary, that he which *deliberates* ſhould have power over his owne deeds: for if he have not power over his owne *actions*; his *conſultation*

ſultation will be fruitleſſe alſo unto him. And if theſe things be ſo; it will follow, by a neceſſary conſequence, that whereſoever *reaſon* is planted, there is likewiſe *freewill*. For either he is no *reaſonable-creature*; or elſe, if he be a *reaſonable-creature*, he hath *power* over the beginnings of his owne actions; and in having that *power*, hath alſo *freewill*.

II. It hath beene declared alſo, that things compoſed of a *materiall ſubject*, have a *mutability* in them; out of which (together with what hath been ſaid before) it may bee inferred, that there muſt, of neceſſity, be in *man* both *freewill*,

freewill, and *mutability*. *Mutability*, becauſe hee is made of *matter*; and *freewill*, becauſe he is indued with *reaſon*.

Whoſoever therefore findes fault with *God*, for that hee did not ſo make man at the firſt, that hee might not fall unto *vice*, but gave him his owne *choice*: Surely, thoſe men are not aware, that they reprove GOD for making man *reaſonable*, and not rather an *unreaſonable creature*.

For one of theſe two is unavoidably neceſſary. Either *man* ſhould have beene made *void of reaſon*; or elſe being indued with *reaſon*, and exerciſed in action,

action, hee muſt have in him *freewill.* Yea, and thereupon it followes alſo of neceſſity, that every *nature* endued with *reaſon*, hath *freewill*, and is *mutable* of his *owne nature.*

But thoſe *natures* have eſpecially a *mutability* in them which are made of a *materiall ſubject*; aſwell in reſpect that they were *made*, as in regard they were made of *matter*: whereas thoſe *natures* which were not made of *matter* (as the ſubject) have *mutability* in them, but in one reſpect onely; namely, in that they were *made.*

Moreover, ſo many of thoſe *immateriall natures* as

as were converſant in earthly matters, and intermedled with ſuch inferiour things, as are to bee done, by reaſon of communicating with *men*; by ſo much they became more *mutable* then others (*of that immateriall nature*) And ſo many of them as directed the excellency of their nature, to approach neare unto *God*, with an inclination to love him; and to enjoy a bleſſed eſtate in the minding and fruition of him; ſo bending themſelves inward, and unto GOD only, that they wholly eſtranged themſelves from *outward*, and *materiall things*. Thoſe (by that meanes) became

ſo

ſo familiar with *contemplation*, and with GOD, that they ſtill remaine without *mutation*. Having a *free-will*, in that they are indued with *reaſon*; and yet are not now ſubject unto *alteration*, for the forementioned cauſes.

And this need not bee wondred at. For even thoſe men alſo, which give themſelves to *contemplation*, and ſequeſter themſelves from the inordinate love, and medling in worldly affaires, doe and may attaine unto an immutable condition, (*and unto an eſtate of grace, from which there is no falling away.*)

Now I doe ſuppoſe, that

that this (with what was formerly ſaid) hath ſufficiently proved, that in the *beginning*, all the *reaſonable creatures* were created in ſo excellent a condition, that if they had remained ſuch as they were made, they ſhould have beene void of all *vice*, and that their *vitiouſneſſe* (*who have been corrupted*) came unto them by their owne *will*. For it ſo falleth out, that they who remaine in the condition wherein they were placed by their creation, are ſetled in a moſt bleſſed eſtate.

Of *incorporeall natures*, *Angels* alone have beene altered: yet not all of them: but ſome part; even

even ſo many onely, as creeping *downeward* departed from that inclination which they had to ſupreame things, and the contemplation of GOD.

It is made plaine by the things afore proved, that the powers of our *will* are *mutable*; becauſe we are of a *mutable* nature: And yet no man can blame GOD, as if hee were the cauſe that we are evill, in regard the *faculties* are *mutable*, which he gave unto us.

For *vices* conſiſt not in our *faculties*, but in *habits*; and our *habits* depend upon our *will*; and it is therefore the fault of our *will*, that we are evill, and not

(*originally*)

(*originally*) of our *nature*. But our meaning ſhall be more plainly underſtood by this that followes.

Wee have ſaid hereto fore, that a *faculty* is a power whereby we are able to put in execution whatſoever we doe. And in all the *faculties* belonging to our *choice*, the ſelf-ſame concerneth both the *contraries* (as for example) there is the ſame *faculty* of *lying*, and of *ſpeaking truth*; one and the ſame faculty of *temperance*, and *wantonneſſe*.

But it cannot bee, that in contrary things there ſhould be the ſame *habit*; as in *wantonneſſe* and *temperance*; or in *lying*, and

ſpeaking

ſpeaking truth; becauſe of *contrary things*, the *habits* are contrary. For the *habit* which concernes *temperance*, belongeth to *vertue*: but all *intemperance* is of *vice*; and therefore the *vices* doe not depend upon the *faculties*, which are in us; but upon our *habits*, and our *will*: And it is not a *faculty*, which maketh us *wantons*, or *lyars*, but our *will*. For if we *would*, we might ſpeak the *truth*, and not *lye*.

Seeing then, *vice* is not a *faculty*, but a *habit*; *God* is not cauſe of our naughtineſſe, which giveth us the *faculty*; but a *habit* (is cauſe thereof.) which being in us, proceedeth from our

our ſelves, and by our ſelves, & for our ſelves. For if wee would endeavour thereafter, we might inſtead of an *evill habit*, attaine unto the contrary thereof.

Now a *faculty* doth herein differ from a *habit*; all *faculties* are naturall, but *habits* are procured by uſe. Yea, and here alſo they differ; our *faculties* are in us *without teaching*, and *our habits* are gotten by *learning*, and *cuſtome*. If therefore the *faculties* that are in us, be naturall, and without teaching; and the *habits* gotten by uſe and learning; then it cannot be that our (*originall*) *nature* ſhould be the cauſe of

our wickednesse; but rather our *evill education*, whereby wee have gotten an *evill habit*.

For that our *habits* come unto us by *custome*, it hath beene already declared; and that our *faculties* are in us by *nature*, it is evident by this; that all men have the same *faculties* (except those which are someway maimed or lame.) And that the *habits* are not naturall, is as evident by this, that all have not the same *habits*; but some of them *habits* of one sort, and some of another: whereas things that are *naturall*, are found in all.

CAP.

CAP. 42. SECT. 1.

I. *Of* Providence; *and first, that there is a* providence, *and for what good causes, both* Jew *and* Christian *ought to believe it.* II. *The same is illustrated to* heathen *men, by* arguments *and* demonstrations *agreeable to their knowledge.* III. *Proofes thereof, by things also generally confessed.*

IT is already sufficiently proved, that *man* hath *freewill*; as also wherein his *freewill* consisteth, and for what cause he was created with *freewill*.

Now

Now forasmuch as every one who purposeth to murther a man, doth not alwayes put the same in execution; but sometime fulfilleth his murtherous intent, and sometime not, because his purpose being hindered, hath not effect according therennto: And wheras we have said that *providence* is cause therof, & not *destiny*, It followeth consequently, after the *Tract* of things which are in *our power*, that we speak next of *Providence*.

We will divide our *discourse* into three parts; the first, proving *that there is a Providence*; the second, shewing *what Providence is*; and the third, *What*

things belong unto Providence.

As for the *Iewes*, unleſſe they be mad, they cannot be ignorant that there is a *Providence*, knowing the wonders which GOD wrought in *Ægypt*; and hearing of thoſe things which hapned unto their Fathers in the *wilderneſſe*; wherein moſt manifeſt viſions of *Providence* appeared more clearly unto them, thē by thoſe things which wee now ſee with our eyes. And they had alſo many evidēt proofes that things were done by *Providence*, both in their *Prophets*, and in their *Babyloniſh captivity*, which leave not any juſt occaſi-

on

on for them, to be doubtfull of the ſame. As for the *Chriſtians*; they have not onely all thoſe things which hapned unto the *Iews*, to preach unto them that there is a *Providence*; but alſo that admirable work of *Providence*, above all other moſt divine, which containeth in it that exceeding great favour towards man, which paſſeth common beliefe; I meane, that GOD ſhould take unto him a *Body* for our ſakes.

II. But ſeeing wee muſt reaſon the matter, not with ſuch onely, but alſo with *heathen men*. Wee will therefore endeavour to prove there is a *Providence*

dence by ſuch other things as are alſo in credit with them. And that there is a *Providence*, may be proved by thoſe argumẽts wherby we prove that there is a *God*.

For concerning the continuance of things, and eſpecially ſuch as are ſubject to *generation*, and *corruption*; and the ſcitnation, and order of all things that are, being alwayes preſerved after one maner; and the courſe of the Starres nothing altering at any time; and the circuit of the yeare, and the returne of the ſeaſons of the yeare; and the equality both of the night and of the dayes of the yeare,

yeare, ſo that either of them is both increaſed and diminiſhed in the ſame proportion of time: how might all this continue under ſo conformable a *government*, if it had none to rule it by his *Providence*?

Moreover, the puniſhments which follow ſin; or (which is of more import) the detecting of *murthers*, and offences themſelves, which are often bewrayed (*when there is no witneſſe of the deed*) by ſome circumſtances; doe ſhew that there is a *Providence*.

Both the Scriptures of the *Hebrewes*, and the writings of the *Heathen*, are

full of ſtories to this purpoſe. Of this nature is that which is written of *Suſanna*: and in prophane bookes, there is a ſtory to the ſame purpoſe of *Ibicus* the *Poet*.

For, when this *Poet* was murthered by certaine ruffians, where none were in preſence, either to aſſiſt him, or beare witneſſe of the aſſault which they made upon him; he ſeeing *Cranes* not far from him, cryed out and ſaid, oh yee *Cranes*, be you revengers of this murther.

And ſo it fell out, that when the Magiſtrates of the City where he lived, endeavoured to ſeeke out the committers of that murther,

murther, and could not finde them: The people being assembled together into a common place for that intent; the *Cranes* flew over them; whereupon the *murtherers* espying them, laughed outright, and said, loe, where they flie that should revenge the death of *Ibicus*: which being overheard by one that sate next unto them, and declared to the *Magistrates*, the said murtherers were thereupon examined, and confessed the fact.

There be very many of such like things, recorded by ancient writers, which if a man should collect together, would enlarge this

Treatiſe to an infinite length.

And though all offenders be not deſcried; but, that ſome do quite eſcape the publike ſtroke of Iuſtice; yet let no man for that cauſe deny that there is a *Providence*. For the *Providence* of GOD, taketh care of men, (and brings thē to repētance) not one way alone; but after divers and ſundry maners.

Furthermore, the compoſure, and proportionable knitting together of thoſe *bodies*, which are ſubject unto generation, and corruption, and there being kept alwaies alike (*according to their ſeverall kinds*)

kinds) is not the leaſt argument proving that there is a *Providence*, ſeeing the great care (*and wiſedome*) of divine *Providence* is very manifeſt in every part of the *body*; as they who will take paines to peruſe them, may learne out of thoſe many *Treatiſes*, which are made upon that ſubject. Yea, the varieties which are in the *colours* of living-creatures, and their keeping alwayes the ſame comely mixture and proportion, are proofes of a *Providence*.

III. And among ſuch things as are generally confeſſed by all men, one evident proofe declaring there is a *Providence*, is that uni-

verſall conſent of men in all times, and of all nations, that wee ought to ſerve GOD, both by *Prayers*, and *Oblations*. For if there were not a *Providence* to governe the affaires of this world, who would *pray?* or to whom ſhould we make our petitions?

Moreover, that earneſt deſire which is in us, to do good unto others (and which they naturally, and very diligently endeavour, whoſe mindes are not perverted) is a plaine demonſtration that there is a *Providence*. For having received a benefit which we are not able to recompence, wee are the more

more desirous to be some-way helpfull to them, who are not able to requite us for the same.

If *Providence* were taken away, then every man should be permitted to be injurious, according to the power hee hath to doe wrong. There would also be no giving of *almes*, nor any *feare* of GOD among men; and therewithall *vertue* and *piety* would be quite rooted out. For if GOD had not a provident care of every thing; neither did punish *evill-doers*; nor encourage those that were *well-disposed*; nor defended *innocents* from oppression; Who would worship GOD? or who

who would ſerve him, that could be no way profitable unto them?

If there bee no *Providence*, all *prophecies*, and the *fore-knowledge* of things, are likewiſe overthrowne. But even thoſe things which happen out before our eyes, almoſt every day, are manifeſtations of the ſame: For, GOD often appeareth unto us in our neceſſities (*by ſupplying our wants in an unexpected maner*) many have beene cured of their infirmities, by that which hath beene revealed unto them in *dreames*; many *predictions* of things to come have beene truely uttered in all ages. And many

many who have embrued their hands in innocent blood, or committed ſuch like heynous offences, have been horribly terrified night and day.

From the *goodneſſe* of *God*, his *Providence* may alſo be inferred; for hee is the moſt excellent Good; and as he is *good*, he is inclined to bee *good* and beneficiall to others; and if he be inclined to be beneficiall to others, he is inclinable alſo, to have a *Providence* over others.

What need I ſpeake here of thoſe workes which belong unto the *Creation*? of their *proportion*? of their *harmony*? of their *ſcituation*? of their *order*?

order? or of the uſe whereunto every thing ſerveth in the whole world? ſeeing all things may evidently appeare to have beene perfected in ſuch maner, that nothing ſhould have been in good plight, if it had beene otherwiſe then it is now: and that nothing can well be added, nor any thing be conveniently wanting in any of thoſe things which were made thorowout the world: For, both by *wiſdome*, and *providence*, all things therein were created in a comely and perfect maner.

SECT.

SECT. 2.

I. *Of the difference betweene* Providence, *and* Creation; *and of their diſtinct workes.* II. *Of the wonderfull* Providence *of* GOD, *in the manifold, and unlike* viſages *of men.* III. *The ſame* Providence *is illuſtrated by the great diverſity of* colours *whereby the ſeverall* ſpecies *of every kind of* living-creatures *are diſtinguiſhed.*

BUt wee will defer the full explanation hereof, untill we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeake of the *Creation*, leſt wee ſhould fall into that overſight where-

whereinto thoſe *writers* have ſlipped; who extoll GOD's *creation* inſtead of his *Providence*; when his *Providence* was their *Theme*. For though indeed *Creation* gives us an occaſion to treat of *Providence*; yet ſo great is the difference betwixt them, that they are farre from being *one*.

It is the worke of *Creation* to make well thoſe things which are *made*; but it is the part of *Providence* to conſerve and take care for ſuch things. And theſe two are not alwayes altogether in one; as wee may perceive by thoſe men who are converſant in *arts* and *myſteries*. For, ſome

ſome when they have made a thing well, give over there, and take no more care for the thing which they have made; as *Carpenters*, and *Painters*, and the *makers* of other *handy-craft workes*: and ſome other, doe no more but *provide*, and take care for the preſervation of thoſe things which are under their charge; as *heardmen*, and *ſhepheards*.

Theſe things conſidered, it will become us, when we treat of *Creation*, to ſhew that all the things which were *made*, were exceeding *well-made*: and to declare when we come to ſpeake of *Providence*, that God was diligent in the

the preſervation of thoſe things which he had well created.

By this *providence* it comes to paſſe, that *men* beget *men*, that *beaſts* are engendred of *beaſts*; and that every thing ſprings from his owne, and not from any ſtrange ſeed. And whoſoever ſhall averre, that every thing (after it is once made) proceeds forward as in a certaine *race*, he cannot chuſe but confeſſe alſo, that after a thing is *created*, there muſt be alwayes a *providence* to governe the ſame. For in that the thing *created* proceedeth on in a *courſe*, it is even thereby manifeſted, that together with

with *creation*, there was laid a foundation of *providence*, to whom belongs the governing of al things after they are *created*: and he saith (in effect) that he which first *made* all things, and he which *governes* them by his *providence*, when they are made, is but *one*, and the same GOD.

II. Whosoever beholds the *visages* of men, to bee so many thousands, and yet to differ so much from each other, as that no one is like any of the other in all respects; hee cannot chuse but admire the *work*; and if he well consider the cause of it, shall easily find that it is divine *providence* by

by whom ſo many different, and diſtinct features and countenances, were brought forth.

For if our *viſages* ſhould be all of the ſame forme and moulding without any alteration, how great a confuſion would there follow? In how much darkneſſe and ignorance ſhould man be kept? None ſhould know his *familiar acquaintance*, from a *ſtranger*, nor be able to diſcern a *wicked enemy* from an *honeſt friend*; but all things would be confounded together in one maſſe, according to the opinion of *Anaxagoras*.

Moreover, if this had beene ſo, there had not beene

beene any cauſe why men ſhould have been forbidden to company with ſiſters or mothers: neither would many have refrained from theft, rapine, or from offering any open violence or injurie to others, if they could but contrive their preſent eſcape: For though afterward they were ſeene, none ſhould be able to diſtinguiſh them from other men.

Neither could any *law* be executed; nor any *common wealth* well ordered; neither could *fathers* or *children* know each other; neither could any thing pertaining to humane affairs be well, or orderly affected;

cted; becauſe men ſhould be as it were blinde, not diſcerning between man and man; and bee no way helped by their eyes, except it were in diſcerning the *age* or *quantity*.

This benefit we gaine by *providence*, that it *prevents theſe inconveniences and confuſions*, by making a variety in the viſages of men, *alwayes*, in *all places*, and at *all times*. And it is a ſtrong argument alſo to prove that this *providence* extendeth unto every *particular*; in that every particular man is known one from another, by his *portraiture*, by his *proportion*, by his *viſage*, and by his *voice*.

For

III.

For mans viſage is not the onely marke whereby we may diſcerne him; but (as if that were not enough) *providence* hath added another diſtinction for our more advantage; even the diverſity of *colours* alſo, to the intent that the weakneſſe of our nature might bee aſſiſted divers wayes: And I ſuppoſe likewiſe, that many of thoſe living-creatures, which in their generall kinde, have in appearance but one *ſhape* (and *colour*) as *Dawes* and *Crowes*; yet there may be certaine viſible differences, *whereby they might bee diſtinguiſhed by good heed*; and whereby they diſcerne each other when

when they ſhould couple together. For though many *Dawes* and *Crowes* bee gathered together in one place; yet in their coupling, they diſcerne each other; and every *male* and *female* know their owne *mate*.

But how could they know each other, if every one of them had not ſome proper diſtinction in the ſhape; which (though not eaſily perceived by us) might be well enough diſcerned by thē, through a *naturall inſtinct*; they being creatures of one kinde?

Laſtly, the *ſignes*, and *oracles*, and *ſooth-ſayings*, and *wonders*, which are from above (for now I direct

direct their discourse to *heathen* philosophers) and which (as they affirme) doe by their owne force make good the events of such things as are declared by them, have (no doubt) their *significations*, by the vertue of *providence*; and have thereby also, a true effect, according to the same *significations*.

Cap. 43.

This Chapter declares, what Providence *is; and that it is necessary & convenient the* Creator, *and* ruler *of all things should be* One.

VEry plainly may it be manifested that there is a *provi-*

dence; both by arguments already produced, and by others which wee shall have occasion to mention hereafter: wee will now therefore, declare what *providence* is.

Providence *is a heedfull provision for all things, proceeding from* GOD. Some thus define it. *Providence is the will of* GOD, *whereby all created things receive a government fit for them.*

Now if Providence be the *will* of GOD, it is necessary that all things should be ordered as reasonably, as excellently, and as decently as the nature of the *God-head* requires; which is after so good and perfect a manner as

as that nothing may poſſibly receive a better order: For neither is it a thing of good cõſequence nor agreeable to decency, that one ſhould make things, and another take the care of their *preſervation* and *government*; ſeeing it were but an argument of weakneſs to have it ſo.

Many types and expreſſions of that which we have ſaid, are ingraffed in *living-creatures*: For every thing which *breedeth* ought, provides food alſo for the thing bred thereby; and *man* provides for all other things alſo, belonging to the life of him whom hee

hath begotten, ſo far forth as his ability doth extend. And all creatures which make not proviſion for their young, doe therefore not make it, becauſe their weakneſſe is a hinderance thereunto.

Therefore it is truely declared, that GOD is he whoſe *Providence* concerneth all: and that *Providence* is the *will* of GOD.

CAP. 44. SECT. I.

I. *It is here ſhewed wherein* providence *conſiſteth*; Plato's *opinion concerning the ſame, and how far his* tenet *is allowable.* II. *The opinions of the* Stoicks, *of* Democritus, Heraclitus, *and* Epicurus,

rus, *touching* Providence, *and the abſurdities inſuing.* III. *The opinions alſo of* Ariſtotle, Euripides, *and* Menander; *and the refutation of them.*

SInce we have ſhewed that there is a *Providence*, and alſo what it is; we will now declare, in what things, that *providence* beareth ſway; whether in things *univerſall*, or things *particular*, or in *both*.

Plato affirmes that it hath government both of *univerſall*, and *particular things*; and he divideth his diſcourſe of *providence* into three parts. The firſt

he calls the *providence* of the firſt and ſupreameſt GOD, and that this *providence* is eſpecially over the IDEÆ (*that is, the moſt beautifull formes of things*:) and in the next place, over the whole *world in general*, as, over the *heavens*, the *ſtars*, and all *generall things*, even over the predicaments of *ſubſtance*, *quantity*, and *quality*, with ſuch like: yea, and over all things which are eſpecially contained under thoſe *predicaments*.

His opinion likewiſe is, that the *providence* of a ſecond degree of *gods*, which (as he conceiveth) turne about the Sphæres; hath rule over the ingendring

dring of all the baſer *living-creatures*, & of *plants*, and of all things which are ſubject unto *generation*, and *corruption*. Yea, and *Ariſtotle* himſelfe aſcribes the ingendring of ſuch things, to the *Sun*, and unto the *Zodiack circle*.

That which according to *Plato's* opinion, is the *third providence*, hath predominãcie over the *events* and *ends* of thoſe things which are begun or perfected by us; as alſo over the *courſe* and condition of *mans life*; and over all thoſe *naturall* and *materiall things*; and over ſuch as are called *inſtrumentall things*, whether they bee *good* or *evill*. And the prin-

cipall agents in this *providence*, he ſuppoſed to bee certaine *Angells* (or *ſpirits*) ordained to bee alwayes converſant upon the *earth*, and to have the charge over thoſe things which men doe.

But hee affirmes that the *ſecond* and the *third providence* alſo, have their whole eſſence from the *firſt*; ſo that all things are in effect, governed by the power of the *chiefeſt God*, who ordained the *firſt*, the *ſecond*, and the *third*, to be employed in the well-ordering, and governing of things.

Now this is praiſe worthy in *Plato*, that he refers reth all unto GOD, and affirmes

affirmes all *providence* to depend upon his *will*. But whereas he ſayes there is a *ſecond providence*, committed unto thoſe which turne the heavens about (*as he hath ſaid*) we commend him not in ſo affirming. For (*if any ſuch were*) that which they performed, is not a worke of *providence*; but rather, a worke of *neceſsity*, whereunto they were deſtinated. For, let them be figured how they will, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that things muſt both be done as they were done; and that they might not be in any other maner then they are. And I have already ſhewed, that no-

thing done by *providence*, is subject unto *necessity*.

II. Now the *Stoick* Philosophers (who defend as an undeniable truth, that there is a *destiny*, necessitating all things, and that some things are also in our *power*) doe leave no place at all for *providence*; and indeed they overthrow (as is before declared) *by affirming there is destiny*, so much of their owne opinion, as averrs that things are in *our power*.

Democritus, *Heraclitus*, and *Epicurus*, are of opinion that there is no *providence* either of *universall*, or of *particular things*. And *Epicurus* hath expressed his meaning to this purpose. The

" The *nature* (saith hee)
" which is blessed and in-
"corruptible; neither is
"of it selfe troubled with
"any businesse; neither
"occasioneth any other
"to be troublesomely im-
"ployed: and therefore,
"neither is angry for any
"thing; nor favoureth any
"thing; because all such
" like things, doe betoken
"*weaknesse*. Yea the *gods*
"cannot bee *angry*, in re-
"gard *anger* never chan-
"ceth unto any, but when
"something succeedeth
"contrary unto their *will*,
" which thing cannot at
"any time happen unto
"the *gods*.

The *opinion* of these men is conformable to the *principles*

principles which are deviſed by themſelves. For, it is no wonder if they hold opinion that there is no *providence* to governe any thing, who affirme that the *world* was made by *hap-hazzard*. For how ſhould thoſe things which had no *Creator*, have any *providence* to preſerve or governe them? Seeing it is plaine that ſuch things muſt be confuſedly caried to & fro, by *hap hazzard*, which were made by *chance*, and at adventure, in the *beginning*.

Wee muſt therefore withſtand them in their firſt *opinion*, as wee have done already (*and ſo diſprove the ſame*) that it may be

be well manifeſted there is a *providence*. And for that cauſe wee will refer the confutation of theſe *men*, unto a fitter opportunity; and proceed to examine the opinion of *Ariſtotle*; and others, who ſay that *particular things* are not governed by any *providence*.

III. For *Ariſtotle* in the ſixth booke of his Ethicks to *Nichomachus*, hath covertly delivered that *particular things* are governed by *nature* onely. For, *nature* being (ſaith he) divine, and ingraffed in all things which are ingendred, doth naturally adminiſter a way unto each, to chuſe which is moſt expedient

pedient for it, and to avoid ſuch things as are hurtfull thereunto. And (indeed) every living creature (as we have ſhewed heretofore) maketh choice of ſuch nouriſhment, as is agreeable unto it; earneſtly purſuing what is convenient for it; and naturally knowing what cures are pertinent unto the diſeaſes thereof.

Euripides, and *Menander*, have in ſome places affirmed, that the principall parts of the *minde*, which is in every man, doth by *providence* governe each man, and no GOD at all. But the *minde* is converſant in thoſe things onely which are in

our

our power; and they are either in *actions which may be done*, or in the *arts*, or in *contemplation*: Whereas *providence* is busied in things which are not in *our power*; as *to be rich*, or *to be poore*; *to be in health*, or *to be sick*; wherewith neither the *minde*, nor *nature*, (as *Aristotle* himselfe holdeth opinion) have any thing to doe, *in that sense*.

For the workes of *nature* are evident: and if a murtherer bee sometime punished, and sometime let goe without punishment, here is that pertinent either to the *minde*, or unto *nature* (*as it is unto providence*?) except some will affirme that things belonging

belonging to *nature*, and unto the *minde*, are pertinent unto *providence*; and that things which follow upon the choice of the *minde*, and operations of *nature*, doe afterward belong unto *destiny*; which being granted, all that should bee in our power, would be quite overthrowne.

But the matter is not at that point. For (as hath beene already declared) every thing belonging unto the *minde* (whether it be for *practise* or *contemplation*) is all in *our power*. Neither doe all things which are contained under *providence*, belong to *nature*; though every thing belonging

belonging to *nature*, is governed by *providence*. For many things wrought by *providence*, are not the workes of *nature*; as I have declared in discovering the *murtherer*; neither is *nature* in all points, the same with *providence*, though it be (as indeed it is) a part of *providence*. And therefore these men doe ascribe the *providence* over particular things both to *nature*, and unto the *minde*.

SECT. 2.

I. *Of their absurd* opinion, *who affirme that* GOD *hath care of* universall, *but not of* particular things. II. *The error of the*

the vulgar, *concerning* bleſſedneſſe; *and of their cauſeleſſe, and impious reprehenſion of* GODS Providence. III. *Of the blaſphemies which muſt conſequently follow the deniall of* GODS Providence, *over* particular things.

THere be ſome who affirme, that God ſo provides for the continuance of all things which hee hath created, that nothing ſhall faile which hee hath made; and that his *providence* extends to this thing alone, without regarding particulars, which are left by him to ſucceed as meer caſualty ſhall bring them about. Here-

Hereupon (as they conceive) it commeth to paſſe, that ſo many injuries, ſo many murthers, and (in briefe) that ſo much wickedneſſe, and oppreſſion is increaſed among men: yea, thereupon it commeth (ſay they) to paſſe, that ſome of them are puniſhed, ſome unpuniſhed, and that little or nothing is performed, either according to *right reaſon*, or the Canons of *Law*.

For, how (*as they think*) can it be poſſible that *God* hath care of any thing, when as neither law, nor true judgement beareth ſway? but where the contrary hath rather the chief rule?

rule? and where the beſt men are for the moſt part wronged, oppreſſed, and plunged into innumerable afflictions; while Tyrants and wicked men are advanced to *offices*, to powerfull dignities, to riches, and to all ſuch things as are well eſteemed of in this life?

But they who ſpeake in this maner, are not onely ignorant of many other things, that are expreſſed in our diſcourſe of *providence*; but eſtranged alſo to the *immortality* of the *ſoule*: For, ſuppoſing the *ſoule* to bee *mortall* they ſhut up all things belonging unto *man* within the compaſſe of this life; and (judging

(judging perverſly of thoſe things which are *good*) they imagine that ſuch as abound in *riches*, and beare great ſway by the places of *authority*, and vaunt of other ſuch like temporall (or materiall) commodities, are the only bleſſed and happy men.

But of the *vertues* of the *minde* (which exceed by many degrees all bodily and externall things) they make no account at all. Howſoever thoſe commodities are the beſt, which belong unto the beſt things. And in that reſpect, *vertue* as far ſurpaſſeth *riches* and *health*, and ſuch like, as the *ſoule* is more excellent then the *body:*

body: And therefore alſo, *vertue* aſwell alone, as together with other things, makes a man to be bleſſed.

Vertue with other things is conſidered according to a finite *amplitude*, as *a thing of two ells*, or the like; but alone, and by it ſelfe, it is conſiderable according to an *indefinite circumſcription*, as a *heape*. For if from a *heape* (*which is a thing having an indefinite circumſcription*) you may take away *two buſhels* (which is a finite *quantity*) two buſhels is indeed taken from the *heape*; yet that which is left continueth ſtill to be an an *heape*.

In like maner, if from

vertue

vertue (considered in its own indefinite *amplitude*) you take away all the good things that are bodily or externall (*which are but finite things*) and leave the *vertue* onely, (*which is an indefinite good*) the *bleſſednesſe* remaineth ſtill intire; becauſe *vertue*, even of it ſelfe, is perfectly ſufficient to *bleſſednesſe*. And therefore every *good man* is *bleſſed* (*though no externall good be left him*) and every wicked man is *miſerable*, though he hath all thoſe things hapned together, which are called the *goods* of *Fortune*.

II. The *multitude* not knowing thus much, doe think that they onely are *bleſſed*, who

who have all things at will, for their bodily delight, and abound in *riches*; and they can oft finde fault with *providence* which governeth our affaires, not with respect unto those things onely which are apparent unto us, but with regard unto those also, which are according to the *fore-knowledge* of GOD.

For GOD foreseeing, that it would be expedient for him to bee *poore*, who is now *honest* and *good*, (and that *riches* comming fast upō him, would corrupt his *minde*) doth keep him in that *poverty*, which is most convenient for the chiefe good of that man.

man. And in regard *God* foreſaw alſo, that the *rich man* would be grievous to others in the want of *riches* (by committing robberies, murthers, and other great outrages) hee ſuffered him to enjoy *riches*.

Poverty hath been many times profitable alſo, in making us to beare the loſſe of our children with more contentedneſſe; and in preventing the vexations which might happen by wicked ſervants; and perhaps their lives would have beene more bitter to us then their deaths, if our children had lived to bee wicked; or if wee ſhould have had falſe and theeviſh

vish servants. We foreseeing nothing that is to come; but beholding only the things present, cannot judge rightly of that which may fall out; but unto GOD all future things are as evident as those which are present.

Thus much wee have spoken against those who have presumed to blame GODS *providence*; and against whom this part of Scripture may well be applyed, *Shall the clay say to the potter, why hast thou made me thus?* For it is an arrogance to be abhorred, that he who dares not finde fault with an earthly *Law-giver*, should prescribe lawes to GOD, and object

obiect againſt the workes of his *providence.*

But we will forbeare to meddle further with ſuch extravagancies, (or to ſpeake more properly, with ſuch impieties) and proceed in diſproving them, who ſay, that *particular things* are not governed by any *providence*, and yet allow that *univerſall*, and *generall things*, are governed by a *providence.* For no man can alleadge more then theſe three cauſes, to prove that there is no providence of *God* over *particular things.*

Either it muſt bee becauſe GOD *knoweth not that it is good to take care for ſuch things*; or becauſe he

will not; or becauſe he *cannot*. But nothing is more eſtranged from that bleſſed *Eſſence*, then *ignorance*, and *unskilfulneſſe*: For It is *knowledge*, and *ſcience*, and *wiſdome it ſelfe*. Nay, there is none among men, ſo ignorant (if he be in his wits) but knowes, that if all *particular things* ſhould be deſtroyed, the *generall things* could not poſſibly conſiſt; ſeeing *univerſall things*, are made up of *particulars*. Yea, all the *particular things*, and the *generall things* are *equall*, and *converted*, & *deſtroyed*, and *preſerved* together. If therfore *particular things* periſh, the *univerſall* will alſo periſh. And there is no reaſon

reaſon why wee ſhould imagine that all *ſingular things* could eſcape deſtruction, if no care were taken of them from *above.*

Now whereas to avoid this objection, they grant that GODS *providence* extendeth to this onely; that *individualls* ſhall bee providently preſerved, ſo far forth as may conduce to the preſervation of *generall things*; they have ſaid enough (though they bee not aware thereof) to prove that there is, alſo, ſome *providence* over *individualls.* For (as they themſelves have ſaid in effect) GOD by preſerving the *ſpecies*, preſerveth alſo the *kindes.*

SECT. 3.

I. *Of the unreasonablenesse of their* opinion, *who thinke that* God *despiseth to take care of* particular things. II. *Of* Gods *undeniable ableneſſe to governe* individualls; *and of the capableneſſe which* particulars *have of the divine* providence. III. Mans *readineſſe to call upon* God *in ſuddain extremities (as it were by naturall inſtinct) is an argument of* providence.

SOme there be who (although they confeſſe that GOD is not *ignorant* how to provide for *particular things*) doe affirme, that

that he *will not* assume the care of them. Now every one that *will not* doe a thing; either *will not doe it*, because of *sloth*, or else for that it is *not comely* for him so to doe.

No man will be so mad as to impute *sloth* to GOD; For *sloth* is bred of these two; *pleasure*, and *feare*; and every one that is slothfull, is thereby drawn away by the love of some *ease* (or *pleasure*) or else discouraged by *feare*: and to cõceive either of these to be in GOD, were an impious absurdity.

If they that will not be so prophane to lay *slothfulnesse* to GODS charge, shall say it is *undecent* for

GOD, and unworthy the majesty of so high a *blessednesse*, to descend so low and unto such vile & smal things (or to be as it were prophaned by the absurdities, and obscenities of those *materiall things* which depend upon the *will* of *man*; and that therefore he *will not* take upon himselfe the government of such matters) they (not heeding it) impute unto GOD, in so saying, two very faulty things, *pride*, and *impurity*.

For either the *Creator* despiseth to take on himselfe the government and administration of *individualls* through *haughtiness*: (which is most absurd to affirme)

affirme) or elſe through feare of being defiled, as they ſpeake. And that is no leſſe abſurd then the other. For if they know the nature of the *Sunne-beams* to be ſuch, that they can exhale naturally all moiſture, even from dung-hills when they ſhine upon them, and that neither the *Sunne*, nor his *beames* are any whit contaminated, or defiled thereby, but keepe nevertheleſſe their owne purity: how can they conceive that GOD ſhould be polluted, by thoſe things which are below? Surely theſe cannot be the conjectures of men, that have any knowledge of what is pertinent

unto the nature of GOD.

For the *God-head* is *untouchable*, *uncorruptible*, not possibly to be contaminated, and above all alteration: But *pollution* and such like things are the workes of *change*, and betoken *alteration*.

II. And how can it bee counted other then most absurd, that an *artificer* (of what art soever) and especially a *Physitian*, taking care of *generall things*, should heedlesly passe over *things particular*? without caring to shew his art in them (though things of the least consequence) seeing hee cannot chuse but know that every *part* standeth in some stead unto the

the *whole*? much more absurd were it for any man to be of opinion; that *God* who is the *Creator* of all, should be more unskilfull then an *artificer*; and what else can be al'eaged, if he be willing, but that hee cannot take the care of *particulars*? And what can be affirmed more manifestly repugnant to the nature of GOD, then to say he is *weak*, and lacketh ability to doe well?

For two other causes, GODS *providence* is by some judged not to be exercised in *particular things*. The one is, because the *nature* of God (as they thinke) serveth not thereunto; the other is, for that they

they conceive *particular things* to be incapable of his *providence*.

But that it is agreeable to the nature of GOD to governe by his *providence*, they themſelves (who have denied it) doe implicitly confeſſe, when they affirme that his *providence* ruleth *univerſall things*; eſpecially ſeeing the *inferiour things* are not able to mount up, unto ſuch as are much above them; whereas the *power* of thoſe which are *ſuperiour*, deſcendeth even unto the loweſt, (even to things inſenſible) for their preſervation: yea, all things depend upon the *will* of GOD, and draw from thence,

thence, their *continuance*, and *well being*.

And that the nature of *individualls* (though infinitely multiplyed) is capable of being governed by *Providence*; it is plaine by those *living creatures* which are ordered by Rule and Authority. For, some of them, as *Bees* and *Ants*, and divers others, which being assembled together, are continued under certaine *Captaines* (or guides) whom they obediently follow: But this is best perceived if we looke into the government of *common-wealths*, and the conversation that is amongst *men*: For it is plaine, that it admits the administration

administration and care, both of *Lawgivers*, and also of subordinate *magistrates*; and how can that which is capable of such things, be unfit, to receive an orderly government from the *providence* of the *Creator?*

III. This also is no small argument, that there is *providence* over *particular things*, even that the knowledge thereof is naturally ingraffed in *men*: which is evident, when wee are brought to any great extremity; for wee then flie immediately unto GOD by *prayer*, as if without teaching, it were naturally written in our hearts, that *help* were to be

be ſought of GOD.

Nature except it have beene taught, cannot of it ſelfe lead us unto that, the doing whereof is not according to *nature*: neither doth it move us to fly thither for aſſiſtance, where none is to be had: yet when any great *affliction*, or *feare* ſuddenly oppreſſeth us; we cry out unto GOD before we be aware; and before we have had time to bethinke our ſelves what wee have to doe. Now, every *naturall conſequence*, is a forcible evidence admitting no contradiction.

SECT.

SECT. 4.

I. *Of the occasion and grounds of their* error, *who thought there was no* Providence *ruling* individualls. II. *How men ought to behave themselves in the search of* Gods providence, *which is beyond their comprehension.* III. *Of* Divine permission, *and the manifold* species *thereof.*

THe occasions & ground of their error who say there is no *providence* over *particular things*, are these. First, they conceived the *soule* to bee mortall, and that it perished with the *body*. And secondly, because

cauſe theſe men could not comprehend by their underſtanding and reaſon, how there ſhould bee any *providence* ruling *individualls*.

But that the *ſoule* is not mortall, and that all things pertaining unto *man*, are not ſhut up within the compaſſe of this life, it appeareth (even to heathen men) both by the opinions of the wiſeſt among the *Grecians*, who taught the *tranſmigration* of *ſoules* from *body* to *body*; as alſo by the *places* which they affirmed to bee allotted out, unto the *Soules* departed, according to their good or evill courſe in this life; and by thoſe puniſhments

niſhments wherwith *ſouls* are (as they hold) puniſhed by themſelves, for the offences they have committed.

For theſe things, although they be erroneous in other circumſtances and reſpects; yet in this they are true, and their *authors* do all agree therein, that the *ſoule* remaineth after this life, and ſhall come to *Iudgement*.

II. But if wee cannot attaine unto the reaſon of that *governance* which *providence* hath over *particular things*; which indeed we cannot, as is implyed by this text: *How unſearchable are thy judgements, and thy wayes paſt finding out!*

Let

Let us not therupon conclude, there is no ſuch *providence*: For no man ought to affirme there is neither *ſea*, nor *ſand*, becauſe he is ignorant of the *limits* of the Sea, and of the number of the ſands: ſeeing by the ſame rule, they might aſwell ſay that there is neither *man*, nor any other *living-creature*, becauſe they know not the number either of the *men*, or of the *living-creatures*.

Particular things are to us *infinite*: Things which are unto us *infinite*, and alſo *unknowne* unto us; and therefore, though *univerſalls* may be (oftentimes) comprehended by our underſtanding,

derſtanding, yet *individualls* are not poſſibly comprehenſible thereby.

There is in every man a *double difference*; one in reſpect of other men; and another in reſpect of himſelfe: yea, there is in every *man* great differences, and alterations even in reſpect of *himſelfe*. Every day; as, *in the maner of his life*; in *his actions*, (or affaires) in *his neceſsities*, in *his deſires*; and in all things which doe happen, or pertaine unto him.

It is not much otherwiſe with an *irrationall creature*; for according to the manifold neceſſities, and occaſions thereof, it is very ſpeedily caried hither

ther and thither; and ſoon altered againe as other opportunities require.

Theſe things conſidered, that *Providence* which is able to keep a continuall courſe with every one of thoſe infinite and incomprehenſible *particulars* (which are ſo *differing* alſo, ſo *changeable*, and of ſo many faſhions) muſt needs be ſuch a *Providence* as is agreeable to all, and every one of thoſe *individualls*: and extended more infinitely then thoſe things are, whereunto it ſhould reach.

And if this *Providence* muſt be ſo fit, and ſo infinite in regard of the infinite difference of *individualls*:

dualls : no doubt but the *reaſon* and method of this *Providence* is as *infinite*; and if it be *infinite*, it cannot poſſibly bee comprehended by us. And it becomes not us to deny that gracious *providence* which governes all things, becauſe our *ignorance* is unable to comprehend it. For thoſe things which wee ſuppoſe to be amiſſe, are knowne well enough unto the wiſdome of the *Creator*, to be well *ordered*.

Becauſe wee are ignorant of their occaſions, we cauſeleſly judge many things to be imprudently done; and that which chanceth unto us in other things, by reaſon of our ignorance,

ignorance, falleth out also in the workes of *providence*; for we doe after the same sort cõceive of those things which belong to *providence*; receiving by obscure likelihoods, and by conjectures, certaine *formes* or shadowes of the workes thereof, by such things as we have seene.

III. Wee say therefore, that some things are done by *Gods permission*; and this *permission* is of many sorts: For he sometime permits that even the *just man* shall fall into misery, to declare unto others, that *vertue* which is concealed as in *Iob*.

Hee doth also permit some absurd things; that by

by the act which appeareth to bee absurd, some great and wonderfull matter may bee brought to passe, as *the salvation of men by the Crosse.*

Hee permits likewise the blessed *Saints* to be afflicted for another end; as that they might not fall from a sincere conscience, and that the loftinesse of the minde might be abated; as when St. *Paul was buffetted by Satan.*

Sometimes also, one man is rejected, and left as desolate for a time; that others considering his case, might be instructed, and amended thereby. As in the example of *Lazarus* and the *rich man*; for, when

when we see any man afflicted, our hearts are naturally touched therewith, according as *Menander* hath very well expressed:

"*By seeing others feele the Rod,*
"*We tremble with a fear of GOD.*

Otherwhile, again, one man is afflicted for the glory of another; and neither for his owne sin, nor the sinne of his Parents: as, he that was blind from his birth, for the glorifying of the *Son of man.*

It is permitted also that some should be persecuted, to be a pattern of constancy unto others; and that when their glory is

exalted, others might be incouraged to ſuffer in the like caſe, in hope of the glory to come; and for the bleſſedneſſe which is expected after this life; as in the *Martyrs*, and in thoſe who have yeelded up their lives for their *Country*, for their *kinred*, or for their *maſters*.

Sect. 5.

I. *One may otherwhile be afflicted for the good of another, without infringing the* Juſtice *of divine* Providence. *Why* holy men *ſuffer bitter* deaths *and* perſecutions. II. Death, *or ſufferings are no diſadvãtages to* good men; *neither are the unlawful*

lawful actions of the wicked, justifiable, though Providence *convert thē to good ends.*

NOw, if any one thinke it againſt reaſon, that one man ſhould be afflicted for the amendment of another; let him know that this life, is (*not the perfection of mans happineſſe*) but a place of wreſtlings, and of ſtriving for maſtery, in reſpect of *Vertue*: And the greater the labours and ſufferings are, the more glorious Crown of Glory ſhall be obtained: becauſe the recompence of *Rewards*, is according to the meaſure of *Patience*.

Saint *Paul* was contented to undergoe the manifold afflictions and tribulations which he ſuffered, that he might obtain the greater, and more perfect Crown of a Conquerour: (*which he himſelf confeſſeth to be more then all our ſufferings can merit*) and therefore the works of *Providence* are juſtly and very decently performed.

A man may the better allow this to be ſo, (and conceive that GOD governs all things, ſo well and ſo fitly, that the nature of each thing cannot more deſire) if he doe but propoſe unto himſelf the beleeving of theſe two things which are generally

ly confeſſed among men: namely, that GOD, onely, is *good* and *wiſe*: For, in that he is *Good*, it is agreeable unto his *goodneſſe* to employ his *providence* over all things; and in that he is *wiſe*, he hath a regard to performe them wiſely and exactly: becauſe, if he uſed not his *Providence*, he could not be *good*: and if he did not uſe it *well*, hee could not be *wiſe*.

He therefore, that gives his minde to conſider diſcreetly of theſe matters, will not miſeſteem of any thing which is wrought by divine *providence*; neither ſpeak evill thereof without due examination: but rather accept of

all things, as exceeding well performed: and marvaile at their admirable decency and perfection, though the ignorant multitude judge according to a falſe appearance: For in conceiving otherwiſe, wee bring upon our heads (beſides the guilt of blaſphemy) great blame for our ſottiſh preſumption.

II. Now, in that wee ſay, *all things are done well*, wee juſtifie not the naughtineſſe of *men*, or of ſuch *evill works* as are in our power to doe, or leave undone; but, we ſpeak it of the works of *Providence* which are not in our power. For, if any man object

ject and say, How falls it out that *holy men* are put cruelly to death without desert? why, if they were unjustly condemned, did not Gods just *providence* hinder those murthers? and if they deserved to be so put to death, why are not they without blame who caused them to bee slaine?

To this we answer, that the murtherers of such men were injurious in slaying them; and that they which were so slain, were slain either for their desert, or their profit. Somtime deservingly, for evills committed by them in secret: and sometimes for their profit: Gods provi-

providence, thereby preventing either future sins, or worse mischiefes to come; and in those respects it was good for them that their life should be shortned. Thus was it with *Socrates*, and the *Saints*.

But, they who slew these men, did not slay them for any such cause; neither was it lawfully done; but out of the corruption of their owne minds, and for gain and robbery: For, the Act is in mans power; but what shall follow upon the Act, (as whether we shall be slain or no) is not as he will: neither is any death evill, except for sinne onely, as is manifest

niſeſt by the death of the *Saints*.

But, wicked men, although they die in their beds on a ſudden, and without pain, doe nevertheleſſe die an evill *death*, which brings them unto an evill *buriall*: I meane, to bee buried in their ſinne; yet whoſoever killeth any man murtherouſly, doth wickedly in ſo doing.

If hee killeth any one for that which deſerveth death; he is then to be accounted among *hangmen* and *executioners*. If it be for the gaining of ſome profit by them that are ſlaine, he is to be reputed among cruell and wicked

ked murtherers.

The like may be ſaid of them who murther their enemies, or oppreſſe them by extreame ſervitude, or uſe any manner of inhumane cruelty, againſt them whom they have overcome.

They alſo are as little to be juſtified, who ſeeke the inriching of themſelves, by extorting other mens goods: for, though it may be expedient for thoſe, from whom they were extorted, that they ſhould be deprived of them; yet, they which wreſted away more then their owne, were *unjuſt*, in ſo ſo doing. For, they take them out of a covetous

tous desire of those good, and not for that it was expedient for them, whō they dispossessed of such things.

Glory be to God.

FINIS.